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ABSTRACT

Francis Bacon has long been considered a significant figure in the Scientific
Revolution, but debate continues regarding the significance and quality of his
contribution. Although Bacon claimed to be developing a natural philosophical
movement, he contributed little to methodological or theoretical aspects of the work that
would eventually become modem science. Bacon's contributions should be evaluated
within the context of Renaissance humanism rather than modem science, to the extent
that in arguing for a tum to natural philosophy his aims were more consistent with the
broad societal goals of his fellow humanists than the more limited ambitions of those
pursuing natural philosophy. Bacon's methods were those of a skilled apologist,
thoroughly trained in rhetoric, arguing for the study of nature as the basis for a better
society. In arguing for the study of natural philosophy as the foundation for his Great
Instauration, Bacon used concepts and commonplaces culled from a range of ancient
texts, including schools both earlier and later than Plato and Aristotle. Among the ancient
philosophies whose influence on Bacon has been insufficiently studied is Stoicism, which
understood the cosmos as the embodiment and working out of reason, often identified as
god. Stoicism provided a way for Bacon to rationalize the study of nature as compatible
with the dominant Christian theology of the day. This dissertation examines the ways in
which Bacon's philosophical project relied on Stoicism, both as a source of rhetorical
commonplaces, and as a model for the synthetic and comprehensive philosophical system
he hoped to institute. Within the context of civic humanism, Bacon blended the Stoic
concept of nature as normative with the Renaissance commonplace of nature as a second
divine text to authorize the pursuit of natural philosophy. The wise men of Solomon's
House in Bacon's New Atlantis co_mbine aspects of the contemplative Stoic sage with the
humanist concept of the prudentia embodied in the vir bonus. I argue that the Royal
vu

Society is evidence of the success of Bacon's Great Instauration and that he helped create
the space in which such a collegial society committed to the study of nature could
develop.
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PREFACE

The availability of primary texts for this dissertation might be described as either
feast or famine. In the case of the works of Francis Bacon, there are so many different
editions that references in the secondary literature are sometimes difficult to locate. For
convenience, I have relied primarily upon John M. Robertson's anthology, Philosophical

Works of Francis Bacon, which contains the Advancement ofLearning and its Latin
translation, De augmentis scientiarum, the Novum Organum, the Essays, and a few of
Bacon's minor natural philosophical texts. References to this work are indicated by the
abbreviation PW, followed by the page numbers. I have also tried always to indicate
which of the philosophical texts is being cited. For the letters and other philosophical
texts that are not included in the Robertson anthology, I have provided a full citation.
As is noted in the text, many Stoic texts are no longer extant and are known only
by reference in other ancient texts. These Stoic fragments are available in a number of
collections, including Doxographi Graeci by Hans Diels and Stoicorum Veterum

Fragmenta by H. von Arnim. With the exception of extant works such those of Cicero,
Diogenese Laertius, Plutarch, and Seneca, I have relied on the English translation of
Greek and Latin fragments in The Hellenistic Philosophers by A. A Long and D. N.
Sedley. The translations are arranged by topic into chapters and given an alphabetical
designation. References to the translations of primary sources from this volume are
designated HP, followed by the chapter number and letter reference (e.g., HP 26A).
Citations of the annotations and other secondary material in this text follow the standard
MLA format for parenthetical citations.
Justus Lipsius's Physiologiae Stoicorum Libri Tres, L. Annaeo Senecae
is a primary representation of Seneca's Stoic natural philosophy in the Renaissance. This
text has not been translated into English and the translations here are mine.
Xl

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviations for Bacon's texts
Adv.

The Proficience and Advancement ofLearning, Divine and Human

de Aug

De dignitate et augmentis scientiarium

Inst. Mag.

lnstauratio Magno

NO

Novum Organum

PW

Philosophical Works ofFrancis Bacon

Abbreviations for Stoic texts
DL

Diogenes Laertius

De fin.

De finibus bonorum et malorum

HP

The Hellenistic Philosophers

Xll

INTRODUCTION

The period between the late sixteenth and early eighteenth centuries has been seen
as a critical time in the transformation of the Western mind from a Renaissance humanist
intellectual tradition, which privileged rhetoric as an epistemological architectonic, to a
modern, positivist world view, which privileges the scientific method as a way of
structuring our understanding of the world. Twentieth-century historians attempting to
write a history of science began to call this transformation the "scientific revolution"
because they viewed the changes associated with it as both novel and radical. According
to this history, the scientific revolution does not refer merely to methodological changes,
but involves profound alterations in the way human beings viewed themselves and their
place in the world. For example, during the Middle Ages and Renaissance, the accepted
view of the cosmos placed human beings at the middle of a Great Chain of Being,
inferior to God and the angels, but superior to animals, plants, and inanimate matter. Just
as humans imperfectly reflected God's perfect nature, the physical world reflected actions
in the human realm, so that disturbances in human society were mirrored in the natural
world. After the scientific revolution, which saw the establishment of a mechanistic
worldview, human beings have increasingly seen themselves as nature's subjects rather
than its masters. For example, in the twentieth century and beyond, genetic factors are
believed not only to determine physical characteristics, but to predispose one to certain
types of behavior as well. Because science is secured by the regularity of natural law and
the rigorous application of scientific method it suggests the availability of a kind of
certainty or "truth" and obviates the need for the arts of contingency that preceded it. It is
difficult to understate the significance and magnitude of the changes that began in the
sixteenth century, and in that sense the metaphor of revolution is an appropriate one.
However, to the extent that "revolution" also represents change that is an abrupt and
1

radical departure from what has gone before, the metaphor leads us to focus on the
differences between distinct eras rather than on their points of intersection and
commonality. One particularly significant consequence of using the metaphor of
revolution is its inadequacy to account for the ways "nonscientific" philosophies,
practices, or arts of earlier eras have contributed to the formation of what we now call
science.
Recently, historians of science have begun to question the accepted tradition that
the scientific revolution and have focused, instead, on the intersection of science and the
broader culture. In Leviathan and the Airpump, their exploration of the conflict between
Thomas Hobbes and Robert Boyle regarding experimental method, Steven Shapin and
Simon Shaffer argue that "there is a conditional relationship between the nature of the
polity occupied by scientific intellectuals and the nature of the wider polity" (332). There
is no question that there is a conditional relationship between and the wider polity and
any number of institutions, such as religion or education, as well as science. In the case of
the development of modem science, Renaissance humanism was among the most
powerful influences on the "wider polity" within which the "polity occupied by scientific
intellectuals" developed. It is one thing, however, for a new institution to gain authority
among a group of adherents, but quite another for it to gain authority within the wider
culture. It is often the case that a significant persuasive effort is required to open a space
within the larger polity for a new institution to develop. Certainly, humanism, to the
extent that it recovered ancient texts of all kinds, provided much of the fuel that impelled
this so-called revolution by inserting many "new" ideas into the culture of the Middle
Ages. These new ideas included natural philosophy as well as moral and ethical
philosophies. 1 In this sense, humanism created the conditions in which modem science
1
N.B. It should be noted that humanism is not, itself, a philosophy, nor does the curriculum that is the
unifying element of humanism include philosophy. See Oskar Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and Its

2

could begin to develop. In the case of the scientific revolution, the humanist project also
provided the tools, specifically, the art of rhetoric, by which natural philosophers and
those who were sympathetic to their work began to achieve epistemological legitimacy
for their ideas. Thus, understanding the epistemological change that has been called the
scientific revolution requires a fuller picture of the ways that humanists both planted and
nurtured the seeds for the development of modern science.
Francis Bacon has long been considered a significant figure in the scientific
revolution, but there continues to be much debate regarding the significance and quality
of his contribution. Bacon has been called by some a "father" of science, while others
have characterized his contributions to modern science as a "joke. "2 I argue that this
disparity in evaluations of his work arises in part as a result of examining his ideas from
the perspective of modern science, rather than attempting to understand his work in terms
of his own era. Bacon, himself, is responsible for much of the difficulty in evaluating his
contributions. Although he claimed to be developing a natural philosophical movement,
he contributed very little to the theoretical aspects of the work that would eventually
become modern science. In addition, his insistence upon the novelty of his ideas belied
his debts to previous philosophical systems. Bacon's contributions should be evaluated as
those of a humanist rather than those of a philosopher, to the extent that in arguing for a
turn to natural philosophy his goals were more consistent with those of his fellow
humanists than the more limited ambitions of those who were actually involved in the
investigation of the natural world. While he certainly attempted to influence the "polity
occupied by scientific intellectuals," to use Shapin and Shaffer's terms, his primary
achievements were in influencing the "wider polity." His methods were not those of the
natural philosopher, but those of a skilled apologist, thoroughly trained in rhetoric,
Sources, for an extended discussion of humanism. This does not, however, negate the fact that many of the
texts recovered by humanists were philosophical.
2
Alexandre Koyre is a primary critic of Bacon. See Galileo Studies, 39, n. 6.
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arguing for the study of nature as the basis for a better society.
In making the case for the study of natural philosophy, Bacon used concepts and
commonplaces from the whole range of ancient texts, from histories to philosophies. He
not only culled concepts from the most famous thinkers, such as Plato, Aristotle, and
Cicero, but deployed ideas from many other ancient Greek and Roman natural
philosophers, including several atomists from Democritus to the Epicureans. Among the
ancient philosophies whose influence on Bacon has been insufficiently studied is that of
the Stoics, particularly the philosophical works of Seneca, the Roman dramatist, moralist,
and philosopher. Stoicism, which is based on the notion that reason is the immanent and
guiding force of nature, held many concepts that were amenable for use of early modem
natural philosophers. Historian William Bouwsma has argued that Renaissance Stoicism
should be understood to have two strains, Augustinian and Stoic, the latter of which is
particularly concerned with the perfection of human rationality, while the former is more
closely allied with Augustine's theological concerns. This dissertation examines the ways
in which Bacon's philosophical project relied heavily on Stoic humanism, both as a
source of rhetorical commonplaces, and as a model for the kind of syncretic and
comprehensive philosophical system he hoped to institute.
Traditional narratives of the scientific revolution and of humanism have suggested
that the two are incompatible with one another. Chapter One, "The Humanist Background
to the Scientific Revolution," reviews the historical literature on the scientific revolution
and humanism. I argue that the metaphor of "scientific revolution," denoting as it does
radical and sudden change, obscures the full range of the epistemological complexity that
characterized the late Renaissance and early modem periods. Most twentieth-century
narratives of the scientific revolution have focused primarily on the internal history of
science, ignoring the ways in which humanism helped to make a space within the broader
culture for natural philosophy to develop. I argue that the philosophical works of Francis
4

Bacon offer an opportunity to study the ways in which humanism served as an incubator
for the nascent practices that would become modern science. Histories that have
portrayed Bacon as anti-humanist have not recognized the ways in which the ancient
philosophy of Stoicism provided a model for Bacon's "active" science and was a source
of commonplaces that allowed him to reconcile a number of cultural conflicts. Although
many twentieth-century narratives of the scientific revolution have largely represented it
as a triumph of Platonism over Aristotelianism, the philosophical background of the
Renaissance was much more complex than these narratives suggest. I build upon
William Bouwsma's argument that Renaissance humanism comprised two specific
strains, one of which was heavily influenced by ancient Stoicism. I summarize the basic
tenets of Stoicism, which was transmitted directly through ancient texts recovered by the
humanists and indirectly through Christian theology, and examine the ways in which the
philosophy influenced the development of Renaissance thought.
Bacon recognized that education was the primary vector through which humanist
values and ideas were disseminated throughout the culture. His first philosophical work
and the one that he says constitutes the first part of his Instauratio Magno was The

Advancement ofLearning in which he describes a complete reformation of learning,
including institutional and curricular reform. In Chapter Two, "Advancing the New
Philosophy Through Humanist Institutions: The Influence of Stoic Humanism on Bacon's
New Philosophy," I argue that the comprehensive and syncretic nature of Stoicism
provides a model for the comprehensive educational system that Bacon proposed. This
educational system, which is founded upon natural philosophy and is organized according
to a model of faculty psychology that emphasizes reason as an organizing principle,
follows Stoic epistemological principles. I argue that Bacon's rationale for his inductive
method, which he describes as a "kind of logic," is founded on concepts from Stoic
epistemology. The method itself is not particularly successful because it relies on the only
5

art with which Bacon himself was actually familiar, the art of rhetoric. While Bacon's
method per se is not effective, his argument for the study of nature, i.e. "things
themselves," is ultimately successful. I also argue that the "universality" that Bacon
claims for his method and that he demonstrates in his Essays is related to the Stoic view
of an organic, systematic, and comprehensive philosophy.
Twentieth-century historians have represented Bacon's "plain style" as "anti
humanist" and "anti-rhetorical." However, when considered within the broad and diverse
context of Renaissance discourse, Bacon's rhetorical practice was not radically out of
step with that of his contemporaries, nor is it so modern that later readers find it more
familiar than that of his contemporaries. What is unique in Bacon's theories of discourse,
however, is the degree to which he situates rhetoric within his understanding of human
psychology. In Chapter Three, "Stoic Influence on Bacon's Rhetoric and Discourse," I
argue that when viewed within its appropriate context of the Stoic strain of Renaissance
humanism, Bacon's discursive theory is neither anti-humanist nor anti-rhetorical, but is
consonant with the Stoic linguistic theories and with the values, goals, and practices of
civic humanism. I analyze Bacon's lnstauratio Magno as a rhetorical "map" of the
intellectual processes involved in his reform of learning.
In the fragmentary New Atlantis, Bacon presents a society in which his ideas are
realized. At the center of this society is a philosophical institution in which educated men
are engaged in scientific studies that are intended to benefit the society. At the center of
this institution is a model of a wise natural philosopher. The concept of the wise man or
sage is one that is shared by Renaissance humanism and Stoic philosophy, although the
concept of the wise man in humanism differs in significant ways from that described in
Stoic philosophy. In Chapter Four, "The Stoic Sage in the House of Solomon," I argue
that the philosophers of the House of Solomon, who are primarily engaged in empirical
and experimental studies, are examples of the Baconian concept of the sage. The well6

ordered nature of Bacon's imagined society demonstrates his view that the Stoic ideal of
behaving appropriately in accordance with nature must be combined with the humanist
value of utility to society. Further, the sage, as Bacon conceptualizes him, is one who
fully integrates, or "embodies" all aspects of the arts: practical, theoretical, and
productive.
In closing, I examine Bacon's influence, not in the twenty-first century, but in an
era much closer to his own. I argue that the Royal Society is evidence of the success of
Bacon's Great Instauration and that he succeeded in creating the space in which such a
collegial society committed to the study of the natural world could safely exist. What has
been called the scientific revolution could only happen because a space for it to occur
was opened by those like Francis Bacon, skilled in the art of rhetoric and operating within
a humanist matrix. Bacon blended the Stoic attitude of nature as normative with the
notion that nature was a second divine text and with the values of civic humanism to
authorize the pursuit of natural philosophy.

7

CHAPTER ONE
THE HUMANIST BACKGROUND TO THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION

"Bacon, the founder of modem science" is a joke and a bad one at that,
that one can still find in the textbooks. In fact Bacon understood nothing
about science. He was credulous and completely uncritical. His manner of
thinking was closer to alchemy and magic (he believed in 'sympathies'),
in short to that of a primitive or to a thinker of the Renaissance than to that
of a Galileo or even a scholastic.
-Alexandre Koyre3

The new-found land Bacon sighted was not something to be won in a
generation or by machines alone. It would have to be drawn slowly, by
infinite and continuing effort, out of minds whose dreams must rise
superior to the existing world and shape that world by understanding of its
laws into something more consistent with man's better nature . . . . Bacon's
science, as he formulated it, was to have taken account of man himself and
to have studied particularly the ethical heights to which individuals, and
perhaps after them the mass might attain. His "second world" as his late
fragment, The New Atlantis, indicates, was to be a world of men
transformed, not merely as we know them amidst the machines of the
twentieth century. Thus parts of Bacon's dream lie beyond us still. . . . It
was his task to summon the wise men, not for one day's meeting or
contention, not to build a philosophy of permanence under whose shadow
3

Galileo Studies, 39, n. 6.
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small men might sit and argue, but to leave, instead, a philosophy forever
and deliberately unfinished-not, as he so ably put it, as a belief to be held
but rather as a work to be done.
-Loren Eiseley4

The period between the latter part of the sixteenth century and the end of the
eighteenth century comprised a critical time in the transformation of the Western
intellectual tradition from a Renaissance humanist tradition, which privileged rhetoric as
a means of dealing with cultural issues, to a modem, rational, and positivistic world view
that privileges "science" as a way of gaining objective information that can be used to
understand the world.5 Simply put, during the early modem period, the focus of
intellectual efforts changed from one that emphasized what "ought" to be done to one
concerned with what "is. "6 This change was so momentous and so pervasive that it came
to be known by the middle of the twentieth century as the "scientific revolution," the
nature and extent of which continues to be debated at the beginning of the twenty-first
century. In a similar fashion, Francis Bacon' s role in the scientific revolution has been the
subject of continuing debate, as the two passages at the beginning of this chapter suggest.
4

Francis Bacon and the Modern Dilemma 1 4- 1 6.
There is considerable slippage in the names applied to the historical periods under consideration here.
Most troublesome is the term Renaissance, which is reckoned to have begun quite early in Italy and arrived
in northern Europe and England, the subject of this dissertation, quite a b it later. Generally, I have used the
term medieval to refer to the period between the fall of Roman empire and the end of the thirteenth century,
but I am primarily concerned with Scho lasticism and its emphasis on Aristotelian dialectic as an
epistemological architectonic; Renaissance refers to the period from 1 300 to the end of the sixteenth
century, which saw the rise of humanism with its emphasis on rhetoric as the preeminent epistemological
art; early modern era refers to the period from 1 600 to 1 800 during which the new philosophy was
established. The life of Francis Bacon ( 1 56 1 - 1 626) began in the late Renaissance and ended in the early
modern period, and his works in many ways reflect the intellectual ferment of this transitional period.
,
6
The notion that the change from humanism to science is a move from concern with "ought' to "is" is a
twentieth century commonplace used to describe the move from a teleological to an ontological world
view. See, for example, Wayne Booth's use of this commonplace in his critique of positivism and
"irrationalism," Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric ofAssent. See also Victoria Kahn, Rhetoric, Prudence,
and Skepticism in the Renaissance.
5
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Scientist Loren Eiseley praises Bacon as a great innovator and prophet of science, as "the
man who saw through time" (28), while historian of science Alexandre Koyre, in more
generous moments, accepts Bacon's description of himself as a "buccinator,"7 or herald
of science (Galileo Studies 39), but at other times, insists that labeling him as a scientist
is a "joke" (39, n6). While Bacon's influence on the development of early modem
science is certainly open to question, both views of Bacon reflect the perspective of those
inside an institutionalized science that did not fully emerge until more than one hundred
years after Bacon's death. Eisley's extravagant praise is justified by a general
correspondence between the prevailing twentieth-century narrative of the development of
modem science and Bacon's description of a productive natural philosophy, despite the
fact that Bacon's own inductive method is not known to have been used to any great
degree by anyone but Bacon himself. It is true, as Koyre claims, that Bacon was not a
scientist in any sense that we would recognize today. He may have dabbled at
experimental science, but he made no significant contributions in any area of scientific
endeavor. 8 He was not significantly involved in the new experimental natural philosophy,
nor did he help to develop the mathematical and theoretical aspects of modem science. It
is also true that Bacon's judgments about the work of other natural philosophers were not
always accurate. 9
7

The term "buccinator" was Bacon's own (buccinator novi temporis). See Brian Vickers' discussion of the
metaphors Bacon used to describe the prophetic nature of his enterprise in Francis Bacon and Renaissance
Prose 3-5 . Koyre' s understanding of the term "buccinator" would not likely coincide with Bacon's. For
Koyre, Bacon was merely a buccinator of science; for Bacon, with his Renaissance sensib ilities of the
fower of language, to announce the arrival of a new philosophical age was, in a sense, to make it so.
Koyre's dismissal of the view that Bacon was a scientist is perhaps buttressed by the standard story of the
end of Bacon's life that he died of a cold or pneumonia contracted while stuffing dead a chicken with snow
as part of an impromptu experiment to determine the possibility of using cold as a food preservative.
Jardine and Stew� in their recent biography. suggest that the story is apocryphal and that the cold was,
instead, a result of his experimenting with nitre or some other chemical to cure a recurring condition. It
seems clear, however, that whatever h is experiments were, they were neither executed methodically nor
documented.
9
According to Brian Vickers, "Bacon was unaware of many of the new developments of his age and when
he did hear of them he rejected them out of hand to return to the traditional theories-so he was either
ignorant of or indifferent to the work of Kepler, Copernicus, Galileo, Napier's logarithms, Harvey's
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However, Koyre' s judgments are based on criteria of modem science that did not exist
when Bacon was writing in the seventeenth century. Implicit in Koyre' s view of Bacon as
a buccinator of science who "merely" announced its arrival are certain assumptions about
the degree to which theories and practices that we now call science had already attained
epistemological and cultural authority within early modern culture. Also implicit in
Koyre's willingness to grant Bacon' s status as a herald of modem science is the
assumption that the epistemological authority for early modern natural philosophy was
inherent in its theories and practices, so that the only task for Bacon and others like him
was to announce its arrival. However, the experience of Koyre ' s own candidate for the
father of modem science, Galileo Galilei, who suffered excommunication and house
arrest for advancing his theories regarding the heliocentric universe, demonstrates that the
knowledge advanced by early modern natural philosophers was not universally regarded
as self-evident.
The difficulty Galileo experienced in gaining acceptance for his theories
regarding celestial mechanics illustrates certain epistemological conflicts of the
Renaissance and early modern periods, consideration of which is necessary for
delineating Bacon' s contribution to the development of modem science. Galileo's model
of a heliocentric universe was controversial because it fundamentally contradicted a
cosmological model based upon ancient astronomical observations made without benefit
of technological aids and buttressed by theology and Aristotelian natural philosophy,
which conceptualized the cosmos as a teleological creation in the process of actualizing
its potentiality . 10 However, many Renaissance thinkers privileged biblical authority and
discovery of the circulation of the blood, and William Gilbert's De Magnete, one of the few pieces of
empirical research in the Renaissance, which he rejected scornfully. Gilbert, he said, 'hath made
philosophy out of the observations of a loadstone' ." (Francis Bacon and Renaissance Prose 2). It is not
inconceivable that B acon's lack of appreciation for Galileo is in part responsible for Koyre's lack of
a�preciation of Bacon.
1
Steven Shapin provides a concise description of the Aristotelian background for Ptolemy's cosmology.
See The Scientific Revolution 1 7-3 0.
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the ideas of ancient thinkers over the new discoveries of their contemporaries. Thus,
regardless of the accuracy of Galileo's observations and calculations, or the validity of
his conclusions, and no matter how many individual adherents his theories gained, larger
cultural institutions, particularly the Catholic Church, resisted such radical theories.
Galileo, who was educated in the humanist tradition, attempted to use rhetorical
strategies 1 1 to make his ideas less threatening to those who were not disposed to accept
them but was unable to circumvent this institutional resistance. Galileo's experience
makes it is clear that as important as it is to understand the development of science as an
institution, it is equally important to understand how the knowledge and practices that we
now call science gained epistemological authority in a world in which religion and what
beliefs we would now call superstition were the lenses through which many viewed an
earth-centered universe.
The institutional resistance that Galileo attempted to circumvent was the focus of
Bacon's efforts regarding the advancement of natural philosophy, efforts which, despite
his claims to the contrary, were primarily rhetorical rather than theoretical. Bacon's
contribution to modern science ought to be seen, not as the discovery of new natural
knowledge, the truth of which was incontrovertible, but as the establishment of a
framework within which natural knowledge could be perceived as authoritative by the
larger culture. Bacon was eminently suited for such a task. By virtue of his education and
subsequent public life, Bacon was a quintessential humanist. He was trained in rhetoric
and committed to the active life of service to king and country, first as a solicitor, later as
a member of Parliament, and ultimately as Lord Chancellor, the most exalted official in
11

In Novelties in the Heavens, Jean Dietz Moss analyzes Galileo's attempts to situate his theories within
the rhetorical context of the Renaissance. Galileo published his theory of cosmology in the then-common
form of a dialogue, hoping that the controversial nature of his view might be diluted when presented as one
of a number of perspectives, including the traditional view. For more on Galileo's attempts to argue for his
ideas see also Mario Biagioli, Galileo, Courtier, and Dava Sobell, Galileo 's Daughter. Both examine the
ways in which Galileo 's work was both made possible and constrained by the wider polity of court and
church.
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the land, under King Jaines I. Bacon's early education focused on the classical texts 12
valued by the humanists. As an adult and a self-proclaimed philosopher, however, he
rejected both the Aristotelian dialectic of the scholastics and the copious rhetoric of the
humanists in favor of modes of thought and communication that were more appropriate
for his interest in natural philosophy. This does not mean that he rejected classical
philosophy and rhetoric altogether. Classical ideas informed Bacon's system for natural
philosophy. Rather than being a rejection of classical philosophies, his new philosophy is
an eclectic blend of ideas and concepts from the most ancient pre-Socratic Greek
philosophers and more recent Greek and Roman philosophies such as Epicureanism and
Stoicism. In addition, Bacon's practice of rhetoric is as closely tied to classical models as
was the copious Ciceronian rhetoric he rejected, and his reform of learning owes as much
to classical thought as did the traditional humanistic model. Along with many of his
contemporaries Bacon rejected Cicero's writings as the ideal for eloquent discourse,
imitating instead the rhetorical models of the Roman writers Tacitus, Marcus Aurelius,
and Seneca, all of whom were Stoics. Bacon's imitation of these rhetorical models is not
merely stylistic, however. In the Renaissance, eloquence was not seen as mere style, but

reflected the character of the speaker. For the Stoics, style was directly related to thought.
Bacon's adoption of Stoic style brought with it a whole set of beliefs about the
relationship between language, thought, and nature.
Koyre is ultimately correct that Bacon's method is of little or no value. While
Bacon's Novum Organum presents an elaborate justification and explication of his .
method, it is essentially an empty vessel that is not particularly worthy. However his
critique of the epistemological status quo and justification of natural philosophy as a

12

At Oxford, Bacon's education included the works of Livy, Caesar, Sallust, Demosthenes' Orations,
Homer's Iliad, Cicero' s Complete Works, and the rhetorical handbook, the Ad Herrenium. He also studied
Plato, Aristotle, Hermogenes, and Xenophon, Greek grammar and logic (Jardine & Stewart 35).
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means of discovering truth and improving the human condition were both effective and
eloquent. In sum, Bacon's contribution to the scientific revolution was primarily
persuasive, deploying ancient ideas and rhetorical practices of the humanist tradition to
the end of establishing nature as a source of authoritative and reliable knowledge, which
could in turn serve as a foundation for making moral, ethical, and political judgments and
for materially improving the human situation. If Bacon did ·not participate in the
"scientific revolution," per se, he certainly helped to create a space within which it could
occur, lending his exceptional rhetorical ability to deploying ancient ideas in the cause of
reviving natural philosophy.

Renaissance Humanism

If we are to understand how the ideas and practices that are the precursors of
modem science, many of which directly contradicted accepted ways of knowing, came to
have epistemological authority during the early modem period, it is necessary to examine
the intellectual context of the time. In particular, it is important to understand the
influence of Renaissance humanism on the formation of European culture. To a large
degree, the Renaissance derived its energy from the conflict between medieval attitudes
and beliefs and the "new'' attitudes and beliefs contained in ancient texts recovered by
individuals whom we now call humanists. The earliest humanists, beginning with
Francesco Petrarch, 1 3 contributed to the intellectual ferment of the Renaissance through
the recovery and dissemination of classical Greek and Roman texts. 1 4 Petrarch, who

1 3 Though Petrarch is known today primarily as the author of a sequence of sonnets, he is perhaps the
prototypical humanist. He sponsored emissaries who went throughout Europe and the Hellenistic world
looking for manuscripts of ancient texts.
14
The literature of humanism is vast. A number of anthologies provide an overview of its history, faces,
and extent. See, for example, Albert Rabil's three-volume work, Renaissance Humanism. See also The
Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Humanism, ed. Jill Kray.
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welcomed these ancient texts as a breath of fresh air in the stale intellectual atmosphere
of the late medieval era, wrote:
I associate greedily with our ancients in the only way I can, and I forget
most willingly those among whom an evil star decrees that I must live.
And I strain all the powers of my mind to flee the modems and to seek the
ancients, because the sight of my contemporaries offends me deeply while
the remembrance of the noble deeds and glorious names of the past fills
me with . . . incredible delight. 1 5
While it is perhaps an exaggeration to suggest that the medieval era was a time of
ignorance and superstition, as the erstwhile term "dark ages" might suggest, it was a time
that valued stability more than change. 16 Medieval epistemology was secured by
remnants of ancient learning, by the knowledge revealed in divine texts, and by the
theological tradition handed down from the early church fathers. The social structure,
which was grounded in the same traditional epistemology, was stable to the point of
rigidity. Intellectual activity, which was largely cloistered within the church, the newly
founded universities, or professions such as law, consisted in large part of applying
Aristotelian categorical logic to particular cases. 17 The recovery of ancient texts by the
early humanists, however, challenged the stable attitudes and beliefs of medieval
Europeans.

The term humanism is a neologism coined in 1 808 by German educator F.

J. Niethammer to distinguish the emphasis in secondary education upon classical
languages and literatures from new scientific education. 18 However, the term is derived
15
16

Four Dialogues/or Scholars. 1 5 7, n. 24 .
See Johan Huizinga, The. Waning ofthe Middle Ages, for an extended description of the late Middle

Ages. Huizinga does not see the era as an intermediate period between the fall of the Roman Empire and
the European Renaissance, but as a distinct period with its own characteristics.
17
This is, of course, an oversimp lification. There was, for example, a resurgence of interest in natural
philosophy, as well as interest in what are now called pseudo-sciences, alchemy and astrology, all of which
are immediate antecedents of the renaissance ofnatural philosophy.
18
It is perhaps ironic that the term humanism only came into use as the practices it names were beginning
to wane. Peter Burke suggests that the term was coined in Germany at a time when the study of the classics
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from a much older word, humanist (Latin humanista), itself coined, apparently as
university slang, during the Renaissance from the ancient term studia humanitatis, which
was used by Cicero and others to describe the liberal education of the Hellenistic age.
During the late quattrocento, studia humanitatis referred specifically to a program of
study that included grammar, rhetoric, history, poetry, and moral philosophy. The studia
humanitatis included the study of Latin, and to a lesser extent, Greek texts. 1 9 This rather
narrow definition of humanism is the only acceptable one, according to P.O. Kristeller,
who rejects the tendency to expand the definition to include new attitudes toward
humankind, or to project it backwards to include those medieval scholastics whose work
was based on ancient Greek texts. Kristeller argues that since the studia humanitatis
excludes all philosophy except moral philosophy, as well as other fields such as
mathematics and law, it is desirable to limit the definition to what can be connected to
this particular range of studies. Though Kristeller's limited definition of humanism may
be technically correct, it does not adequately explain the pervasive influence of
humanism in the Renaissance. In reacting to those who would describe humanism overly
broadly, or who would mingle the effects of humanism with other influences such as
changes in the political environment, Kristeller risks understating the case. 20

was being excised from curricula in the gymnasia in order to make room for the study of the natural
sciences (The European Renaissance 233-234). See also Paul Oskar Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and
Its Sources for further discussion of the origin of the term.
19
This list of subjects is P.O. Kristeller's. The standard curriculum for an education in the arts included
two parts: the trivium included three arts of verbal discourse, grammar, logic, and rhetoric; the quadrivium
included four mathematical disciplines, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music. For a brief but
thorough discussion of the trivium and quadrivium, see William Bouwsma, The Culture ofRenaissance
Humanism 8. For a comprehensive discussion of the history of education during the late medieval period
and Renaissance, see James Bowen, A History of Western Education, Vol. II: Civilization of Europe Sixth
to Sixteenth Century. For the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic, see Peter Mack, Renaissance
Argument: Valla and Agricola in the Traditions ofRhetoric and Dialectic.
2
For further discussion of the limitations of Kristeller's definition of humanism, see Hanna Gray
"Renaissance Humanism: The Pursuit of Eloquence," 499-500; also, Victoria Kahn, 1 98, n. 4. Kristeller' s
rigorous definition may also reflect the influence of the reductionism of positivistic modern science on
other, non-scientific disciplines.
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Nicholas Mann describes the pervasiveness of the influence of humanism's
scholarly concern with the textual legacy of antiquity, which
involves above all the rediscovery and study of ancient Greek and Roman
texts, the restoration and interpretation of them and the assimilation of the
ideas and values that they contain. It ranges from an archaeological
interest in the remains of the past to a highly focused philological attention
to the details of all manner of written records-from inscriptions to epic
poems-but comes to pervade . . . almost all areas of post-medieval
culture, including theology, philosophy, political thought, jurisprudence,
medicine, mathematics and the creative arts. Grounded in . . . learned
research, it rapidly found expression in teaching. And in this way it was to
become the embodiment of, and vehicle for, that very classical tradition
that is the most fundamental aspect of the continuity of European cultural
and intellectual history. (2)
While it is true that, as Kristeller argues, humanism was primarily an educational
movement, its influence was much more far-reaching. First, as Mann argues, humanism
was the vehicle by which large numbers of ancient texts were recovered and the ideas
they contained were disseminated throughout Western culture from the twelfth century
onward. Second, those who were educated in the humanist system, which included
grammar schools as well as universities, went out into the world to become the courtiers,
parliamentarians, foreign emissaries, local officials, and mercantilists who created the
culture of the Renaissance. Third, and most importantly to this study, humanism provided
the rhetorical context and the skills by which early modern thinkers, such as Francis
Bacon, helped to authorize a variety of cultural changes that were inspired, in part, by
these "new" ideas.
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Hans Baron's understanding of humanism, rather than being curricularly defined
as is K.risteller' s, is related to the activities of those individuals whom he considered to be
humanists. Baron coined the term "civic humanism" to differentiate it from the literary
humanism of Petrarch and his contemporaries. This new civic humanism was a response
to the crisis in Florentine government and instantiated by Salutati's book On the Origin of
the City of Florence and On Her Renowned Citizens. From the end of the thirteenth
century, according to Baron,
the ever-recurring leitmotifs in the humanistic philosophy of life were the
superiority of the vita activa over the "selfish" withdrawal into scholarship
and contemplation [vita contemplativa]; the praise of the family as the
foundation of a sound society; and the argument that the perfect life is not
that of the "sage," but that of the citizen who, in addition to his studies,
consummates his humanitas by shouldering man's social duties, and by
serving his fellow-citizens in public office. (7)
While Baron's concept of civic humanism is more contextualized than Kristeller's, it too
is limited by its identification with the city of Florence and failure to account for the
spread of civic humanism to other locales. Nevertheless, his conceptualization of
humanism helps to explain why it is an engine of social and institutional change.
Although ancient texts represented for the humanists an escape from the arid intellectual
tradition of scholasticism, it would be a mistake to suggest that the move from an
emphasis on the vita contemplativa to the vita activa was complete. Petrarch's desire to
"associate with the ancients" rather than immersing himself in the civic life of
contemporary society is representative of the tension between these modes, one which
might be considered an essential tension of Renaissance humanism.
Like Kristeller, William Bouwsma has suggested that humanism must be
considered primarily a phenomenon of educational practice. However, because he
19

recognizes that education more than other social institutions is sensitive to social change
and that modifications to curricula may be taken as indicators of shifts in human values,
his view of humanism allows for a broader interpretation than either Kristeller's or
Baron's ( Culture of Renaissance Humanism 7). Certainly, the relationship between
humanist education and culture is an intimate and critical one. Bouwsma contrasts the
Renaissance humanist emphasis on the studia humanitatis to the medieval emphasis on
logic, natural philosophy, and metaphysics. Within the group of subjects designated as
the trivium (grammar, logic, and rhetoric), medieval education emphasized logic.
Renaissance humanists, however, were concerned with rhetoric and grammar, which
included philology and the study of literature, as well as the study of the structure of the
language. He characterizes that shift of emphasis as a move from a concern with testing
knowledge through the methods of logic to a concern with finding or discovering
knowledge from texts and communicating that knowledge to one's fellow citizens (7-9).
As Bouwsma suggests, it is important to recognize that Renaissance humanism was not a
coherent or monolithic institution and that it varied considerably even within Italy during
the trecento and quattrocento, undergoing even greater change as it made its way
throughout Europe.

The Scientific Revolution
During the Middle Ages and early Renaissance, natural phenomena, particularly
unnatural or catastrophic ones, were seen as mysteries to be interpreted rather than
explained because nature was believed to be subject to the actions of supernatural beings
and the vagaries of human behavior.2 1 While it is an overstatement to suggest that there
was a single view of nature, it is generally true that Europeans of the Middle Ages and
21

See Johan Huizinga's The Waning of the Middle Ages for a lengthy discussion of medieval European
attitudes regarding humans and nature.
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Renaissance saw nature as part of a hierarchical system, a "great chain of being,"22 that
extended from the celestial realm to the material world, in which humans enjoyed a
privileged position between God and angels and the lesser elements of nature such as
animals, plants, and inanimate matter. Any member of the chain was subject to those
above it and could be influenced by their actions. Raphael Holinshed's description of the
unnatural and monstrous consequences of the murder of King Duffe of Scotland (the
event which served as the source for Shakespeare's Macbeth),23 illustrates perfectly the
way in which these beliefs permeated the culture.
For the space of six moneths together, after this heinous murther thu�
committed, there appeered no sunne by day, nor moone by night in anie
part of the realme, but still was the skie couered with continuall clouds,
and sometimes such outragious winds arose, with lightenings and
tempests, that the people were in great feare of present destruction . . . .
Monstrous sights also that were seen within the Scotish kingdome
that yeere were these: horses in Louthian, being of singular beautie and
swiftnesse, did eate their owne flesh, and would in no wise taste anie other
meate. In Angus, there was a gentlewoman brought foorth a child without
eies, nose, hand, or foot. There was a sparhawke also strangled by an
owle. Neither was it anie less woonder that the sunne, as before is said,
was continuallie couered with clouds for six moneths space. But all men
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The concept of the great chain of being was discussed at length in Arthur 0. Lovejoy's book by that
name. See also E.M.W. Tilyard, The Elizabethan World Picture, which explores the implications of the
great chain of being on Elizabethan society. See Michel Foucault's The Order of Things for a less totalizing
representation of medieval and Renaissance worldviews and the changes that took place between these
eras.
23
This description was published in Raphael Holinshed's Chronicles ofEngland, Scotland and Ireland.
Cited by Waithe in Introduction to The Tragedy ofMacbeth 1 1 2 1 .
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understood that the abhominable murther of king Duffe was the cause
heereof. ( qtd. by Waithe in Introduction to The Tragedy ofMacbeth 1 12 1)
The events are medieval, but the description itself was published in 1 577 and again in
1 5 87 in an edition edited by John Hooker.
This anthropocentric view of nature was also reflected in the beliefs of natural
philosophers of the early Renaissance, who continued to hold to a model of the cosmos
advanced during second century of the Common Era by the Greek astronomer and
geographer Claudius Ptolemy. Ptolemy situated the earth at the center of a series of
concentric spheres, which rotated in perfect circles. Each successive sphere exhibited a
greater degree of perfection in its composition and inhabitants, with the most perfect
outer sphere being inhabited by God. Ptolemain cosmology was based in part on
observed experience but was also informed by ancient philosophy and the tenets of the
Judea-Christian religion. The Ptolemain model depends largely upon the physics of
Aristotle, who regarded the universe as matter in a state of unrealized potential moving
toward an unknown telos, or goal (Shapin, The Scientific Revolution 29-30).24 The appeal
of such a teleological orientation for a society so wholly dominated by Judea-Christian
theology is obvious. This cosmological model illustrates the ways in which natural
philosophies and theology were integrated with and mutually constitutive of one another.
In the early modem era, however, Ptolemain cosmology began to be challenged
by the results of empirical observation and renewed interest in mathematics. The Polish
prelate Nicolaus Copernicus was the first to posit a heliocentric universe. Copernicus's
theory was a result of his inability to reconcile mathematically the Ptolemain model with
his own observations of planetary orbits. Aware of the implications of his model for

24

For a comprehensive explanation of Aristotle's teleology and its implications for physics, see Guthrie,
vol. VI 106-1 29. For a brief explanation of the teleological nature of Aristotle's physics, see Shapin, The
Scientific Revolution 29-30.
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contemporary culture and concerned about the possible consequences, Copernicus
published abstracts of his mathematical work in 1 532, but did not publish the whole of
his theory until 1 543, the year of his death. Early in the seventeenth century, Galileo
Galilei, working from even more accurate observations made possible by his telescope,
confirmed Copernicus's theories and challenged the Ptolemain model even further when
he observed sun spots on the supposedly perfect and immutable surface of the sun.
While he found an audience for his work outside his native Italy, Galileo was eventually
imprisoned, tried, and excommunicated from the Roman Catholic church for his views
because in challenging Ptolemain cosmology, he also challenged the theology on which it
and, indeed, social, political, and religious hierarchies were founded.25
Similar challenges to the fundamental conceptualization of nature and its
concomitant hierarc1:tlcal social structure occurred throughout W estem culture during the
Renaissance, supplying the context in which modem science was formed. The newly
rediscovered texts of ancient philosophies, advances in technology, and social, political,
and cultural changes evoked powerful reactions from all classes. These reactions ranged
from skepticism to fear, from animosity to hatred, from disagreement to censure. In more
extreme cases, those who were advancing new and apparently heretical ideas faced
exileand even execution. John Donne's poem, "The First Anniversary" offers a
description of the intense anxieties at work in the seventeenth century:
And new philosophy calls all in doubt,
The element of fire is quite put out,
The sun is lost, and th'earth, and no man's wit
Can well direct him where to look for it.
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Recent scholars, notably Mario Biagioli, Galileo, Courtier, and Dava Sobel, Galileo 's Daughter, have
suggested that Galileo's trial had less to do with perceptions of his work as heretical and more to do with
political expediency for Pope Urban VIII, who had previously been Galileo's patron.
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And freely men confess that this world's spent,
When in the planets and the firmament
They seek so many new; they see that this
Is crumbled out again to his atomies.
'Tis all in pieces, all coherence gone,
All just supply, and all relation;
Prince, subject, father, son, are things forgot. . . (11. 203-21 4)
The "new philosophy" that Donne suggested was responsible for the cultural confusion of
his era has come, in subsequent ages, to be seen as the foundation of the "scientific
revolution."
During the first third of the twentieth century, perhaps as part of constructing a
modernist narrative in the wake of the trauma of World War I,26 historians and
philosophers began to examine epistemological shifts between the early seventeenth and
mid eighteenth centuries, which they called the "scientific revolution." However, the use
of the term "revolution" to refer to a change in knowledge during this era was not
completely new to the twentieth century. LB. Cohen27 contends that the concept has a
long tradition, and traces the use of the term "revolution" in the works of natural
philosophers, such as Francis Bacon and Joseph Priestley. 2 8 He contends that "from the
26

Philosopher Stephen Toulmin suggests that the scientific revolution is part of a retroactive narrative of
modernity that he dates to the first third of the twentieth century. See Cosmopolis, Toulmin's exploration of
modernity, 5-44.
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Cohen examines applications of the term "revolution" to development of modern science in Revolution
in Science 75- 1 0 1 , 473-569. See also H. Floris Cohen, The Scientific Revolution: A Historiographical
Inquiry; John R. R. Christie, "The Development of the Historiography of Science" in R, C. Olby, et al.,
Companion to the History ofModern Science 5-22; and David C. Lindberg, "Conceptions of the Scientific
Revolution from Bacon to Butterfield" in Lindberg & Westman, Reappraisals ofthe Scientific Revolution
1 -26.
28
It is unlikely, however, that in the seventeenth century, the term carried quite the same connotations as it
does today. According to Hanna Arendt, it was not until the end of the eighteenth century that "revolution"
gained its contemporary meaning of violent upheaval, "the notion that the course of history suddenly
begins anew, that an entirely new story, a story never known or told before is about to unfold" (2 1 ). Thus, it
is unlikely that the term carried quite the same meaning for these early natural philosophers as it does for
twentieth and twenty-first century historians of science. In fact, during the early modern period, revolution
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late seventeenth century onward, scientists and historians of science have used the
language of political revolution (or political warfare) to describe the progress of science"
(4 73). By the late eighteenth century, Cohen argues, the idea of a revolution in science
was fully established, as demonstrated in the works of historians Jean-Sylvain Bailly and
Jean Etienne Montucla, both of whom link Copernicus' reconfiguration of the universe to
the idea of revolution, though neither actually uses the term "Copernican revolution"
(498-99).
In the twentieth century, historians began using the term "scientific revolution" to
describe the epistemological changes that occurred during the early modern era. One of
the earliest examinations of the scientific revolution, was E. A. Burtt's The Metaphysical
Foundations ofModern Physical Science, published in 1 924. Burtt laments the way that
the scientific revolution resulted in a demotion of humankind's place in the universe and
characterizes the worldview of the Middle Ages as one in which
man was in every sense the centre of the universe. The whole world of
nature was believed to be teleologically subordinate to him and his eternal
destiny . . . . The prevailing world-view of this period was marked by a
deep and persistent assurance that man, with his hopes and ideals, was the
all-important, even controlling fact in the universe. (4)
This worldview underlay all inquiry and, as in the case of physics, the world was
interpreted through categories, which "developed in the attempt to throw into scientific
form the facts and relations observed in man's unaided sense-experience of the world and
the main uses which he made it serve" (5). According to Burtt, the scientific revolution
represents a shift from a teleological world view, in which humankind's journey to reach
its own potential was reflected in the events of the physical world, to an ontological
generally referred to cyclical repetition of events, such as the annual progression of the seasons.
Consequently, Bacon used the term "new instauration" to convey the novelty, magnitude, and
revolutionary nature of his thought.
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perspective, in which humankind was one of many equal factors in a mechanistic
universe:

[J]ust as it was thoroughly natural for medieval thinkers to view nature as
subservient to man 's knowledge, purpose and destiny; so now it has
become natural to view her as existing and operating in her own self
contained independence, and so far as man 's ultimate relation to her is
clear at all, to consider his knowledge and purpose somehow produced by
her, and his destiny wholly dependent on her. ( 1 0- 1 1 , italics in original)
Burtt views much of the course of modern philosophy as a succession of attempts to
recover humankind's spiritual sovereignty, the failure of which demonstrates the
overwhelming dominance of the new ontological world view ( 1 1). Burtt's regrets
regarding the consequences of the scientific revolution were soon replaced by the views
of other historians with more positive perspectives on these changes.
Exploring the metaphysical dimensions of the reform of Aristotelian physics,
Koyre describes the scientific revolution as a struggle so intense that it amounted to a
veritable "mutation" in human thought (Galileo Studies 1). Koyre suggests that the
scientific revolution is nothing less than the "destruction of the Cosmos . . . the most
profound revolution achieved or suffered by the human mind since the invention of the
Cosmos by the Greeks. It is a revolution so profound and so far-reaching that mankind
. . . for centuries did not grasp its bearing and its meaning" ("Galileo and Plato" 1 9-20). It
is a revolution that "changed the very framework and patterns of our thinking and of
which modern science and modem philosophy are, at the same time, the root and the
fruit" (Closed World v).29 Koyre considers the apex of the scientific revolution to be
29

Koyre's metaphors reveal a great deal about the way the modem era has come to view the scientific
revolution. The notion that modern science and philosophy are both the "root and fruit" of the scientific
revolution quite perfectly demonstrate the tautological conceptualization of modern scientific evidence as
"self-evident."
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Galileo's application of Archimedes' principles of mathematics to the study of
movement, transforming physics from a purely empirical science to a theoretical one,
liberating humankind from the "concrete world-space conception of the pre-Galilean
physics" into the "homogeneous and abstract space of Euclidian geometry" (1 9-20). For
Koyre, the scientific revolution is largely attributable to a triumph of the Platonic
worldview over the Aristotelian tradition. Ultimately, Koyre views the scientific
revolution as the result of a change in world view from a hierarchically ordered universe
whose different levels are subject to the control of those superior to them on the chain of
existence to an "open and infinitely extended" universe whose laws may be apprehended
through a "hypothetico-deductive mathematical treatment" ("Galileo and the Scientific
Revolution" 2).
Other historians of science have explored the nature of the scientific enterprise. C.
C. Gillespie sees modern science as contiguous with Greek natural philosophy to the
extent that it constitutes "conceptual thought mediating between consciousness and
nature" but claims that modern science is superior to the extent that it is "determinate
instead of speculative" (9). Where Greek science imposed subjective categories on
nature, the new science is "impersonal and objective" because, while it is founded upon
empirical observation, the data are expressed mathematically and tested experimentally
for their ability to predict outcomes and generate new concepts (9). Rupert Hall defines
natural science as "the conscious, systematic investigation of the phenomena revealed in
the human environment and in man himself objectively considered" (xi). Such
investigation is founded on the assumption that "there is in nature a regular consistency,
so that events are not merely vagarious, and therefore an order or pattern also, to which
events conform, capable of being apprehended by the human mind" (xi).
Perhaps the single most important concept underlying the scientific revolution is
the notion that there is a "regular consistency" in nature, for it is this concept that gave
27

epistemological authority to natural philosophy. Marie Boas Hall argues that this new
view, in which nature is characterized as "a vast and intricate piece of machinery,"
provided the "ingredient of rebellion from the past which is so often a necessary stimulus
to the creative thinker in any field" (3 1 ). She also suggests that the "concept of the world
as a machine gave a new meaning to the idea of a physical law; for laws of nature could
now be apprehended as expressions of the way in which God had built the machine and
the way he intended it to run. Hence physical laws had real meaning and existence, and
the task of the scientist was to find these laws out" ("The Machinery of Nature" 32). E. J.
Dijksterhuis, in The Mechanization ofthe World Picture, argues that this view is the very
foundation of modernity:
It was this conception that first led to the methods of research and
treatment that have caused the great flourishing of physical science . . . of
which we are reaping the fruit in our own day: experiment as the source of
knowledge, mathematical formulation as the descriptive medium,
mathematical deduction as the guiding principle in the search for new
phenomena to be verified by experimentation. It was the subsequent
success of this conception which made the development of technology
possible, thus leading to the sweeping industrialization without which the
life of modem society has long since become inconceivable. It was finally
the modes of thought inherent in this conception which penetrated into
philosophical thought about man and his place in the universe, and into
numerous special sciences which at first seemed to lack all contact with
the study of nature. Owing to all these factors the mechanization of
physical science has become much more than an internal question of
method in natural science;· it is a matter that affects the history of culture
as a whole. (3)
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These various views of the history of science, regardless of how narrow or broad
their claims for scientific "revolution," share one thing. They all hold to an "internalist"
view of science; that is, they are concerned with the internal development of science as an
autonomous knowledge-producing activity. According to philosopher of science Steve
Fuller, the "main historiographical assumption [of the internal history of science] is that
there is a natural trajectory to the development of science when it is regarded as a
knowledge producing activity" (Philosophy ofScience 7). Koyre puts it more poetically
when he describes the scientific revolution as a "world-bubble [that] grew and swelled
before it burst and merged with the space that surrounded it" (Closed World vi).
However, although it was never intended to do so, Koyre's metaphor also describes the
way that science is not quite so easily detached from the other cultural institutions that
surround it. The same is true for Marie Boas Hal's contention that physical laws had "real
meaning and existence" as "expressions of the way God had built the machine and had
intended it to run" (32). Duijksterhuis, too, when he describes the modernity of sciences
uses metaphors that are more appropriate to the humanist context than to that of science.
In order for the new natural philosophy to flourish, diverse reactions of theologians,
philosophers, and statesmen had to be addressed and overcome. In explaining the
emergence of science, it is important not merely to explain how science itself advanced,
but also to show how it came to be seen as an acceptable, authoritative endeavor within a
cultural context many of whose fundamental beliefs were directly contradicted by its
findings. In other words, we must account not only for the development of "science," but
for its epistemological and institutional positioning within the larger culture.
In contrast to intemalist views of the history of modem science, externalist
histories of science examine the relationship between science and society. The extemalist
view is concerned with identifying the cultural phenomena that led to the development of
modern science. Among the earliest of the histories written from the extemalist
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perspective are that of Soviet historian Boris Hessen, The Social and Economic Roots of
Newton 's 'Principia ', published in 1 93 1, and The Social Function ofScience, published
in 1 939 by English Marxist historian J. D. Bernal. Both works draw correlations between
elements of the economic and cultural context of the early modern period and the
progress of science. 3 0 Sociologist Robert K. Merton in his 1 93 8 Science, Technology, and
Society in Seventeenth Century England argued that the development of modern science
in the seventeenth century was linked to the rise of Protestantism, particularly of
Puritanism. More recently, Frances Yates' studies of the Hermetic Corpus and its
influence on philosophers of the early modern period such as Copernicus and Newton,
who are revered for their contributions to the formation of a rational, positivistic science,
have called into question the integrity of seventeenth century "science." 3 1
By the turn of the twentieth century, extemalist views of the scientific revolution
have come to question whether such a phenomenon may legitimately be said to have
occurred. Steven Shapin begins his sociological examination of these changes, The
Scientific Revolution, with the oxymoronic assertion, "(t]here was no such thing as the
Scientific Revolution, and this is a book about it" (1). 3 2 Shapin's account of the move to
science in the early modern era recognizes the degree to which what is now called
"science" - an institution that, since the early twentieth century, has often been
portrayed as being isolated from the arena of ordinary human activity by its objective
methodology - remains a socially and historically situated institution. According to
3 0 Porter contends that the work of Hessen and Bernal are often dismissed by historians of science as

"vulgar Marxism" because they lack critical perspective (33-39).
3 1 In Yates's view, intemalist histories of science have failed to interrogate the influence of disciplines that
have, in subsequent eras, come to be seen as "pseudo-sciences''. She has investigated the influence of the
Hermetic corpus in a number of texts, including Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition, 1 964, The
Rosacrucian Enlightenment, 1 972, and The Occult Philosophy in the Elizabethan Age, 1 979.
3 2 See also Shapin The Social History a/Truth and Shapin and Shaffer, Leviathan and the A ir Pump. For
other similar views, see Nature and Society in Historical Context, ed. by Mikulas Teisch, Roy Porter, and
Bo Gustafsson; see also Scientific Renaissance in National Context, ed. by Roy Porter and Mikulas Teisch.

30

Shapin, the scientific revolution is characterized by four changes in the way early
moderns viewed knowledge: 1) metaphors of mechanization were increasingly used to
describe natural processes and occurrences; 2) humans increasingly saw themselves as
separate from their objects of study in the natural world, particularly as related to
distinctions between human experience of the natural world and explanations of that
world; 3) epistemological practices were methodized with the end of objectifying
knowledge, i.e., preventing human subjectivity from tainting scientific knowledge; and 4)
early moderns began to realize their humanistic impulse to put objective knowledge to
work for the benefit of human society ( 12-14).
Because he maps the place of science within the larger culture, Shapin's account
of the scientific revolution helps to clarify the intellectual terrain of the early modern era.
He recognizes that the new epistemology arose out of and was enabled by activities
unrelated to the intellectual practices we now call science, activities related to the
Renaissance passion for recovering ancient knowledge. He suggests, for example, that the
humanist recovery of ancient texts spurred the practice of natural philosophy as a way of
verifying ancient "truth" (75-76). Shapin also recognizes that seventeenth-century
attempts to change beliefs about nature and the means for securing such beliefs, were not
incidental but self-conscious and deliberate (75). Finally, he explores ways in which
"facts" came to be constructed during the seventeenth century, 33 and acknowledges that
practitioners used "social and linguistic techniques" (84) to achieve adherence to these
facts. In Leviathan and the Air-Pump, a case study of controversy surrounding Robert
Boyle's experiments with air pump, Shapin and Simon Shaffer identify three points of
interaction between the progress of science and politics:

33

See 84ff.
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First, scientific practitioners have created, selected, and maintained a
polity within which they operate; second, the intellectual product made
within that polity has become an element in political activity of the state;
third, there is a conditional relationship between the nature of the polity
occupied by scientific intellectuals and the nature of the wider polity.
(332)
Because they begin with the scientific polity, however, Shapin and Shaffer do not explore
the means by which space was made within the wider polity for "scientific" activity to
take place. Moreover, though Shapin recognizes that it was influential in the development
of early modem science, he defines humanism merely as a concern with recovering
ancient knowledge by restoring ancient texts corrupted by medieval copyists to a pristine
condition (75-76). Shapin, like many others, fails to examine how the culture of
Renaissance humanism enabled the development and expansion of nascent scientific
institutions. This failure to examine the role humanism played as a context in which
modem science could be formed has led historians to conclude that these two systems
had opposing trajectories, with humanism declining as science arose. In particular, it is
important to understand the impact of the linguistic and rhetorical practices of
Renaissance humanists in authorizing early modem science as a legitimate intellectual
activity. 34

The Decline of Humanism and the Rise of Science

Many historical accounts of humanism have traced a trajectory that is opposite
that of the scientific revolution. The history of the scientific revolution suggests that
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In Leviathan and the Air-pump, Shapin does examine rhetorical and linguistic implications of debates
about early modern science; however, he fails to examine the extent to which these are part of, or a legacy
of, the humanist project.
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science and humanism are so incompatible with one another that they cannot coexist.
Perhaps no one has been more influential in advancing this notion than historian Richard
Foster Jones, who cast the scientific revolution as a "battle" in which the scientific
modems triumphed against the humanist affection for the ancients. Jones argues that the
Elizabethans who contributed to the development of modern science were reacting
against a perception of nature as a creation in the process of decay, a view that they had
inherited from the classical tradition. 35 According to Anthony Grafton, "until the last
generation or so most historians of civilization, literature and art assumed that
Renaissance humanism died as the sixteenth century wound to a close" (204). The
markers of hurpanism's demise were the replacement of Latin with vernacular languages,
the rise of natural philosophy, and the notion, which he attributes to Montaigne, that
ancient philosophies had nothing to offer to an age so radically different (204-5) .
To a large extent, the belief that humanism gave way to science can be accounted
for by the decline in the fortunes of rhetoric, the art that was central to the humanist
project. Rhetoric was not merely a communicative art, but was a means of inculcating a
set of values that were seen as essential to developing the ethos of a Renaissance
courtier. 36 In an age in which social status had become much more fluid and trained
individuals were needed to administer new governmental entities, rhetorical education
provided not only the means for ambitious courtiers to adopt the appropriate personae,
but also to develop skills they needed for their work in the civic arena. The
epistemological anxiety that characterized the Renaissance not only helped to form a
context for the growth of science, but also led to a crisis within humanism. Victoria Kahn
describes the trajectory of Renaissance humanism as one in which the belief in the
35

Foster's Ancients and Moderns: A Study of the Rise of the Scientific Movement in Seventeenth Century
England, was revised and reissued in 1 965.
36
See Janet Atwill, Rhetoric Reclaimed, for a discussion of humanist education as the inculcation of
values.
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possibility that rhetoric can move the individual to prudence, or right action, evolved into
skepticism about the effectuality of texts and even of language itself. Implicit within this
trajectory is a conflict between values and facts, between "ought" and "is". In Rhetoric,
Prudence, and Skepticism in the Renaissance, Kahn argues that
[w]ithin the humanist tradition, it is only those texts of the later
Renaissance, in which the analogy between rhetoric and prudence is
subject to doubt . . . . For many of these authors, the rhetorical dimension
of the text can no longer be contained by practical concerns; rather, it is
conceived of as threatening, aberrant, resistant to the author's intention to
persuade to right action. (21 -22)
Eventually, Kahn continues, the rhetorical element of texts gives way to "literariness" as
epistemological standards change:
[T]he eighteenth century development of a formalist aesthetics . . .
coincided with the redefinition of politics in terms of science rather than
prudence. When mathematical certainty is taken as the standard of reason
in politics as well as science, then the aesthetic realm of prudential
deliberation . . . must be redefined in terms of mere subjective experience.
(24)
Early Renaissance rhetorical activity, according to Kahn, grew out of the
conjunction of the rediscovery of ancient texts and political conditions in the Italian city
states. New translations of Aristotle's Rhetoric and Nichomachean Ethics, along with
Ciceronian texts, were readily received by individuals who were open to the argument
that "the activity of the prudent man is analogous to that of the . orator" (30), i.e., the
prudent individual employed the same strategies in making wise judgments that the orator
used in finding effective arguments. Kahn argues that although classical rhetoric had as
its provinces the law courts and democratic governments, Renaissance rhetoric was "a
34

truncated version of its classical ancestor, since as the legal and political dimension of
rhetoric falls away, only epideictic-the rhetoric of praise and blame-remains" (38).
However, this truncation of rhetoric is not merely "an anticipation of properly aesthetic
conception of literature" (3 8). 37 Rather, she says, "if the conflation of rhetoric and
poetics diminishes the sphere of rhetoric as it was classically conceived, it enlarges the
sphere of literature, since the written text now takes on the functions of deliberative and
judicial rhetoric" (3 8). Whereas classical rhetors invented arguments by arguing on either
side of a question ( arguing in utramque partem ), they presented only a single side in the
law courts or forum. However, Renaissance writers, because their arguments were not
constrained by such specific situations, could always argue both, or many, sides of a
question. The frequent use of the dialogue as a means of exploring controversial issues
demonstrates this aspect of Renaissance rhetoric (38). For the early humanists, rhetoric
was a practical art that was as concerned with process as with product, or perhaps more
accurately, saw product as equivalent to process. Kahn argues that
Renaissance humanists . . . go beyond their classical mentors in conceiving
of literature not only as the cause and effect of prudence and right action
(i.e., the writer is presumed to be prudent and to inspire prudence in
others), but as a form of prudence itself. Rhetoric here is not primarily
conceived of in terms of style or ornaments, but in terms of its capacity to
exemplify and encourage the activity of practical reasoning. (39).
According to Kahn, humanist rhetoric was inescapably related to moral philosophy, and
this relationship was founded on two assumptions:
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In fact, the dialogue was the form that Galileo adopted when he published his theories on the structure of
the solar system, Dialogue on the Two Chief World Systems. Galileo hoped to blunt the force of his theory
by presenting it along with the received model as a conversation among learned men struggling with
competing worldviews.
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First, the prudence or practical wisdom that is at work in deliberation
about action in a social or political context is also at work in the artist's
production of a work of art. Prudence is, in this sense, the precondition of
artistic decorum, just as it is of ethical decorum. As a result, the work of
art is seen less as a product as reflecting a certain process or activity of
judgment. Second, and consequently, the reader's knowledge of the text
( or any other work of art) can only be practical, since the act of reading
requires the same acts of discrimination, the same judgments of decorum
as does the author's practice of writing. Thus, the practice of
interpretation, like the practice of writing, exemplifies for the humanist the
inseparability of rhetoric and moral philosophy. (39)
This linkage of rhetoric and moral philosophy in the Renaissance is surprising, perhaps,
given rhetoric's historical reputation for being abused by unethical practitioners, but
Kahn traces its development from ancient texts. Beginning with Aristotle, Kahn argues,
rhetoric comprises "a practical standard of judgment reflected in common linguistic
usage legitimated by the orator's appeal to common sense, his arguments by consensus,
opinion, and commonplace" (33). Cicero develops this view of rhetoric, arguing in De
oratore that the "good orator is necessarily a good man" and, in De officiis, that moral
goodness and decorum, honestas and utilitas, cannot conflict" (34). He further legitimizes
rhetoric by drawing parallels between the practice of rhetoric and Academic skepticism.
Kahn shows that "[s]ince man, according to the skeptic, can know nothing absolutely, he
is always concerned with the realm of the contingent and the probable, that is, the realm
of rhetoric" (34). Moreover, the skeptic and orator share a rejection of dogmatism and the
ability to argue in utramque partem, although the skeptic is less concerned with
persuasion (35).
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According to Kahn, early humanist rhetoric synthesizes aesthetic, political, and
religious factors:
Aesthetic decorum is seen to be inseparable from political effectiveness,
and in both cases the possibility of such decorum is seen to be not only
compatible with cognitive skepticism, but contingent upon it. But this
skepticism about the power of human reason is itself just the opposite side
of faith in divine will. The view that the impossibility of theoretical
knowledge leaves room for action and practical certainty explains the
benign role of both skeptical and hypothetical arguments in early humanist
texts. (44)
However, this synthesis did not long survive. As Kahn points out, the very acceptance of
rhetorical wisdom undermines the standard, i.e., faith in divine will, that legitimizes that
acceptance: "The legitimacy of the prudential judgment's claim to be something more
than mere subjective preference depends on an available standard of judgment, but this
standard is ultimately an article of faith that by definition cannot justify itself before the
court of skepticism" (46).
By the late sixteenth century, the reemergence of Pyrrhonism, the more radical
form of ancient skepticism, which challenged rather than supported religion, as well as
advances in natural philosophy, undermined the humanist project and the status of
rhetoric. According to Kahn, these changes meant that "skepticism and faith were no
longer allied [and] faith itself had become an object of skepticism, and along with faith,
the possibility of practical wisdom" (47). Later humanists, such as Erasmus, questioned
the existence of a standard for practical wisdom, using the "humanist emphasis on
discursive activity as constitutive of moral philosophy" (54). Nevertheless, these later
humanists, and early modem figures, such as Montaigne, and Hobbes, continued to work

37

within the humanist tradition to the extent that the means by which they questioned that
tradition was rhetoric itself.

Stoic Humanism as Context for the Scientific Revolution

The view that humanism and science are incompatible may be explained, in part,
by an overly narrow definition of humanism. In "The Two Faces of Humanism," William
Bouwsma argues that, while Kristeller's identification of rhetoric as a kind of "lowest
common denominator for humanism" helps to simplify an enormously complex
movement, it may underestimate its variety and historical significance ( 1 9). He argues
that the humanist art of rhetoric "was also the vehicle of a set of intellectual conflicts
crucial to the development of European culture in the early modern period" ( 1 9-20). Like
Kristeller, Bouwsma recognizes that humanism, despite a coherent and cohesive
objection to scholasticism, was hardly a unified movement, and that its conflicts were
perhaps more characteristic than its agreements. Bouwsma disputes the commonly held
notion that the Renaissance is a triumph of Platonism over Aristotelianism because the
philosophy of the Middle Ages was not simply Aristotelian, but was a much more
eclectic mix, while Renaissance humanism "owed at least as much to Plato as Aristotle"
(5). Second, neither the Aristotelian nor the Platonic tradition was primarily interested in
rhetoric,3 8 which was the central preoccupation of the humanist program. Finally,
Bouwsma argues that to the humanists of the Renaissance, Aristotle and Plato were
systematic philosophers who shared the same cultural moment and seemed to resemble
3 8 Although neither was "primarily" interested in rhetoric, it was certainly of great concern to both

Aristotle and Plato. Plato's reaction to rhetoric was primarily negative, and it plays an essential role in at
least three of his dialogues, Gorgias, Protagoras, and Phaedrus. Only in the Phaedrus does Plato find any
role for rhetoric at all, and then only when it is subordinated to dialectic. Aristotle's handbook of rhetoric is
an extensive discussion of the art. In contrast to Plato's discussion of the ethical dimensions of the art,
Aristotle's Rhetoric is a techne, a handbook that sets forth strategies for practice of the art. While not
necessarily more important than his other works during his own era, it was among the most widely studied
of his works during the Renaissance.
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each other more than to differ. The debates about Plato and Aristotle in which humanists
engaged were more likely academic exercises than contests regarding issues of central
concerns. Thus, he says, the search for the intellectual ·antecedents of the Renaissance
should focus on Hellenistic derivations rather than the original Hellenic philosophies;
Stoicism and Augustinianism make much better candidates for explaining the
contradictions inherent in Renaissance humanism (4-6).
Bouwsma recognizes the difficulties in seeking explanations for humanist
dichotomies in these two traditions. Neither is particularly easy to define since both are
large, synthetic, and essentially unsystematic schools of thought. Moreover,
Augustinianism is, as Marcia Colish demonstrates,39 considerably influenced by Stoicism.
Despite significant areas of overlap, Bouwsma suggests that the dichotomy can be
synthesized fairly easily in general terms. Stoicism, he argues, "for the humanist, was
sometimes a fairly particular set of beliefs, but it was also the particular form in which
the pervasive and common assumptions of Hellenistic paganism presented themselves
most attractively and forcefully to the Renaissance" (7). Augustinianism, on the other
hand, is "a slow, steady, though incomplete advance from a Hellenistic understanding of
Christianity, which sought to reconcile the Gospel with the commonplaces of later
antique culture, toward an increasingly biblical understanding of Christianity" (8).
Bouwsma describes the conflict in this way:
The issue between them, in its most direct terms, was the difference
between the biblical understanding of creation, which makes both man and
the physical universe separate from and utterly dependent on God, and the
Hellenistic principle of immanence which makes the universe eternal, by
one means or another deifies the natural order, and by seeing a spark of
39 See The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Middle Ages, volume IL Colish demonstrates at length the
complex interplay between Christianity and Stoicism in Augustine's philosophy.
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divinity in man tends to make him something more than a creature of God.
(9)
Bouwsma argues that it is this set of contradictions that energizes the humanist project
and that ultimately, as Stoicism became secularized, the two were seen as complementary
rather than antagonistic. Nevertheless, "such a reconciliation, which depended on the
deracination of Stoicism, was obviously a reconciliation on Augustinian terms. Also,
Stoicism had a peculiar facility for growing new roots" so that a resolution to the
antagonism could never fully be realized (60).
Although the commonly held view is that "renaissance thinkers only drew
isolated, practical ethical concepts from Stoic sources," Bouwsma argues that there is a
good deal more Stoic influence than has previously been recognized. In particular, he
argues that much Stoic "inspiration" came, in fact, from its doctrines on the "divine,
harmonious, and intelligible order of nature" ( 1 7). Bouwsma finds Stoic influences in the
work of Valla, Vives, and even Calvin.4° Calvin's version of Adam, for example, is
concordant with that of the Stoic sage, a man in whose mind reigned "perfect intelligence
. . . uprightness . . . [whose] senses were prepared and molded for due obedience to
reason; and in the body there was a suitable correspondence with this internal order"
(Commentary on Genesis, qtd. in Bouwsma 1 9). For the Renaissance mind, reason was
not a "legitimate source of religious insight" (20), but a resource for practical sense (2 1 ).
Finally, Stoicism was a source of moral training, and since morality was closely
associated with intellect, it could be closely connected to the humanist educational
project (22-23).

40

In this brief article, Bouwsma does not recognize the fact that Stoic influences in the works of these
thinkers is more likely the result of their reliance on Pauline doctrine rather than on Augustinianism. Please
see discussion of the Stoic influence on Pauline doctrine later in this chapter (43-46).
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Stoicism was prominent among the historical influences that led to the
Renaissance reconceptualization of what it means to be human. In Renaissance Man, her
examination of Renaissance philosophy, Agnes Heller argues that any philosophy
comprises two primary functions: to articulate a vision of objective reality and to develop
a set of moral and ethical rules that reflect that vision. Stoicism, because it focuses on the
objective world rather than on a theoretical hereafter, minimizes the dissonance between
these two aspects of philosophy. This pragmatic nature of Stoicism had three significant
consequences that made it a particularly attractive philosophy from the Renaissance
perspective. First, the distinction between the philosopher and the layman was practically
non-existent. This kind of active philosophy allowed for a synthesis of the humanist
dichotomy between vita activa and vita contemplativa. Second, the Stoic emphasis on
human autonomy was compatible with the developing sense of the human as an
individual rather than a part of a community. Third, the ontological orientation of
Stoicism helped to authorize the shift from a teleological to an ontological worldview. 4 1
Certainly, the ontological world view and pragmatic nature of Stoicism, as Heller
describes them, is consonant with that which historians of science have suggested made
way for the development of modern science.

The Legacy and Transmission of Stoic Philosophy

Stoicism derives its name from an Athenian landmark, the Stoa or Painted
Colonnade, where Zeno Citium (c. 333-26 1 BCE) regularly conducted public discourse.
Zeno's philosophical system, which was among the most fully developed and
comprehensive of any in the ancient world, flourished for more than four centuries, and
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See Chapter three, "Stoicism and Epicureanism" for Heller's discussion of the role of Stocisim in the
Renaissance, particularly 1 0 1 -27.
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spread from Athens to Rome and beyond.42 It found its way to Renaissance Europe
principally through the writings of Romans of the imperial period, such as Cicero,
Marcus Aurelius, Tacitus, and Seneca, and through the doxographic texts of the Greek
historian, Diogenes Laertius and the Roman Plutarch. Though Stoicism was clearly pagan
in origin, it offered much that would appeal to the Christian philosopher, particularly in
its descriptions of the wise and virtuous individual. Thus, its influences are seen in the
work of the early church fathers such as Augustine and Tertulian, who were educated in
the Roman system. Its later influence can be seen in the deism and naturalism that were
popular in the eighteenth century, not only in Europe but also among the founders of the
American republic.
Stoicism is a synthetic philosophy, which drew from various ancient Greek
philosophies. According to A. A. Long, Stoicism owes its ethical foundation to Socratic
influence. For example, Zeno incorporated into his philosophy some basic Socratic
propositions, among them, that "knowledge and goodness go hand in hand . . . ; from
knowledge right action follows necessarily; and the greatest evil is a bad condition of the
soul" (Hellenistic Philosophy 1 1 1). Zeno likely based his notion of a "creative reason" as
cosmic principle on Plato's divine craftsman or world soul, and he and his successors
also borrowed from Aristotelian (from Aristotle's own works and from his successors in
the Peripatetic school) and Epicurean philosophies, as well as from other less well-known
philosophers, such as Heraclitus and Diogenes ( 1 1 0- 1 13). Despite its debts to its
contemporaries and predecessors, Stoicism should not be considered a derivative
philosophy, Long argues, for it altered what it found and pushed well beyond the
42

For thorough discussions of ancient Stoicism see A. A. Long, Hellenestic Philosophy: Stoics,
Epicureans, Sceptics, and F. H. Sandbach, The Stoics. See also Marcia L. Colish's two-volume work, The
Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages. The most comprehensive anthology of Stoic
textual fragments is H. von Arnim' s Stoicorum veterum fragmenta (SVF). Translations of the principal
sources, with commentary, are included in A.A. Long and D. N. Sedley's two-volume work, The
Hellenistic Philosophers.
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boundaries of what it borrowed from other schools of thought. Most importantly,
Stoicism, unlike its predecessors, developed its philosophical tenets so fully that it
became a comprehensive system that included three main branches-physics, ethics, and
logic-that were almost inextricably intertwined. According to the Greek doxographer
Aetius,
The Stoics said that wisdom is scientific knowledge of the divine and the
human, and that philosophy is the practice of expertise in utility. Virtue
singly and at its highest is utility, and virtues, at their most generic, are
triple-the physical one, the ethical one, and the logical one. For this
reason philosophy also has three parts-physics, ethics and logic. Physics
is practiced whenever we investigate the world and its contents, ethics is
our engagement with human life, and logic our engagement with
discourse, which they also call dialectic. (HP I:26A)43
Stoicism was an important philosophical movement throughout antiquity, and was
widely practiced throughout the Roman world from the fourth century BCE until the fall
of the Roman Empire. It continued to exercise influence even as ancient doctrines began
to give way to Christianity as the primary philosophical and ethical system in Western
Europe. Although Stoicism was no longer a recognized doctrine at the beginning of the
Renaissance, certain concepts and ideas that were part of the philosophy continued to
hold sway throughout the Middle Ages. As a result, Stoicism's influence in the
Renaissance came not only through the recovery of ancient texts, but also through the
received tradition of Christian theology.
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Aetius I, Preface 2. Aetius was a Greek doxographer, c. 1 00 CE. His works are not extant, but were
recomposed from the works of Plutarch, Stobaeus, and others by H. Diels in the late 1 9th century and
published in Doxographi Graeci.
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One difficulty in studying Stoicism is that most of the available texts, which come
from the time when Stoicism was already a fully developed and orthodox doctrine, are
practical rather than theoretical in nature. There are no extant texts from the earlier Stoic
philosophers, only fragments and reports in other works. Extensive reports of Stoic
philosophy can be found in Parallel Lives, biographies of famous Greek and Roman
philosophers by second century CE Greek historian Plutarch and in Lives ofthe

Philosophers by Diogenes Laertius, a Greek doxographer of the third century CE. The
works of Aetius were preserved in an anthology compiled by fifth century CE Roman
Joannes Stobaeius for his son Septimus. Thus, Stoic theory, its antecedents, and its
development are sometimes difficult to ascertain. It is perhaps this lack of theory as much
as its lack of clear connection to pagan religion that made Stoicism an appealing doctrine
for Renaissance thinkers. Many of the Stoic texts recovered by the humanists were in the
form of dialogues on philosophy, letters of advice, and moral essays, which closely
resembled the "self-fashioning" advice to which the Renaissance mind was accustomed.
Cicero was not himself a Stoic but found much to admire about the philosophy except for
their dismissal of rhetoric. He explored Stoic doctrine in several texts, including De

officiis [On Duty], Definibus bonorum et maloram [On the Limits of Good and Evil],
and De natura deorum [On the Nature of the Gods}. Seneca's epistles and moral essays
were widely read in the Renaissance, as were the works of Diogenes Laertius and
Plutarch. These discussions of Stoic philosophy focused on moral advice rather than on
the theory upon which the advice was based, so that the incompatibility between pagan
and Christian theology and worldviews was not so apparent.

Stoicism & Christianity
Christianity originated and began to be disseminated during the last few centuries
of the Western Roman Empire. The early church fathers were educated in the same
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Hellenized system that prepared the leaders of the empire. Consequently, the church
leaders were fully aware of the various philosophical systems that were part of the
intellectual milieu of the time. Most of these philosophies were too inimical to
Christianity to be of any value to the Christian cause. Epicureanism, for example, posited
a rather randomly organized universe in which gods were not qualitatively superior to
human beings. Skepticism, with its emphasis on suspension of belief, was equally
antithetical to a religious movement. Stoicism, however, proved to be a valuable ally for
the Christian fathers for two reasons. First, its strong emphasis on morality and its
insistence upon acceptance of one's lot were useful adjuncts to the Christian morality and
acceptance of God's will. More importantly, perhaps, was the Stoic belief in a rational
force that directed the course of the universe. For most Stoics, even those who called this
force "god," the deity was not necessarily identified by name so that the "god" of
Christianity fitted the conceptualization as well as any member of the Roman pantheon.
The concordance between Stoic philosophy and Christian doctrine is apparent in the
epistles of St. Paul who was educated in the Roman tradition. Some early Christian
writers found the connections so persuasive that a legend arose in the fourth century that
the Stoic Seneca was converted by St. Paul, a belief that was seemingly substantiated by
a body of correspondence between the two.44 Though this series of letters was
apocryphal, the fact remains that the tenets of Stoicism and Christianity had sufficient
common elements that many early Christian writers felt the need to deal with it in one
way or another. In her exploration of the legacy of Stoicism from classical antiquity to
the middle ages, Colish argues:
[W]hether as men trying to make sense out of their own intellectual
experience or as spokesmen of a beleaguered Christian community in a
44

This apocryphal correspondence was edited by C. W. Barlow in Epistolae Senecae ad Paulum et Pauli

ad Senecam 'quae vocantur '.
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hostile pagan environment, [early Christian thinkers] frequently felt the
need to make explicit their attitudes toward the relationship, or lack of
relationship, that they saw between Stoicism and Christianity. (11 :3)
According to Colish, this conversation between Stoicism and Christianity continued even
after the church became institutionalized in the late empire, since theologians could use
Stoic doctrine in various ways. Where they observed heretical or schismatic threats to
orthodoxy, theologians could "characterize their opponents as having fallen into error
because of their attachment to Stoicism," or apply it as a "corrective" to positions they
wished to refute (11:3). Tertullian, for example, drew heavily upon Stoic philosophy in his
writings, where he was equally likely to "criticize them in one context, praise them in
another, and Christianize them in the third" (11 : 1 4).
Among the avenues, which Stoicism followed into the Christian Middle Ages, the
most comprehensive and significant is in the works of St. Augustine. Colish argues that
Stoic philosophy is ubiquitous throughout the works of Augustine; in some areas he uses
it inconsistently (II: 1 53-69), and in others Stoicism simply indicates the development of
his Christian philosophy (11 :2 12-33). In five areas, however, he uses Stoicism with
relative consistency, including epistemology, rhetoric, language and logic, physics, and
ethics. Augustine's use of Stoic rhetoric is quite minimal, and his departures from
Ciceronian style, Colish argues, are attributable both to Stoicism and Christianity (II: 1 798 1). His use of physics is mixed. He, of course, rejects the Stoic cosmic cycle and the
corporeality of god, although Stoic notions about human nature as a reflection of divine
rationality are amenable to his doctrines (1 98-207). Augustine also accepted Stoic ideas
regarding the passions and the location of virtue in the soul, though he rejected a good
deal of the remainder of their ethical doctrines (207-2 12). Perhaps the most influential
areas of Stoic doctrine in Augustine are in epistemology and language. Augustine made
good use of the Stoic ideas about sensory perception as an interaction between the
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individual's pneuma and that of the observed object within a material plenum, though he
did not specifically recognize the contributions of Stoicism to his thought in this regard
(Colish 1 70). Finally, his preservation of the Stoic distinction between word and meaning
is foundational to his own theories of language and logic ( 190-98).
Historians have long recognized how influential Stoicism was in England,
particularly during the Puritan revolution. Reid Barbour, whose English Epicures and
Stoics examines the influence of Stoicism in Renaissance English culture, argues that
early Stuart culture is diacritically obsessed with the Stoics and
Epicureans, apart from and in relation to one another; that the Stoics and
Epicureans afford early Stuart readers and writers with the most
impressive yet vexatious answers to many of their most urgent political
and religious questions; and that given the complexity with which the
philosophies have been transmitted, the cultural brokers of early Stuart
England are forced to wrestle with the paradox by which the friendly
philosophy becomes the enemy, and the enemy the friend. (2-3)
Barbour argues that Stoic philosophy contributed to English culture in a variety of ways.
While it has primarily been seen as a source of moral philosophy, it also contributed to
the formation of early modem natural philosophy (4), and found its expression in
political and religious treatises, and even in the drama of the times. Audrey Chew
examines the ubiquity of the Stoic influence on the art literature of Renaissance and early
modem England. Many "writers were likely to have absorbed Stoic ideas unconsciously
from a multiplicity of sources, including their favorite Roman popular writers, many of
whom subscribed to a moderate or diluted Stoic philosophy of life" (79). She argues,
however, that there were many varieties of Stoicism, some more pure than others, some
more compatible with Christianity than with paganism.
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Justus Lipsius and the Recovery ofStoic Philosophy
The most direct recovery of Stoic philosophy during the Renaissance was in the
work of Flemish humanist Justus Lipsius, who edited editions of Tacitus and Seneca.45
Although Lipsius is primarily recognized as a philologist and literary critic,46 his
translations of Stoic documents constituted the most substantial such effort until Arnim
complied Stoicorum veterumfragmentum in 1 905. According to his biographer, Jason
Saunders, Lipsius' s aim was to trace the history of Stoicism and compare it to Christian
doctrine, as found in the Bible and in theological works of the Church fathers (xiv).
Saunders attributes Lipsius' s interest in Stoicism to his anxieties about the wars that
ravaged Europe during the late sixteenth century, claiming that he wrote the first of his
Stoic treaties, De constantia libri duo ( 1 5 84) "from his real need for support during the
sufferings of the wars" (22). De constantia was an introduction to Stoic moral philosophy
that focused on explicating Stoic definitions of concepts such as free will, providence,
justice, and fate (23). Lipsius relied primarily on the works of Seneca, Epictetus, and,
occasionally, Cicero. Politicorum, sive civilis doctrinae libri sex, published in 1 5 89, was
intended to "illustrat[e] various theories of government and sound political procedure"
(27). Sources for Politicorum were Aristotle, Tacitus, and Cicero. The Politicorum was
an incredibly popular and influential work. Originally published in 1 588-89 in a Latin
edition, it was translated almost immediately into Dutch, French, English, German, and
Portuguese, and by 1 604, it had also been translated into Italian and Spanish. In addition,
new editions of about fifteen hundred books were released annually until about 1 61 8
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For an explication of Lipsius' s Stoic philosophy, see Jason Saunders, Justus Lipsius: The Philosophy of
Renaissance Stoicism; see also M. Morford, Stoics and Neostoics: Justus Lipsius and the Circle of
Reubens. For a brief discussion of Lipsius and his works, see Anthony Grafton, "Portrait of Justus Lipsius."
46
Lipsius is widely recognized as a leader of the sixteenth-century reaction against Ciceronian style.
According to Morris C_roll, Lipsius was able to build upon the less successful fifteenth-century anti
Ciceronian movement led by Erasmus. See Croll, "' Attic' Prose in the Seventeenth Century."
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(Evans 9). In 1 604, Lipsius produced two works of Stoic doctrine, Manductio ad stoicam
philosophiam and its sequel, Physiologiae stoicorum. According to Saunders, the
Manductio is an unsystematic and inferior philosophical analysis of the miscellaneous
aspects of Stoic moral doctrines, a historical treatment of Stoic philosophy and its
antecedents, and a survey of the Stoic paradoxes. By contrast, the Physiologiae was a
more carefully argued exposition of Stoic thought, emphasizing Stoic physics (54).
Lipsius's treatment of Stoic theory revived the Stoic study of physics as the
fundamental part of philosophy. According to Saunders, Lipsius believed that ethics
should be the aim of philosophy and logic the method by which knowledge is achieved,
but physics must be the beginning of philosophy (Saunders 1 1 9) .. Lipsius argued that
logic, while "useful [for] sharpening the mind and establishing the separation and choice
of truth and falsity," loses its meaning when studied "apart from the natural world" ( 1 19).
Regarding nature as the source of knowledge, Lipsius says,
Does not the subject of natural philosophy have the power of being more
sweet [wholesome], honest, useful than other disciplines? Nature opens its
whole breast - the heavens, earth, and lower regions; the sky, earth, fire,
water, air; everything contained in them, God, the angels, and
humankind-and invites one to observe and learn of them. (Phys.
Stoicorum, 1.2, IV, 835 [translation mine])47
Lipsius also equates the study of nature with the study of the divine.
The mind in the body is oppressed, as if enclosed in a prison. Unless
contemplation is added, which bids the mind to recover courage from the
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Potestne autem suavius, honestius, utilius isto Physicorum? Natura totum sinum suum offert, and
panduisupera, media, inferna; caelum, terras, ignem, aquas, aera; quidquid iis continetur, Deum, Genios,
Homines; ad haec spectanda and noscenda invitat.
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spectacle of the things of nature, and turns the mind from earthly matters
to those divine. (Phys. Stoicorum, 1 .2 IV, 835 [translation mine])48
For Lipsius, the eclectic nature of Stoic philosophy was its greatest appeal. He sought in
philosophy a solution to the dogmatic conflicts that were tearing Europe apart, seeing
adherence to a single philosophy as dangerous and believing that the study of philosophy
in general could enhance the "truths" of Christianity (Saunders 2 1 8).
Lipsius's version of Stoicism is clearly not faithful to the original, but is a
compromise with his Renaissance Christian perspective. In his attempt to reconcile
Stoicism with Christianity Lipsius failed to represent the synthetic and systematic nature
of the philosophy, instead relying too heavily on the works of Seneca and Epictetus and
ignoring a variety of other sources, particularly those which described technical aspects
of Stoic cosmology (Long, "Stoicism in the Philosophical Tradition" 379). Lipsius also
distorted the original philosophy by incorporating secondary material from Platonist and
Christian writers. Finally, he referred to Christian doctrine as the criterion by which Stoic
philosophy should be judged. Thus, a number of significant aspects of Stoic philosophy,
particularly of physics, fell by the wayside (379-80).49 The fact that Lipsius's
representation of Stoicism was not completely true to the original philosophy does not
negate its influence, however. It was the compatibility of the received version of Stoicism
with Christianity that made it attractive as an alternative to the Augustine strain of
Renaissance humanism.
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Ille in hoc corpore, velut in custodia clausus, premitur; nisi Contemplatio accessit; que ilium respirare
rerum Natura spectacula iubeat; and a terrenis dimittet ad divina.
49
Long, whose interest is ancient Stoicism, is perhaps too harsh in his criticism of Lipsius' s representation
of Stoicism. It is certainly the case that Lipsius was more concerned with moral philosophy than with
physics and that he deferred to Christian doctrine whenever he found conflicts between it and Stoicism.
However, there were fewer texts extant that pertained to Stoic physics, and Lipsius did, at least, make
available a version of Seneca's understanding of Stoic physics to his Renaissance contemporaries.
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Francis Bacon and Stoic Humanism

Twentieth century scholars have often described Francis Bacon as an anti
humanist. Anthony Grafton, for example, says that Bacon treated humanism as "a fatal
disease of learning" ("New Science" 205).50 Generally, such critique is founded on
Bacon's criticism of the copious yet empty rhetoric of some of his contemporaries. Brian
Vickers argues at length that Bacon's
critique is directed against the excessive imitation of Cicero's Latin style
and forms part of a well-documented episode within humanism . . .
culminating in the whole series of literary quarrels sparked off by
Erasmus' s Ciceronianus. ("The Myth of Francis Bacon's ' Anti
Humanism"' 1 40)
Vickers concludes that any reading of Bacon's theories regarding rhetoric and language
that places him outside the humanist tradition does so only by narrowly defining
Renaissance rhetoric to include only those theories that descended from Quintilian and
Cicero. 5 1 Certainly, Bacon fits more neatly within the framework of Stoic humanism than
he does within the Augustinian tradition.52 Bacon's Advancement ofLearning, in which
he argues for a complete reform of education to create a system that is organized
according to the structure of the human mind and aimed at exploring and explicating the
natural world, is the clearest example of how he melds elements of Stoic philosophy
within a Renaissance humanist framework.

50 See Brian Vickers, "The Myth of Francis Bacon's Anti-Humanism" for a more extensive summary of
the literature regarding Bacon 's purported antipathy to humanism.
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Nothing here should be construed to suggest that Vickers places Bacon within the Stoic tradition. In fact,
places Bacon within the line of Aristotelian rhetoric and rejects quite strenuously arguments for Bacon's
adoption of the Stoic style. See Vickers' Francis Bacon and Renaissance Prose.
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While Vickers recognizes Bacon's plainer style, he rejects the notion that his style is Stoic.
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English Humanism and the Education ofFrancis Bacon
Nowhere was the civic aspect of humanism more fully developed than in
England. 53 The early English humanists-including Thomas More, Richard Fox, who
founded Corpus Christi College at Oxford, John Colet, dean of St. Paul's Cathedral and
founder of the boys' grammar school there, and Roger Ascham, tutor to Queen Elizabeth
and author of The Scholemaster - were all committed to promoting a classical
education, including training in rhetoric, even at the grammar school level,54 and
competency in both Greek and Latin for more advanced students. For the English
humanists, however, education was not intended to lead to a cloistered life (the vita
contemplativa), but to be used in an active life of service to the monarch and
commonwealth. A number of famous humanist texts, notably Thomas More's Utopia and
Thomas Elyot's The Boke Named the Governour, were concerned primarily with offering
advice for the sound government of the commonwealth. Utopia described an idealized
form of government in which all citizens contributed to the good of the society, while
Elyot's text delineated the most desirable education and characteristics of the ideal
sovereign. English humanism did not limit education to male aristocrats. Ascham
describes, for example, the excellencies of character of Elizabeth I and Lady Jane Gray,
both of whom were classically educated in the humanist tradition. Francis Bacon's
mother also received an extensive humanist education and it was she who chose her sons'
tutor and oversaw their formal education (Jardine and Stewart 32).
Francis Bacon was born in 1 561, younger son of Nicholas Bacon, Lord-Keeper of
the Great Seal to Queen Elizabeth I, and Ann Cooke, his second wife. Nicholas Bacon, a
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This is not to suggest that English civic humanism went further than that described in the Italian city
state by Baron. My point is that the establishment of educational institutions to prepare individuals for an
active life of service to the commonwealth was the primary interest of the British humanists.
54
Laurence Green has argued that the training in the use of tropes and figures in Lily's Latin Grammar,
widely used in grammar school education from the fifteenth century onward, provided a basic education in
rhetoric even for students who did not proceed to a university education. See "Grammatica movet".
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sheep reeve's son, was educated as a scholarship student at Cambridge, became a
member of the aristocratic literati of the country, and advanced to one of the highest
positions in the land. That Nicholas recognized the role education played in his
advancement is demonstrated by a number of generous gifts to educational institutions
throughout his life (Jardine and Stewart 24-25). Bacon was immersed in Renaissance
humanist culture throughout his life. 55 As a child, Francis Bacon was introduced at court
by his father, and is reputed by his biographer Rawley to have demonstrated a rhetorical
precocity that made him a favorite with the Queen, who called him "the young Lord
Keeper" (P W 1). Bacon's education began at home, where he was first tutored by John
Walsall, a scholar from Christ Church, Oxford, who was selected by Ann Bacon as much
for his radical Protestantism as for his humanist erudition (Heltzell; see also Jardine and
Stewart 35). In 1 573, twelve-year old Francis accompanied his older brother Anthony to
Trinity College, Cambridge, where they spent most of the next three years. While at
Oxford, the brothers' education was directly supervised by John Whitgift, master of
Trinity, who designed for them a typically humanist course of study that included the
works of Livy, Caesar, Sallust, Demosthenes' Orations, Homer's Iliad, Cicero's
Complete Works, and the rhetorical handbook then believed to be authored by Cicero, the
Ad Herrenium. They studied Plato and Aristotle, along with Hermogenes and Xenophon
in an edition with Greek and Latin on facing pages. They also would have studied Greek
grammar and logic (35). It was during this time, according to Rawley, that Bacon "first
fell into the dislike of the philosophy of Aristotle; nor for the worthlessness of the author,
to whom he would ever ascribe all high attributes, but for the uselessness of the way;
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Francis Bacon did not leave an autobiography, though his life is well documented through his letters and
many other texts . The first of many biographies was published in 1 657 by William Rawley, the first editor
of Bacon's works. Subsequent biographies include Edwin Abbott' s Bacon and Essex: A Sketch ofBacon 's
Earlier Life (1 877) and Francis Bacon: An Account ofhis Life and Work (1 885); Charles Williams's Bacon
( 1 933); Bryan Bevan's The Real Francis Bacon (1 960); Catherine Drinker Bowen's Francis Bacon: The
Temper of a Man ( 1 963); Anthony Quinton's Francis Bacon ( 1 980); and Lisa Jardine and Alan Stewart's
Hostage to Fortune: The Troubled Life ofFrancis Bacon (1 998).
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being a philosophy (as his lordship used to say) only strong for disputations and
contentions, but barren of the production of works for the benefit of the life of man" (2).56
According to Rawley, during his tenure at Cambridge, Bacon "was observed to be more
than an ordinary proficient in the several arts and sciences" (2); it is clear from the
eloquence that characterized his discourse throughout his life that he learned much from
his early training in the liberal arts. It should not be assumed, however, that Francis
Bacon was devoted solely to the academic life. Jardine and Stewart paint a portrait of
Bacon and his brother Anthony at Cambridge as young men who saw this time as an
opportunity for "gentlemanly grooming," during which they gathered the learning and
accouterments that allowed them to fashion themselves as the future courtiers that their
heritage entitled them to be (36).
In 1576, shortly after Francis was admitted to Gray's Inn for the study of law, his
father arranged for him to become a member of the household of Sir Amyas Paulet,
ambassador to France. Nicholas Bacon's plan was for Francis to augment his legal
studies by studying Roman law as it was practiced in France (Jardine and Stewart 39).
Francis Bacon was to look back on this period as one of the most important in his life. In
addition to learning Roman law, he met new people and learned the manners and habits
required of an ambassador to the more sophisticated courts of Europe (39-40). He was
also exposed to new ideas and new ways of thinking. 57 During his stay in France, in order
to supplement the money supplied by his father, Francis undertook some spy missions on
behalf of the crown. He also became acquainted with Thomas Phillips, Sir Francis
Walsingham's master cryptographer, from whom he first learned codes and cyphers, an
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Jardine and Stewart suggest that, brilliant as the young Bacon was, such "philosophical precocity" may
be some of Bacon's own revisionism (35).
5 7 Paolo Rossi suggests that Francis Bacon's philosophy regarding technology was formed in part by his
exposure to the ideas of Bernard Palissy, a French potter known for his experiments in ceramics (From
Magic to Science 8-9). Markku Peltonen indicates that Bacon may have attended Palissy's public lectures
during his time in Paris (3).
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interest that Bacon continued throughout his life and that informed his representation of
nature as a perplexing but ultimately decipherable mystery (Jardine and Stewart 49-57).
In February, 1 579, Nicholas Bacon died unexpectedly, before he was able to provide an
estate for Francis. Within a month, Francis returned home to begin a much different kind
of life.
On his return home from Europe, Bacon began his study of the law at Gray' s Inn
and the long struggle to carve out a place for himself in the British court. Two years later,
Bacon got his first taste of political office when he was returned to Parliament for
Bossiny, Cornwall, and he continued to be active in the House of Commons for many
years. In 1 5 82, he was admitted to the bar as an utter barrister and progressed through the
ranks for the next decade. Throughout this time, as Bacon became more involved in the
political and legal life of England, he continued to seek the preferment that he finally
found from Elizabeth' s successor, James I. In 1 603, he was knighted, in 1 604 appointed
Learned Council to the king, and in 1 607, having taken a key role in the negotiations
between Parliament and the King for unification of the two kingdoms, he was rewarded
with the post of Solicitor-General which he had sought for many years. As he continued
to curry favor with James and his intimates, Bacon' s fortunes rose accordingly. Between
1 6 1 2 and 1 6 1 8, he was appointed to the posts of Attorney General, Privy Councilor, Lord
Keeper, and Lord Chancellor. In 1 6 1 8, Baco_n was created Baron Verulam and, in
January 1 62 1 , he was created Viscount St. Albans. This exalted status did not last long,
however; by March of the same year, Francis Bacon was charged with and convicted of
accepting bribes.
Although Bacon never again participated to any significant degree in the public
life of England, he made perhaps his most lasting contribution during the last five years
of his life. As was the case with many humanists, Bacon longed for the contemplative life
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even as he lived the active life at court and in Parliament. 58 During the relative seclusion
that resulted from his disgrace, he produced many of the philosophical texts for which he
is remembered today. His biographer, Rawley, gives the following account of the works
Bacon produced during this period: 59
The last five years of his life, being withdrawn from civil affairs and from
active life, he employed wholly in contemplation and studies-a thing
whereof his lordship would often speak during his active life, as if he
affected to die in the shadow and not in the light; which also may be found
in several passages of his works. In which time he composed the greatest
part of his books and writings, both in English and Latin. (PW 4)
Jardine and Stewart suggest that Rawley's account of Bacon's final years and his gift to
posterity is a continuation of Bacon's own campaign to rehabilitate his image (473-476).
Whatever his or his close associates' intentions, there is no doubt that these texts, along
with the Novum Organum and The Great Instauration, are the foundation for the image
of Francis Bacon that has persisted into the twenty-first century.
As in his lifetime, Bacon remains a difficult figure to evaluate. His life, however,
exemplifies the tension between the vita activa and vita contemplativa that is
characteristic of the humanist project. Whether or not his motivations were selfish, there
is no question that he dedicated all his energies to the life of public service that was
central to the humanist tradition. This impulse toward service carried over into both his
political and philosophical writings. Although Francis Bacon's political writings were,
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William Bouwsma in The Culture ofRenaissance Humanism, examines the contradictory impulses
toward the vita activa and vita contemplativa that characterize the humanist experience.
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Rawley goes on to enumerate the list of works Bacon completed, many of which were published
posthumously. See Graham Rees' Introduction to Vol. 6 of The Oxford Francis Bacon for a discussion of
when the works Rawley enumerates were actually written. Rees suggests that most of these works were, in
actuality, already in progress as many as ten years before Bacon's trial and subsequent "withdrawal" from
civic life.
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perhaps, the most influential of his writings during his lifetime, they have proved less
durable over time than his Essays and his philosophical works on education and natural
philosophy. As a humanist, Bacon was concerned with reforming the educational system
of his times, and he sought to resolve some of the inherent conflicts he recognized within
the humanist project. He describes his project William Burghley thus:
I have taken all knowledge as my province; and if I could purge it of two
sorts of rovers, whereof the one with frivolous disputations, confutations,
and verbosities, the other with blind experiments and auricular traditions
and impostures, hath committed so many spoils, I hope I should bring in
industrious observations, grounded conclusions, and profitable inventions
and discoveries; the best state of that province. (qtd. in Jardine and Stuart
1 33-34)
Such confidence in his ability is, perhaps, no great boast for one who, according to his
biographer Rawley, had decided at an early age to reform educational practices that had
been in place since the time of Aristotle.

Bacon 's Active Science
Twentieth-century opinions of Francis Bacon's status as a progenitor of modem
science are mixed. Whether he is seen as a buffoon or as a visionary, however, such
retrospective views are based on criteria of modem science. One might argue, following
Thomas Kuhn's model, that Bacon's views are no longer scientific because subsequent
paradigm shifts have made his understanding of science incommensurable with our
contemporary understanding of science. 6° Conversely, however, contemporary views of

°

6

Kuhn, a historian of science, introduced the concept of the "paradigm shift," a model that describes the
process through which changes in scientific thought and practice occur. Paradigm shifts begin in the course
of "normal science," i.e. the routine testing of the limits of currently accepted theory, with the observations
of anomalous events that contradict a prevailing scientific theory. As these anomalous observations
accumulate, scientists begin to advance new theories to explain them. Generally, however, it is not until the
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science are incommensurable with sixteenth-century epistemology, so one cannot so
easily dismiss the appropriateness of Bacon' s limited practice of natural philosophy in
his own age.
There is also considerable disagreement over the relationship between Bacon's
new philosophy to humanism. Grafton, for example, cites a commonly held view that at a
time when humanism was already being "questioned and subverted," Bacon "inserted
dynamite and lit the fuse" ("The New Science and the Traditions of Humanism" 205).
Assertions that Bacon intended either to destroy humanism or to establish science are
both problematic since humanism was hardly a coherent institution and "science" as an
identifiable cultural construct had yet to come into being. Bacon recognized a number of
"deficiencies" in the educational and intellectual practices of his day, deficiencies that he
detailed for the first time in his 1605 publication of The Advancement ofLearning. Not
all these deficiencies were part of the humanist tradition; some of them were associated
with scholasticism and with the Protestant reformation. Among the problems he
identified were the conflict between the vita activa and the vita contemplativa and a
concern with words at the expense of matter. The way to remedy these problems,
according to Bacon, was "to commence a total reconstruction of sciences, arts, and all
human knowledge, raised upon the proper foundations" (Proem to the Great Instauration,

PW 24 1). He argues for nature as the foundation for the edifice of learning he proposes.
The belief that Bacon's program is anti-humanistic is a result of a failure to
consider the totality of his debt to ancient philosophies, as well as his commitment to
humanist values. Graham Rees argues that Bacon drew on a variety of ancient doctrines
in formulating his view of nature and natural philosophy, including "atomist and
accretion of anomalies is so great that they can no longer be ignored that a paradigm shift occurs, and a new
theory becomes generally accepted. In Kuhn's view, then, the process of scientific revolutions is much
more evolutionary than catastrophic. They are, however, revolutionary to the extent that they are inevitable
and irrevocable; after the paradigm shift occurs, the old paradigm is incommensurable with what it
replaced.
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Aristotelian natural philosophies, Copemicanism, Galileian observational astronomy, the
work of Paracelsus, of William Gilbert, Telesio, Patrizi, and others besides" ("Bacon' s
Speculative Philosophy" xxxvii). According to Rees, Bacon's natural philosophy had a
doubleness that has not been sufficiently explored. He argues that it appears "[ o ]n the one
hand . . . . as a programme for constructing a body of scientific knowledge that would
yield practical benefits to release the human race from material privation. On the other
hand it appears as a strange corpus of theory, a speculative recreation, an attempt to
picture the knowledge that might be produced once the programme was implemented"
(xxxvi). This is reflected in the Plan of the Great Instauration, for example, in which
Bacon's descriptions of the first three parts of the work clearly indicate his intent to
establish such a program while the latter parts suggest a more speculative activity. If
Rees's description of the doubleness of Bacon's project is taken at face value, there
seems to be little space for Stoic influence, since the programmatic aspects are too
materialistic for Stoic sensibilities, and the speculative sections are informed by the mish
mash of theories that Rees has identified. However, Rees' description of Bacon's
program, i.e., "constructing a body of scientific knowledge that would yield practical
benefits to release the human race from material privation," does not reflect fully the
degree to which Bacon saw his Instauration as transformative of the intellect and spirit of
humankind, as well as improving its material situation. For the humanist, intellectual arts
were not mere sets of strategies, but were intended to be internalized and practiced. In the
same way that eloquence was not merely the product of art, but reflected the character of
the speaker as well, Bacon would have expected his method to have a transformational
effect on its practitioner and for that to be reflected in behavior and demeanor. Thus, the
benefits achieved through the methodical study of nature would not have been merely
intellectual, but material and spiritual as well. The philosophy of Stoicism served as a
model for this sort of transformational and normative practice. Bacon's understanding of
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nature as a rational and discernible creation owes much to the ideas of the later Stoics,
especially those of Seneca. In particular, Bacon relied on Stoicism to bolster his
assertions that nature was divinely created and yet an orderly system whose mysteries
could be penetrated by rational humans. Bacon's understanding of nature as a source of a
normative standard may also be traced to the Stoics.
Bacon recognized that many of the fundamental conflicts of the Renaissance were
epistemological. Humanism, operating in the realm of the contingent, relied upon a
standard of practical wisdom; religion was legitimated by divine revelation; and the new
philosophy yielded theoretical knowledge that was legitimated observationally or
methodologically. Bacon argued for nature as a legitimate source for theoretical
knowledge, and in doing so, he proposed a new ethical standard for the practical wisdom
which humanists valued so highly. He also articulated a justification for technology as
productive knowledge and broadened the range of methodologies by which human
beings interrogated their world. Whereas the humanists had depended almost exclusively
upon rhetoric as an architectonic art, Bacon developed a "new kind of logic" for the new
kind of intellectual activity he proposed. However, despite his claims regarding the
novelty of his new philosophy, Bacon's reformation is clearly in the humanist mold,
given its emphasis on education, civic activism, and the rhetorical nature of his efforts.
His earliest attempts in this regard were aimed at reforming the educational system,
replacing both the stultified Aristotelianism of the Middle Ages and the copious rhetoric
of the Renaissance with a "new" philosophy inspired,. in part, by ideas from ancient texts
recovered by his humanist predecessors. Moreover, it seems clear that this reconstruction
was founded upon the humanistic desire to improve the human condition. Despite his
concern regarding the inherent inability for words adequately to represent things, his
program was greatly influenced by humanist rhetoric, and his Great Instauration was
really little more than an extended argument, which begins from the premise that nature
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is the appropriate foundation for knowledge. Unlike his contemporary Peter Ramus, who
showed great contempt for rhetoric, Bacon recognized the importance of eloquence in the
public arena. The centrality of language to his project is perhaps best demonstrated in his
emphasis on the development of new discursive forms that he claimed were better suited
to philosophical endeavors.
While Bacon's new philosophy in some respects seems to reject humanist
practices and to propose a new, methodical intellectual enterprise that somewhat
resembles modem science, it is grounded in humanist values and practices. Bacon
sought, through his Great Instauration, to unite the active and contemplative ways of life
and to produce a certain kind of individual who could carry out this program of
improvement. Thus, he united practical wisdom with theoretical knowledge and, rather
than replacing Aristotelian teleology with ontology, conflated "ought" with "is". This
collapsing of "ought" with "is" is compatible with the Stoic view of nature as rational
and normative. Bacon did not stop, however, with uniting these two epistemological
practices, but returned to the Aristotelian typology, which posits a third branch of
wisdom, productive knowledge. Unlike Aristotle, however, Bacon had to deal with a
theological tradition that was suspect of notions that humans could command nature. The
philosophy of the ancient Stoics provided him with a set of concepts and commonplaces
that he deployed in an extended argument for a new epistemological system. Stoicism
provided a model for a synthetic philosophy that integrated all these aspects of
knowledge in a way that could accommodate theological objections and advance the
humanistic desire for improving the lot of humankind.
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CHAPTER TWO
FINDING NATURE'S ORDER:
STOIC INFLUENCES IN BACON'S NATURAL PHILOSOPHY

Nature is an artistic fire going on its way to create.
-Diogenes Laertius61

Philosophy, they say, is like an animal, Logic corresponding to the bones
and sinews, Ethics to the fleshy parts, Physics to the soul. Another simile
they use is that of an egg: the shell is Logic, next comes the white, Ethics,
and the yolk in the center is Physics. Or again, they liken Philosophy to a
fertile field. Logic being the encircling fence, Ethics the crop, Physics the
soul or the trees. Or, again, a city strongly walled and governed by reason.
-Diogenes Laertius62

Now what the sciences stand in need of is a form of induction which shall
analyse experience and take it to pieces, and by a due process of exclusion
and rejection lead to an inevitable conclusion. And if that ordinary mode
of judgment practiced by the logicians was so laborious, and found
exercise for such great wits, how much more labour must we be prepared
to bestow upon this other, which is extracted not merely out of the depths
of the mind, but out of the very bowels of nature.
-Francis Bacon6 3
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It may also be asked . . . whether I speak of natural philosophy only, or
whether I mean that the other sciences, logic, ethics, and politics, should
be carried on by this method. Now I certainly mean that what I have said
to be understood of them all; and as the common logic, which governs by
the syllogism, extends not only to natural but to all sciences; so does mine
also, which proceeds by induction, embrace everything. For I form a
history and tables of discovery for anger, fear, shame, and the like; for
matters political; and again for the mental operations of memory,
composition and division, judgment and the rest; not less than for heat and
cold, or light or vegetation, or the like. But nevertheless since my method
of interpretation, after the history has been prepared and duly arranged,
regards not the working and discourse of the mind only (as the common
logic does) but the nature of things also, I supply the mind with such rules
and guidance that it may in every case apply itself aptly to the nature of
things.
-Francis Bacon64
The key to the development of modem science is a mechanistic view of nature as
a regular system the rules of which may be perceived and exploited by human beings.
Francis Bacon's natural philosophy, while not completely consistent with modern
science, also presents nature as orderly and comprehensible to human beings. This view
is very different from that which preceded it, i.e., nature as a mysterious system
responsive to the commands of God and the actions of human beings. Any history of
63
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science ought to take into account the means by which this transformation occurred. The
standard narrative of the scientific revolution suggests that a revitalizing Platonism, with
its emphasis on abstract mathematical concepts, triumphed over a stultified Aristotelian
teleological philosophy.65 However, modern science is not merely abstract; rather it is
also empirical and experimental, to the extent that it derives abstract principles from the
experimental testing of hypotheses based upon empirical observations. Platonism
certainly provided no examples for this kind of thinking or practice. Despite the
usefulness of Platonist mathematics for disciplines such as theoretical physics, it is
unlikely that Platonism alone could have sparked changes as far-reaching as those that
constitute the scientific revolution. First, the Platonists viewed the physical world as an
inferior reflection of the world of Ideas, so that, while it may ultimately be useful for
scientists attempting to describe how Nature works in the abstract, Platonism is not likely
to have led Renaissance thinkers to engage in empirical investigations of nature, the
corrupt physical manifestation of the Ideal. Thus, while this Platonizing narrative may
partially satisfy an intemalist history of science, it does not fully explain even the internal
changes in natural philosophy, much less how the larger culture came to accept such a
radical change in world view. To uncover the roots of the scientific revolution, it is
worthwhile examining the activities and ideas of Renaissance humanists, who recovered
a wide variety of ancient philosophical texts and are responsible for inserting new ideas
into the culture of the late Renaissance. A number of these other philosophical systems
encompassed views of nature that were more compatible with both the then-current
natural philosophy and Christian theology.
The intellectual life of the ancient world was much more diverse than the
modernist Platonism-Aristotelianism dichotomy would suggest. As a result of their
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efforts to recover ancient texts, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century European humanists
were fully aware of philosophies both more ancient and more recent than those of Plato
and Aristotle. Available to them through the works of ancient biographers and
doxographers were fragments from the most ancient Greek philosophers, such as Thales
and Anaxagoras, the Pythagoreans, and the early Greek atomists such as Democritus. It
was a rich heritage, only part of which included a mathematical view of the universe. In
addition to these more ancient texts, humanists also recovered the works of philosophers
who were contemporaries of Plato and Aristotle, as well as those of their successors in
their respective schools. Texts that were not extant were often recounted in the other
texts. Also available to Renaissance thinkers were texts from philosophical schools that
evolved from these classical philosophies, such as the various schools of skepticism
the Academics and the more radical Pyrrhonists - as well as the materialist philosophies
of the Epicureans and Stoics. In addition to these ancient texts, records of more recent
attempts to understand and manipulate nature contributed to the intellectual background
of the scientific revolution. These include a brief interest in natural philosophy during the
late Middle Ages66 and the more durable interest in alchemy and astrology.67 Finally,
technological innovations in a number of fields, from medicine to optics to ceramics,
contributed to this eclectic intellectual mix.
Francis Bacon's philosophy, which he constructed from both ancient
philosophies and more recent practices, demonstrates the eclecticism that characterized
the Renaissance philosophical landscape. In his study of Bacon's philosophy, Stephen
Gaukroger examines the degree to which Bacon's eclecticism was characteristic of the
philosophical landscape of seventeenth-century England. According to Gaukroger, this
66
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eclecticism was not merely a result of the variety of sources recovered by the humanists,
but reflected the character of the recovered philosophies themselves:
Eclecticism was a feature of philosophy in the late Hellenistic, Roman,
and early medieval periods. Cicero, one of the principal sources of the
moral philosophy of antiquity, presented this moral philosophy in a
completely eclectic way, and Renaissance humanists from Petrarch
onwards took over this eclecticism as part [of] their approach to moral
philosophy. More generally, Roman thought, in which Stoicism was
particularly important, was saturated with various forms of eclecticism and
syncretism, and Stoic, Aristotelian, and Platonist doctrines were readily
assimilated. (28-9)
As far as the practice of experimental natural philosophy in the Renaissance is concerned,
Epicureanism,68 which adopted a material view of the universe and attempted to explain
events in the physical world without reference to any divine intervention, may have had
more to contribute to the Renaissance resurrection of natural philosophy as the immediate
epistemological antecedent of modern science. But Epicureanism, to the degree that it
was seen to promote hedonism and reject the divine, was certainly anathema to Christian
Europe. However, Stoic philosophy, which had a much greater influence on Renaissance
and early modern society as a whole, is more likely to have helped prepare the late
Renaissance or early modem mind for the epistemological shift that has been called the
68
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"scientific revolution." This is not to say that Bacon himself, who often protested quite
vigorously against various Stoic doctrines and against those of his contemporaries who
had more openly adopted Stoic moral philosophy, was a Stoic. Nor is it to suggest that
Bacon's natural philosophy replicates Stoic physics, of which little is actually known.
Rather, I argue that Bacon incorporates certain aspects of Stoic philosophy, particularly
that he uses Stoic ideas as commonplaces in his argument in favor of natural philosophy
and that Stoic epistemology informs his own new philosophical method. Stoicism also
provided a model for integrating natural philosophy with other moral and ethical
philosphy and provided a model for the sort of synthetic intellectual system Bacon
wanted to build. Finally, because for the Stoics �ature fulfilled a normative function, i.e.,
to behave in accordance with nature was the highest good, .it served as a model for the
study of nature as equivalent to the study of divine relevation.

The Stoic View of Nature

Stoic philosophy is built upon the central principal that the whole of the universe
is the embodiment of reason, which they call logos, and that human beings are governed
by and share in the immanent logos of the universe. It is this intersection between the
natural world and reason that accounts for the extraordinary coherence of Stoic
.. philosophy. Physics, the study of nature or physis, is the study of the natural (rational)
order of the universe; logic trains human beings to interpret immanent logos; ethics is the
practical application of natural reason, or, to be precise, the attempt to conform to natural
order. Central to the Stoic enterprise are two key concepts: reason (logos) and nature
(physis).
Logos
The term logos is a contested term that carried different meanings within the
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various schools of Greek and Hellenistic philosophy. Generally it is denotes a variety of
linguistic concepts, including the structure of argumentation, discourse, and logic or
reason. 69 Throughout antiquity, because the Greeks recognized language as the source of
humans' superiority over other creatures, logos always evoked the notion of power or
force: the power to persuade, or even, in the rhetoric of the early Sophists, to remake our
concept of the world. 70 The Stoic philosophers, however, endowed the term with
extraordinary generative power because they believed that logos was not merely a way
for human beings to conceptualize the world, but the force that was responsible for the
creation of the world. The Stoics believed that the universe (kosmos) was made up of two
elements, "that which acts and that which is acted upon. That which is acted upon is
unqualified substance, i.e. matter; that which acts is the reason [logos] in it, i.e. god. For
this, since it is everlasting, constructs every single thing throughout all matter" (Diogenes
Laertius 7. 134). For the Stoics, logos is "intelligent, a designing fire [pur technikon]
which methodically proceeds towards creation of the world, and encompasses all the
seminal principles according to which everything comes about'' (Aetius 1 .7.33 [HP
46A]). Logos is the seminal force in the cosmos. In the Stoic cosmology narrative, logos,
which is synonymous with "god," in the form of a creative fire, initiates a cycle of
generation which lasts several thousand years before being consumed in a conflagration
initiated by the sun:
God, intelligence, fate, and Zeus are all one, and many other names are
applied to him. In the beginning all by himself he turned the entire
substance through air into water. Just as the sperm is enveloped .in the
69
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seminal fluid, so god, who is the seminal principle of the world, stays
behind as such in the moisture, making matter serviceable to himself for
the successive stages of creation. (Diogenes Laertius 7. 1 3 5-67 )
The two primary principles, i.e., logos and matter, are indestructible and infinite, whereas
elements, i.e. earth, air, fire, and water, which combine to create everything in the world,
are finite and "pass away at the conflagration" (Diogenes Laertius 7 . 1 34 ). Following the
conflagration, "nature comes to stop for a while" and the god "reposes in himself given
over to his thoughts" (Seneca, Letters 9. 1 6), after which the cycle repeats itself. In
representing logos as a "designing fire," [emphasis added] the Stoics emphasized the
intelligence and craftsmanship of the seminal principle in the cosmos.
Another term for the immanent, activating force in the cosmos is pneuma,71 or
breath, a term which the Stoics preferred to use in discussions of material aspects of
nature. They use pneuma, for example, to explain the diversity of life in the cosmos.
Diogenes Laertius says that, according to the Stoics, "[t] he world is directed by
intelligence and providence, . . . since intelligence pervades every part of it, just like the
soul in us. But it pervades some parts to a greater extent and others to a lesser degree"
(Diogenes Laertius 7. 1 3 8-9). The Stoics make distinctions between different levels, or
concentrations, of pneuma as it inhabits animals, plants, and inanimate objects:
Intelligence . . . has many powers, the tenor kind, the physical, the psychic,
the rational, the calculative . . . Tenor is also shared by lifeless things,
stones and logs, and in our bones, which resemble stones, also participate
in it. Physique also extends to plants, and in us there are things like
plants-nails and hair. Physique is tenor in actual motion. Soul is Physique
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which has also acquired impression and impulse. This is also shared by
irrational animals. (Philo, Allegories of the laws 2.22-3 )
The Stoics make a distinction between inanimate objects that have only the tenor of the
creative force and cannot act but must be acted upon and things that "have the cause of
movement in themselves, that are ' ensouled' and able to receive impressions which lead
to impulses" (Origen, On principles 3. 1 .2-3). The soul of animals had seven parts,
including the five senses, the ability to reproduce, and utterance. Rational animals had, in
addition, a commanding faculty (hegemon) that was called reason (Aetius 4.2 1 . 1 -4). For
the Stoics, the cosmos, itself ensouled by reason/god/pneuma was in effect a living
being- "[The Stoics] say that god is an animal which is immortal and rational or
intelligent" (Diogenes Laertius 7. 147)-and the human being was seen as a microcosm
(Long & Sedley 319).
Stoicism, unlike its philosophical antecedents, did not posit the existence of
absolutes or the Platonic concept of the Ideal:
[C]oncepts are neither somethings nor qualified, but figments of the soul
which are quasi-somethings and quasi-qualified. These, they say, are what
the old philosophers called Ideas. For the Ideas are of the things which are
classified under the concepts, such as men, horses, and in general all the
animals and other things of which they say that there are Ideas. The Stoic
philosophers say that there are no Ideas, and what we 'participate in' is the
concepts, while what we 'bear' is those cases which they call
'appellatives'. (Stobaeus 1 . 1 36, 21-137, 6)
Nor did the Stoics believe in an afterlife. At the end of the regenerative part of the cosmic
cycle, when the world was consumed in fire, god, or logos, withdraws into itself:
It will be like the life of Zeus, at the time when the world is dissolved �d
the gods have been blended together into one, when nature comes to stop
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for a while; he reposes in himself given over to his thoughts. The wise
man's behaviour is just like this: he retires into himself, and he is with
himself. (Seneca, Letters 9 . 1 6)
Stoicism, then, is not a teleological system, such as those posited by Plato and Aristotle.
The end of human existence, indeed of the cosmos itself, is not some future existence, but
existence itself.
Nature and Natural Order
The second critical term in Stoic philosophy is "nature" (physis), which they use
to refer to a cluster of related concepts:
By 'nature' they sometimes mean what sustains the world, and so�etimes
what makes things on earth grow: nature is a self-moving tenor, which
completes and sustains its products in accordance with seminal principles
at determinate times, and continues to perform the actions from which
they came to light. (Diogenes Laertius 7. 1 48.9)
These two functions do not fully capture the many ways in which the Stoics
conceptualized nature. The Stoics commonly used this term in five ways, including "(l)
the power or principle which shapes and creates all things; (2) the power or principle
which unifies and gives coherence to the world; fiery breath; (3) artistic fire, self-moving
and generative; (4) necessity and destiny; ( 5) God, providence, craftsman, right reason"
(Long Hellenistic Philosophy 148). While the term 'nature' is often synonymous with
logos, it has additional meanings since the term refers not only to the entire cosmos, but
also to each part of the cosmos, i.e., the nature of plants is physic, the nature of animals is
soul, and the nature of rational animals, or human beings, is logos.72 Because it is
identified with logos, the creative and intelligent force of the universe, the Stoics saw

72 See Long's discussion of these natures in Hellenistic Philosophy 148.
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nature as deterministic and normative and identified this deterministic aspect as fate, "a
sequence of causes, that is, an inescapable ordering and interconnection" (HP 551).
Chrysippus, one of the leaders of the Stoa, called fate
a power of breath, carrying out the orderly government of all . . . . [A]nd
here and there . in other works he expresses a variety of views: 'Fate is the
rationale of the world', or 'the rationale of providence's acts of
government in the world', or 'the rationale in accordance with which past
events have happened, present evets are happening, and future events will
happen'. (Stobaeus 1 .79, 1 - 1 2)
Alexander of Aphrodisias describes the Stoics' view of fate in this way:
[S]ince the world is a unity which includes all existing things in itself and
is governed by a living, rational, intelligent nature, the government of
existing things which it possesses is an everlasting one proceeding in a
sequence and ordering. . . . For nothing in the world exists or happens
causelessly, because none of the things in it is independent of, and
insulated from, everything that has happened before. . . . They say that the
very fate, nature and rationale in accordance with which the all is governed
is god. It is present in all things which exist and happen, and in this way
uses the proper nature of all existing things for the government of all. (On
fate 1 9 1 , 30- 1 92, 28)

Because of the rational nature of the cosmos, the Stoics believed that the universe is
ultimately knowable: "[I]f there were some human being who could see with his mind
the connection of all causes, he would certainly never be deceived. For whoever grasps
the causes of future things must necessarily grasp all that will be" (Cicero, On divination
1 . 1 27).
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The rational principle, according to the Stoics, is similar to a sperm that
inseminates inanimate matter, resulting inevitably in a perfectly ordered nature :
At certain fated times the entire world is subject to conflagration, and then
is reconstituted afresh. But the primary fire is as it were a sperm which
possesses the principles [logoi] of all things and the causes of past,
present, and future events. The nexus and succession of these is fate,
knowledge, truth, and an inevitable and inescapable law of what exists. In
this way everything in the world is excellently organized as in a perfectly
ordered society. (Eusebius, Evangelical preparation 15 .14.2 [HP 46G])
This order includes both animate and inanimate things. Diogenes Laertius describes the
natural order of the cosmos: "Uppermost is the fire called ' aether' in which the sphere of
the fixed stars is first created, and next the sphere of the planets. After this the air, and
then the water, and as foundation of everything the earth, which is at the center of all
things" (Lives ofthe Philosophers 7.137). 73 Animate objects "must be sharper and
greater" than inanimate objects because they "have some part of the world's commanding
faculty. "For every nature which is not isolated and simple but conjoined and composite
must have within itself some commanding faculty, such as intelligence in man, and
something resembling intelligence in beasts . . . [and] trees too and plants are thought to
have a commanding faculty in their roots" (Cicero, De nature deorum 2.23-5, 28-30).
Finally, human beings occupy the second highest spot in the natural order on account of
having reason as their commanding faculty: "What is best in man? Reason: with this he
precedes the animals and follows the gods" (Seneca, Letters 76.9-10). The Stoic concept
of Nature plays a dual role in causal explanations. According to Long, "To say of
something that it is natural in Stoicism is to combine description with evaluation. Nature
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embraces both the way things are and they way they should be (Hellenistic Philosophy
169). For the Stoics then, Nature is both factual and normative, what is and what should
be; it is at once ontological and teleological.
The Instauratio Magno

Though in his lifetime Bacon was best known for his activities in Parliament and
in the cowts of Elizabeth and James, his lasting reputation is related to his book of Essays
and the philosophical texts he produced after his disgrace. While these works, especially
the philosophical texts, are now seen by some as contributing to the scientific revolution,
there is no question that they are also part and parcel of the humanist context of the
Renaissance. In particular, they are consistent with the branch of Renaissance humanism
that Bouwsma associates with Stoicism and has identified as being concerned with the
exercise of human rationality. While Bacon called his works philosophical they are, to an
even greater degree, rhetorical, using language that is carefully crafted to persuade those
who read the texts to accept a version of the natural world that is radically different from
the prevailing model.
Renaissance cosmology depicted nature as a "great chain of being" in which each
element of the chain exercised some degree of command over all other inferior elements.
Because theological and political institutions relied upon such a model to justify their
own hierarchical structures, a mechanistic world view that posited regular and discernible
natural laws might well threaten such institutions. Thus, it is not likely that widespread
trust in the findings of the natural philosophers, which was prerequisite to the acceptance
of the the mechanistic world view and the development of scientific institutions, would
have come about simply because those findings were "self-evident." Rather, the new
philosophy had t� be fitted to the contemporary worldview. The lnstauratio Magno and
Book I of Novum Organum constitute just such an argument. Stoic philosophy, i.e., the
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received Stoicism of the Renaissance, provided a set of concepts that could be used to
forge a middle way between the theological/political tradition and the new natural
philosophy. Bacon's use of Stoic principles was subtle. Unlike Lipsius, who sought to
reintroduce Stoic philosophy but truncated and altered it to fit within the framework of
Renaissance theology, Bacon culled concepts that were useful to his project, without
necessarily attributing them to the Stoics.
The Goal and PIan of the Work

In 1 620 Bacon published the lnstauratio Magno, which consisted of the Novum
Organum along with a number of prefatory texts. In this work, he proposed a new

"instauration," an intellectual edifice that he believed should take the place of the then
current, and in his eyes, impotent status of human knowledge. In the Proemium, Bacon
argued that "the entire fabric of human reason which we employ in the inquisition of
nature is badly put together and built up, and like some magnificent structure without any
foundation," and he proposed to begin "a total reconstruction of sciences, arts, and all
human knowledge, raised upon the proper foundations" (PW 24 1 ). He found that the state
of knowledge as it then existed was "not prosperous nor greatly advancing" and believed
that an entirely new way should be opened so that "the mind may exercise over the nature
of things the authority which properly belongs to it" ("Author's Preface," PW 243). The
new edifice that Bacon imagined was founded upon the empirical observation of ''things
of nature." This interrogation of nature was to be guided by a method that was itself
based upon human nature, i.e., a method that was designed according to Bacon's
understanding of the human perceptual and intellectual faculties. This method
accommodated the flaws in human nature that stood in the way of achieving more
accurate and productive knowledge. Bacon articulated two goals for the new instauration:
initially, he hoped to improve the human condition through technological innovation,
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which was to be achieved through experimentation; and, ultimately, he anticipated the
discovery of a philosophia primum, a set of general principles drawn from the careful and
methodical examination of particular instances. These goals encompass both the
pragmatic values of humanism and the desire for theoretical knowledge of the new
natural philosophy that was the basis for the scientific revolution.
The tasks that Bacon set for himself in the Jnstauratio Magno demonstrate the
degree to which his work was at once rhetorical and philosophical. The first task, which
was clearly rhetorical, was to make a case for the study of nature as appropriate work for
humanity. The second task, which he called a purging of the intellect, combined
rhetorical and philosophical elements. The third, the explication of his new method,
which included a gathering and winnowing of particulars, was clearly philosophical in
nature and intent. Further, to the degree that Bacon's great instauration was not merely a
method, but included recommendations for institutional change as a way of realizing the
method and gaining benefits from it, it is both humanistic and "scientific." Stoicism, with
its beliefs that nature was normative and that physics was the foundation upon which
other forms of philosophy were predicated, and humanism, which provided the rhetorical
strategies upon which Bacon draws, form the context for his efforts.

Making the Case for Natural Philosophy

Bacon's argument in favor of the study of nature as the basis for a new
epistemology was certainly not unique during the Renaissance, but it was among the
more sophisticated and successful of such efforts. Unlike Galileo who, for example, used
the rhetorical form of the dialogue to mitigate the impact of his "heretical" conclusions,74
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Bacon's intention was not merely to justify his own experimental and theoretical work.
Rather, he hoped to influence culture more broadly, arguing for the establishment of
institutions in which theoretical and productive endeavors would yield knowledge and
inventions that would improve the situation of humankind. In a cultural milieu in which
the foundations of knowledge and authority were under assault from all sides, Bacon's
"new philosophy" offered the promise of a degree of epistemological certainty to anyone
willing to engage in the careful and methodical study of nature. Nevertheless, he
recognized the need to accommodate the concerns of a number of different groups,
including natural philosophers and humanists. Bacon argued that the study of nature was
not the kind of mere solipsism of which the humanists accused their scholastic
predecessors, but a productive art that could yield tangible benefits for humankind. At the
same time, he countered the objections of theologians by arguing that nature was God's
creation. While he never directly presented a view of nature that refers directly to
Stoicism, he certainly drew on Stoic imagery and concepts to make his case.
Bacon did not contest the commonly accepted view of nature as a divine creation
that was corrupted as a result of the fall from grace of Adam and Eve. Rather, he
exploited the creation story effectively to his own ends. Prior to the fall, Bacon argued,
Adam had enjoyed a "pure and uncorrupted natural knowledge" ("Preface," PW 246). As
a consequence of the fall, Bacon suggests, such knowledge was no longer readily
available, but was hidden: "But the universe to the eye of the human understanding is
framed like a labyrinth; presenting as it does on every side so many ambiguities of way,
such deceitful representations of objects and signs; natures so irregular in their lines, so
knotted and entangled" ("Preface," PW 245). Though it is difficult for the human
understanding to penetrate the mysteries of nature, however, Bacon did not believe that
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those ways were chaotic or capricious. In his Confession ofFaith,15 Bacon describes how
the creation is governed by laws ordained by God:
He created heaven and earth, and all their armies and generations, and
gave unto them constant and everlasting laws, which we call Nature,
which is nothing but the laws of creation; which laws nevertheless have
had three changes or times, and are to have a fourth and last. The first,
when the matter of heaven and earth was created without forms: the
second, the interim of every day's work: the third, by the curse, which
notwithstanding was no new creation, but a privation on part of the virtue
of the first creation: and the last, at the end of the world, the manner
whereof is not yet revealed. So as the laws of Nature, which now remain
and govern inviolably till the end of the world, began to be in force when
God first rested from his works and ceased to create; but received a
revocation in part by the curse, since which time they change not. ( Works
vii.220- 1)
In representing nature as a regular system governed by laws established by God, Bacon
was able to argue for a reform of education based on natural philosophy.
Bacon recognized the need to deal with religious beliefs and the objections of the
church before advancing learning along the paths that he mapped out in the Instauratio
Magno. When he addressed his culture's "disgraces and discredits" of learning (Adv.
Learning, PW 43), he first addressed those of the divines. As Galileo's experience

illustrates, religious doctrine and institutions were, perhaps, the greatest impediment to
the pursuit of natural philosophy. In large part, the objections of the divines were related
to concerns that too much learning leads to the kind of arrogance and overreaching that
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lead to the fall, or to atheism, or that "contemplation of second causes doth derogate the
mind from our dependence upon God, who is the first cause" (44). Bacon also recognized
that it was not sufficient merely to critique the church's objections to learning; he needed
also to present an alternative model of natural knowledge that did not conflict with
religious doctrine. First, he makes a distinction between divine revelation and natural
philosophy and the means by which we are to understand them. In De augmentis, Bacon
distinguishes between the two types of knowledge:
For knowledge of man is as the waters. Some waters descend from above,
and some spring from beneath; and in like manner the primary division of
sciences is to be drawn from their sources; of which some are above in the
heavens, and some here below. For all knowledge admits of two kinds of
information; the one inspired by divine revelation, the other arising from
the senses . . . . I will therefore divide knowledge into Divinity and
Philosophy; meaning by Divinity Sacred or Inspired, not Natural Divinity.
(PW 453)

While divine knowledge must be accepted unquestionably, Bacon believes that natural
philosophy is subject to human reason. In dividing natural philosophy and divine
revelation in this way, Bacon avoided criticism that he was making the study of nature
superior to received Biblical knowledge. At the same time, however, he manages to
legitimate knowledge gleaned from nature so that it could be seen as roughly equivalent
to truths received from divine inspiration. In one of his fragmentary texts, Filum
Labyrinthi, 76 Bacon makes the case that knowledge gained from natural philosophy is not
16

Fi/um /abyrinthi (Thread of the Labyrinth) is a fragment that, according to Spedding, appears to
correspond to Bacon's Latin text, Cogitate et visa. It was not published until 1 794. Spedding speculates that
it was intended as part of the lnstauratio Magno and was not a further explanation of Bacon's method. At
any rate its late publication suggests it would not have been an influential text during the early modern
period. It does, however, help to clarify some of Bacon's thinking regarding the justification for making
natural philosophy the foundation for studies.
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the same as the knowledge of good and evil, the "temptation which caused the original
fall" (PW 209). First, he argues, knowledge of nature was already inherent in human
beings as "the light whereof man discerned of every living creature, and imposed names
according to their propriety" (209). Rather, it is moral philosophy that is harmful to the
extent that it seeks "moral knowledge of good and evil, affected to the end to depend no
more upon God's commandments, but for man to direct himself' (209). Bacon further
argues that, apart from this unquestionable acceptance of divine revelation, human beings
are not only allowed, but commanded to seek further knowledge.
[N]either could he find in any Scripture, that the inquiry and science of
man in any thing, under the mysteries of the Deity, is determined and
restrained, but contrariwise allowed and provoked; for concerning all other
knowledge the Scripture pronounceth, That it is the glory of God to

conceal, but it is the glory of man . . . to invent; and again, The spirit of
man is as the lamp of God, wherewith he searcheth every secret,· and again
most effectually, That God hath made all things beautiful and decent,

according to the return oftheir seasons; also that he hath set the world in
man 's heart, and yet man cannot find out the work which God worketh
from the beginning to the end; shewing that the heart of man is a continent
of that concave or capacity, wherein the content of the world (that is, all
forms of the creatures and whatsoever is not God) may be placed or
received. (P W 209; emphasis in original)
Bacon expands further the notion that humans have an obligation to study nature
by arguing that such study "tendeth highly to the magnifying of the glory of God in his
power, providence, and benefits; appearing and engraven in his works which without this
knowledge are beheld but as through a veil; for if the heavens in the body of them do
declare the glory of God to the eye, much more do they in the rule and decrees of them
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declare it to the understanding" (Fi/um Labyrinthi, PW 2 1 0). Such understanding of the
limitless possibilities of the power of God is, according to Bacon's reading of Scripture,
an imperative:
for to that purpose speaketh our Saviour in that first canon against heresies
delivered upon the case of the resurrection, You err, not knowing the
Scriptures, nor the power of God; teaching that there are but two fountains
of heresy, not knowing the will of God revealed in the Scriptures, and not
knowing the power of God revealed or at least made most sensible in his
creatures. (PW 2 1 O; emphasis in original)
The sense that the study of natural philosophy is a sacred activity is reflected in the
Preface and Plan of the /nstauratio Magno. In the Author's Preface, he prays
to God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, that
remembering the sorrows of mankind and the pilgrimage of this our life
wherein we wear out days few and evil, they will vouchsafe through my
hands to endow the human family with new mercies. This likewise I
humbly pray, that things human may not interfere with things divine, and
that from the opening of the ways of sense and the increase of natural light
there may arise in our minds no incredulity or darkness with regard to the
divine mysteries; but rather that the understanding being thereby purified
and purged of fancies and vanity, and yet not the less subject and entirely
submissive to the divine oracles, may give to faith that which is faith's.
Lastly that knowledge now being discharged of that venom which the
serpent infused into it, and which makes the mind of man to swell, we may
not be wise above measure and sobriety, but cultivate truth in charity. (PW
246-47)
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This prayer, which reiterates his intention not to question divine revelation, echoes a
similar prayer at the end of t,he Plan of the Work:
And all depends on keeping the eye steadily fixed upon the facts of nature
and so receiving their images simply as they are. For God forbid that we
should give out a dream of our own imagination for a pattern of the world;
rather may he graciously grant to us to write an apocalypse or true vision
of the footsteps of the Creator imprinted on his creatures.
Therefore do thou, 0 Father, who gavest the visible light as the
first fruits of creation, and didst breathe into the face of man the
intellectual light as the crown and consummation thereof, guard and
protect this work, which coming from thy goodness returneth to thy glory.
Thou when thou tumedst to look upon the works which thy hands had
made, sawest that all was very good, and didst rest from thy labours. But
man, when he turned to look upon the work which his hands had made,
saw that all was vanity and vexation of spirit, and could find no rest
therein. Wherefore if we labour in thy works with the sweat of our brows
thou wilt make us partakers of thy vision and thy sabbath. Humbly we
pray that this mind may be steadfast in us, and that through these our
hands, and the hands of others to whom we shall give the same spirit, thou
wilt vouchsafe to endow the human family with new mercies. (PW 25354)
While these prayers place the pursuit of natural philosophy clearly within a religious
context, their language also reflects the commitment to an active life that is characteristic
of Renaissance civic humanism. Bacon foresaw that the results of the study of nature
would be, not merely knowledge, but tangible benefits.
Bacon's view of nature provided a means by which to reconcile, not only some of
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the theological and epistemological conflicts of his time, but also the humanistic conflict
between the vita contempliva and the vita activa. He uses the metaphors of "mines" and
"caves" as a way of emphasizing the benefits to be gained from experimental and
technological work. In his view, by immersing oneself within these deep mines and
caves, it was possible both to divine nature's secrets and reproduce the results of her
actions for the benefit of one's fellow humans. Bacon's view of nature both synthesized a
variety of ideas contained within the many philosophical texts recovered by the
humanists and also provided a foundation which could be used to reconcile conflicts
inherent within the humanist project.
A common metaphor for portraying nature during the Renaissance was as a
secondary divine text, a book of nature equivalent to biblical texts. As Bouwsma
describes it, there emerged from the new research in natural philosophy "an insistence
that truth was of several kinds, among which the least certain was that composed by men.
But God . . . had revealed not only the way of salvation in Scripture, but also another set
of truths in the 'book of nature'" (The Waning ofthe Renaissance 1 85). Galileo used this
conceit in attempting to justify his research as reading the book of nature, as did Bacon
himself. 77 There is no doubt that the metaphor was a powerful one in a culture so deeply
embedded within a textual matrix as the Renaissance. In the Advancement ofLearning,
Bacon explains the ways in which philosopher's reading of the book of nature works to
support faith and religion:
There be two principal duties and services, besides ornament and
illustration, which philosophy and human learning do perform to faith and
religion. The one, because they are an effectual inducement to the
exaltation of the glory of God: For as the Psalms and other Scriptures do
77 See Charles Whitney, Francis Bacon and Modernity, 60-62, for a discussion of how Bacon developed
this metaphor to conceptualize his new philosophy.
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often invite us to consider and magnify the great and wonderful works of
God, so if we should rest only in the contemplation of the exterior of them
as they first offer themselves to our senses, we should do a like injury to
the majesty of God . . . . The other, because they minister a singular help
and preservative against unbelief and error: For our Saviour saith, You err,
not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God ; laying before us two
books or volumes to study, if we will be secured from error; first the
Scriptures, revealing the will of God, and then the creatures expressing his
power; whereof the later is a key unto the former; not only opening our
understanding to conceive the true sense of the Scriptures, by the general
notions of reason and rules of speech; but chiefly opening our belief, in
drawing us into a due meditation of the omnipotency of God, which is
chiefly signed and engraven upon his works. (PW 63-4)
In the Proemium to the Instauratio Magno, Bacon equates the study of nature with the act
of interpreting, i.e., reading, in order to make the somewhat paradoxical point that
humans, who are subservient to nature rather than its masters, may nevertheless gain
some degree of mastery over nature only by observing it:
For man is but the servant and interpreter of nature: what he does and what
he knows is only what he has observed of nature's order in fact or in
thought; beyond this he knows nothing and can do nothing. For the chain
of causes cannot by any force be loosed or broken, nor can nature be
commanded except by being obeyed. And so these twin objects, human
Knowledge and human Power, do really meet in one. (PW 253)
In this brief summary, Bacon represents the study of natural philosophy as a middle path
between many of the conflicts that characterized the early modem era. While he does not
refer specifically to religion, he presents the human pursuit of natural knowledge as a
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necessary and obedient act rather than as an attempt to rise above the power of the
Creator. In choosing to use the phrase "chain of causes," Bacon evokes the familiar
concepts of the great chain of being and the Aristotelian theory of causes, both of which
he will later challenge.78 He also manages, by asserting that human knowledge arid power
"meet in one," to resolve the humanist conflict between the vita contempliva and the vita
activa. In making his case for the study of natural philosophy, Bacon deploys a variety of
theological, literary, and philosophical arguments. Ultimately, it was Bacon's expertise in
the humanist art of rhetoric that allowed him to write and speak so eloquently on behalf
of natural philosophy.
In making the case for Stoicism as one of two faces of Renaissance humanism,
Bouwsma argues that the notion that nature is the expression of god is a primary
attraction: "[T]he hellenistic principle of immanence . . . makes the universe eternal, by
one means or another deifies the natural order, and by seeing a spark of divinity in man
tends to make him something more than a creature of God ("Two Faces of Humanism"
9). Bacon's view of nature as an orderly system that may ultimately be perceived and
even manipulated by human beings seems clearly to reflect this view. In the beginning of
the Book II of Novum Organum, Bacon uses the phrase natura naturans to describe the
specific or individual natures of the various elements of nature. The phrase, which
Spedding translates as "nature-engendering nature" is equivalent to "form," or "true
specific difference," or "source of emanation" (NO Il.i). According to Spedding, the
phrase is unique in Bacon's works, and suggests that "[w]ith the later Schoolmen, as with
Spinoza God was considered as the cause immanens of the universe, and therefore,
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These concepts were familiar to his audience, but it is unlikely that Bacon was referring to Aristotle's
theory of the four causes, which he ultimately rejects in the Novum Organum. It is likely that h is
understanding of causes is much closer to that of the Stoics.
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according to the latter at least, not hypostatically different from it" (PW 302, n. 1).79 The
Stoic view of god as logos, of course, was incompatible with Renaissance Christian
theology. However, Bacon's separation of divine knowledge from natural knowledge
allows him to follow the Stoic model without contradicting Christian beliefs.
The contradictions between Stoicism and Christianity are sufficiently great that
Bacon does not make obvious connections between the ancient philosophy and his own
new philosophy. It is also the case that the status of the Stoic textual legacy would have
made it difficult to formulate an authentic neo-Stoic physics. Additionally, the Stoic
concept of god was certainly at odds with that of Renaissance Christian theology.
However, the Stoics seem to be less concerned with the pantheon than with god as
reason. Diogenes Laertius says, for example, "God, intelligence, fate, and Zeus are all
one, and many other names are applied to him. In the beginning all by himself he turned
the entire substance through air into water" (7. 135). Aetius, too, said, "The Stoics made
god out to be intelligent, a designing fire which methodically proceeds toward the
creation of the world" ( 1 .7.33, HP 46A).
While Bacon does not directly attribute elements of his thought to Stoic
philosophy, the general assumption that nature is a source of normative knowledge is
very strong. In addition, there are intimations of the connection, many of which are found
in the images Bacon uses to describe human faculties and God as a maker or craftsman. 80
The Stoics used two primary images, fire and breath, or pneuma, in referring to reason,
the logos of the universe. Bacon does not often use the image of fire, but blends the Stoic
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Spinoza' s use of the term is significant since he is perhaps the most faithful interpreter of Stoicism in the
early modern age. See A. A. Long's discussion of Spinoza's Neosto icism in "Stoicism in the Philosophical
Tradition : Spinoza, Lipsius, Butler."
80
See Antonio Perez-Ramos' s discussion of Bacon's new philosophy as part of the "maker's knowledge
tradition in Francis Bacon 's Idea ofScience and the Maker 's Knowledge Tradition.
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image of breath with the Christian image of light. 8 1 In his essay, "Of Truth," Bacon
explores this image at length.
The first creature of God, in the works of days, was the light of the sense;
the last was the light of reason; and his sabbath work ever since, is the
illumination of his Spirit. First he breathed light upon the face of the
matter or chaos; then he breathed light into the face of man; and still he
breatheth and inspireth light into the face of his chosen. (PW 750)
Bacon uses both images, light and breath, in describing creation in a way that is
remarkably similar to the Stoic version of creation. The image of light, particularly in
referring to reason and intellect, is common throughout Bacon' s work. Davis also
demonstrates how Bacon uses the image of God as maker, craftsman, or architect in
describing God ( 1 67-68).
Bacon' s attempts at natural history are loosely patterned on those of the Roman
philosopher and playwright Seneca, who was also known for his moral essays and
epistles. Entitled Natura/es Quaestiones, these essays gather what is known about various
natural phenomena, such as "Lights in the Sky," "Terrestrial Waters," and "Lightnings
and Thunderings". Bacon' s own attempts at natural histories, which include De fluxu et
refluxu maris, Historia venturum, Historia vitae et mortis, and Historia densi et rari,
follow Seneca's in that they gather and compare various observations and theories on
their different topics. However, Bacon owes an even greater debt to Seneca, to the extent
that Seneca' s understanding of nature as a trove of nomative knowledge is a forerunner of
Bacon' s own. In the first of Seneca' s examinations of natural questions, he says:
I, for one, am very grateful to nature, not just when I view it in that aspect
which is obvious to everybody, but when I have penetrated its mysteries;

8 1 See Walter B. Davis's exploration of Bacon's use of this image in "The Imagery of Bacon's Late Work."
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when I learn what the stuff of the universe is, who its author or custodian
is, what god is; whether he keeps entirely to himself or whether he
sometimes considers us; whether he creates something each day or has
created it only once; whether he is a part of the universe or is the universe;
whether it is possible for him to make decisions today and to repeal in part
any sort of universal law of fate; whether it is a diminution of his majesty
and an admission of his error that he had done things which had to be
changed. If I had not been admitted to these studies it would not have been
worthwhile to have been born. ( 1.3-4)
Seneca also finds utility in the study of nature: "[T]he subtlety of thought exercised on
the mysteries of nature will be no less successful in dealing with plain problems" (111. 1 8).
Seneca also implies an equivalence between divine knowledge and natural knowledge
that is a pattern for Bacon's:
Aristotle has said excellently that we should never be more reverent than
when a subject deals with the gods. If we enter temples with composure,
if, when we are about to approach a sacrifice, we lower our eyes, draw in
our toga, if we assume every sign of modesty, how much more ought we
to do so when we discuss the planets, the stars, the nature of the gods, lest
in our ignorance we assert something rashly, impudently, or even lie
knowingly. (Natural Quaestiones VII 30. 1)
Finally, Seneca provides a foundation for Bacon's understanding of the great work that
needs to be founded upon the study of nature:
Nature does not reveal her mysteries once and for all. We believe that we
are initiates but we are only hanging around the forecourt. These secrets
are not open to all indiscriminately. They are withdrawn and closed up in
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the inner sanctum. This age will glimpse one of the secrets; the age which
comes after us will glimpse another. (VII.30. 6)
Bacon, too, insists that his work is merely a step onto the path, not a completed journey.
In the Plan of the Jnstauratio Magno, he describes the fifth part as an "Anticipation" of a
natural philosophy, "for temporary use only, pending the completion of the rest, like
interest payable from time to time until the principal be forthcoming" (PW 253). The
sixth and final part "which discloses and sets forth that philosophy by which the
legitimate, chaste, and severe course of inquiry which I have explained and provided is at
length developed and established," will be a long time in the making. He calls it a
beginning and "the fortune of the human race will give the issue" (253). Like Seneca, he
recognizes that the discovery of God through the study of nature is a long and arduous
task. For Bacon, that task must be predicated upon purging the intellect of mistaken
notions and old philosophies.

The Reform of Learning
In The Advancement ofLearning,82 Bacon speaks to the importance of education
in human society:
[L]et us conclude with the dignity and excellence of knowledge and
learning in that whereunto man's nature doth most aspire; which is
immortality or continuance; for to this tendeth generation, and raising of
houses and families; to this buildings, foundations, and monuments; to this
tendeth the desire of memory, fame, and celebration; and in effect, the
82

Bacon published The Advancement ofLearning in 1 605 . The text was expanded and translated into Latin
as part of the lnstauratio Magno, De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum, and published in 1 623.
Chronologically, De augmentis was the second part of the lnstauratio Magno as it was published
subsequent to the Novum Organum, although it precedes it in the organizational scheme. Spedding suggests
that the text may actually have been completed earlier and delayed by the translator ("Editor's Preface" to
De augmentis, PW 4 1 3).
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strength of all other human desires. We see then how far the monuments of
wit and learning are more durable than the monuments of power or of the
hands. [. . .] But the images of men's wits and knowledges remain in books
exempted from the wrong of time and capable of perpetual renovation.
Neither are they fitly to be called images, because they generate still and
cast their seed into the minds of others, provoking and causing infinite
actions and opinions in succeeding ages. (P W 73-4)
Education was the vehicle by which the values of humanism made their way through
Renaissance culture. According to Bouwsma,
Viewed simply as a shift in emphasis within latter medieval education,
Renaissance humanism may seem at first sight, a development of only
mild and specialized interest; it hardly appears a likely vehicle for the
cultural revolution widely associated with the renaissance. But, as recent
experience has compelled us to realize, education is peculiarly sensitive to
the world that surrounds it. For this reason pressures for the modification
of educational programs are likely to express - and so, perhaps, to reveal
- significant social change and even profound shifts in human values.
(Bouwsma, The Culture ofRenaissance Humanism 1)
There can be little doubt that Bacon was aware of the importance of education to cultural
change. In the Instauratio Magno, Bacon suggests that learning is the fundamental task of
human beings, one that is necessary for both spiritual and material improvement of the
human condition. This emphasis on learning as a means of bettering the human condition
is consonant with the values of Renaissance civic humanism, but Bacon's insistence upon
nature as the foundation for learning does not conform with the humanist educational
emphasis on the art of rhetoric and the study of ancient texts. The fact that Bacon's
proposal for the reform of education does not adhere strictly to the standard humanist
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curriculum should not be interpreted to mean, however, that he was anti-humanistic. He
did not, for example, remove rhetoric from the curriculum, but situated it within an
expanded curriculum for the study of language. His educational reforms should be
understood as an attempt to create a framework that would accommodate changes that
had come about as the result of the activities of humanists, as well as those of explorers,
artisans, and natural philosophers.
Bacon's goal was to develop an intellectual edifice that could accommodate all
the conflicting facets of contemporary culture. He saw the wisdom in recovered
philosophies, but he also recognized the degree to which the veneration of ancient
wisdom was stifling innovation. He adhered to the tenets of Protestantism, but recognized
the ways in which religious institutions impeded the practice of natural philosophy. He
was fascinated by the technological developments of his day and hoped, not only to
encourage them, but to coordinate such practical wisdom with natural philosophy.
Stoicism represented a synthetic and comprehensive philosophy and served as a model
for the kind of edifice for learning Bacon hoped to construct. In Ofthe Proficience and
Advancement ofLearning, Bacon set out his plan for a division of learning that would
lead to the kind of philosophically-based society that he hoped to create.
The Advancement ofLearning, which comprises an extensive proposal for the
reform of learning, is not merely a renunciation of humanist learning but a description of
a comprehensive system founded upon the study of nature. Moreover, Bacon's
educational reform is not merely curricular reform. Rather, it comprises a critique of the
epistemological milieu of the late Renaissance and makes recommendations for both
curricular and institutional reform. Furthermore, his curricular reform is not just a
reorientation of emphasis from rhetoric to another part of the traditional liberal arts
curriculum but describes a wholly new curricular organization based not upon the
traditional model but on human nature. The Advancement advocates replacing the
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traditional trivium and quadrivium with a division of the diciplines founded on natural
philosophy. Bacon claimed that his reforms were original, and to the extent that what he
described was unlike previous educational models, those claims are accurate. This is not
to say, however, that his ideas are completely new. In fact, the ideas that inform his
curricular reform demonstrate a significant debt to ancient philosophies, and most
especially to Stoicism.
In the Plan of the Instauratio Magno, Bacon describes the De augmentis as a
"summary or general description of the knowledge which the human race at present
possesses," including "not only things already invented and known, but likewise things
omitted which ought to be there" (PW 248). Bacon dedicated the Advancement of
Learning to King James as a tribute to the king's great intellect and erudition, a "fixed
memorial, and immortal monument bearing a character of signature both of the power of
a king and the difference and perfection of such a king" (PW 43). Bacon says that the
work will
consist of these two parts: the former concerning the excellency of learning
and knowledge, and the excellency of the merit and true glory in the
augmentation and propagation thereof; the latter, what the particular acts
and works are which have been embraced and undertaken for the
advancement of learning, and again what defects and undervalues I find in
such particular acts; to the end that though I cannot positively or
affirmatively advise your Majesty, or propound unto you framed
particulars, yet I may excite your princely cogitation to visit the excellent
treasures of your own mind, and thence to extract particulars for this
purpose agreeable to your magnanimity and wisdom. (PW 43)
Bacon follows in a tradition of giving advice to rulers that had been established by his
humanist predecessors, most famously, Machiavelli. The most notable precedent in the
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English tradition was Thomas Elyot's The Booke Called the Gouvernor, which dealt in
part with the proper character and training of a king. 83 Bacon's project differs, however,
in significant respects: first, his emphasis is not on virtue itself, but on philosophy - the
pursuit of knowledge, particularly knowledge of nature - as the proper path to attaining
virtue; second, his advice is not directed toward changing character per se, but on
changing the institutions and methods that, as far as the humanists were concerned, were
charged with shaping character. Nevertheless, Bacon's purpose is to argue for the
establishment of an educational system which would allow those who participate in it to
attain skills that will allow them to live a virtuous life.

Mapping the Epistemological Landscape
Just as Bacon required a thorough natural history as foundational for improving
natural philosophy, Bacon's plan for learning begins with a thorough survey of the
history and status of learning. In the first book of the Advancement ofLearning, Bacon
begins by addressing what he calls the "discredits and disgraces of learning," and he
provides what is essentially a map of the epistemological uncertainty of the late
Renaissance. Bacon delineates arguments against learning perpetuated by the "zeal and
jealousy of divines, . . . the severity and arrogancy of politiques, . . . and the errors and
imperfections of learned men themselves" (43) and then systematically responds to those
critiques. Divines, for example, object to learning on the grounds that the desire for
knowledge was the cause of original sin, that "knowledge puffeth up," that concern with
worldly knowledge distracts the attention from God, and that sometimes learned
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Elyot's text was published in 1 53 1 and dedicated to Henry VIII in a letter that, similarly, praises the
king's wisdom and learning. Elyot, however, was more concerned with explicating the qualities of a good
commonwealth. Bacon's sycophancy, perhaps, led him to limit his discussion of the King's character to
praise rather than advice. Also, by limiting his discussion to institutional and curricular reform of
education, he dealt with a subject in which he knew James was interested, but in which he had little direct
involvement. Also, James I was himself the author of a treatise on government, the Basilikon Doron, a
treatise written to his eldest son Henry to advise him how to rule when he became king.
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individuals have become atheists (43-4). "Politiques" object to learning on the grounds
that it makes men soft and unfit for war or civic life and that learning leads to indecision
or too much love for the contemplative life (46). In general, Bacon's response to these
"discredits and disgraces" are that they result from weakness of character rather than
being the fault of learning and that selfless devotion to learning is not the cause but the
cure for these problems (44-49). While Bacon considered these attitudes among "divines"
and "politiques" regarding the advancement of knowledge to have serious consequences,
he was more concerned about the attitudes of the learned themselves.
Bacon finds many problems with the contemporary state of learning, but he
focuses on the rhetorical practices of the humanists and the stultified logic of the
Scholastics as the most serious deficiencies of learning. He identifies three "distempers"
of learning which he considers to be the most serious obstacles standing in the way of the
advancement of learning: "the first, fantastical learning; the second, contentious learning;
and the last, delicate learning: vain imaginations, vain altercations, and vain affectations"
(PW 53). The last of these, which he treats first, is excessive concern with style, the most
extreme example of which was the euphuistic style of John Lyly. Bacon argues that the
humanists' preoccupation with the search for ancient texts and their admiration for the
style of those classical texts, which was precipitated both by their objection to the sterile
wranglings of scholastic philosophers and by the need to persuade a variety of audiences,
led84 to the
study of eloquence and copie of speech, which then began to flourish. This
grew speedily to an excess; for men began to hunt more after words than
matter; and more after the choiceness of the phrase, and the round and
clean composition of the sentence, and the sweet falling of the clauses, and
84

Bacon erroneously traces the humanist preoccupation wit rhetoric to Martin Luther's rebellion against
Catholicism.

95

the varying and illustration of their works with tropes and figures, than
after the weight of matter, worth of subject, soundness of argument, life of
invention, or depth of judgment. . . . Here therefore [is] the first distemper
of learning, when men study words and not matter. (54)
Bacon does not wholly prohibit the use of eloquence, for he recognizes its usefulness in
"civic occasions, of conference, counsel, persuasion, discourse, or the like" (55). Rather,
he objects to the tendency of eloquent discourse to curtail inquiry: "for surely to the
severe inquisition of truth, and the deep progress into philosophy, it is some hindrance;
because it is too early satisfactory to the mind of man, and quencheth the desire of further
search, before we come to a just period" (55).
Bacon is even more dismissive of scholastic logic, which he calls the second
distemper of learning. According to Bacon, scholastic logic demonstrated two indicators
of what he called "suspected and falsified sciences; the one, the novelty of and
strangeness of terms; the other, the strictness of positions, which of necessity doth induce
oppositions, and so questions and altercations" (55). In addition, he is critical of the
tendency for scholastic logic to become focused on its own processes rather than on the
subject under examination:
For the wit and mind of man, if it work upon matter, which is the
contemplation of the creatures of God, worketh according to the stuff, and
is limited thereby: but if it work upon itself, as the spider worketh his web,
then it is endless, and brings forth cobwebs of learning, admirable for the
fineness of thread and work, but of no substance or profit. (55) 85

85 The comparison of dialectic to spiders' webs, which Bacon uses throughout his works, is almost certainly
a borrowing from the Stoic philosopher Ariston, a member of the early Stoa, who wished to discard both
logic and physics. According to D iogenes Laertius, Ariston said, "Dialectical reasonings . . . are like
spiders' webs, which, though they seem to display some artistic workmanship, are yet ofno use" (DL
II. vii.161 ).

96

Bacon's primary objection both to rhetoric and logic was that they were more concerned
with language, i.e., with words and form of arguments, than with matter; they focused on
verba, rather than res. He does not, however, advocate doing away with logic and
rhetoric. Rather, he proposes a reform of education founded on nature, focusing on things
rather than words, but that nevertheless recognizes the importance of words when they
were kept in their place.
Curricular and Institutional Reform
In Book II of The Advancement ofLearning Bacon describes a comprehensive
reform of learning at both the institutional and disciplinary levels. At the institutional
level, he is concerned with resources, such as libraries, with support for scholars, and
with cooperation between and among educational institutions. This concern with
institutional aspects of education as a way to secure the blessing of learning for the good
of the citizenry is certainly consonant with the humanist tradition, and it demonstrates
Bacon's attempt to unite the vita activa and vita contempliva. Bacon hoped that James
would support in substantial material ways the educational reforms that he recommends
in the Instauratio Magno. In the Epistle Dedicatory, Bacon asks that James follow
Solomon's example in
talcing order for the collecting and perfecting of a Natural and
Experimental History true and severe (unencumbered with literature and
book-learning), such as philosophy may be built upon - such, in fact, as I
shall in its proper place describe; that so at length, after the lapse of so
many ages, philosophy and the sciences may no longer float in air, but rest
on the solid foundation of experience of every kind, and the same well
. examined and weighed. I have provided the machine, but the rest must be
gathered from nature. (PW 242)
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Bacon was not asking merely for James's encouragement; in fact, he hoped that James
would provide resources to endow institutions in which the research for this natural and
experimental history would occur. In the Advancement ofLearning, Bacon identifies
three "objects" involved in learning: places, books, and persons (PW 75). Regarding
books, he was concerned with the institution of libraries for assembling the works of
ancient authors and with commissioning the production of new and more accurate
translations of these authors (75).
There are four items to be considered regarding the places of learning:
"foundations and buildings, endowments with revenues, endowments with franchises and
privileges, institutions and ordinances for government; all tending to quietness and
privateness of life, and discharge of cares and troubles" (PW 76). Bacon was concerned
that the colleges and universities of Europe were primarily places for professional
education and argued that institutions dedicated to the arts and sciences were needed. He
argued for institutions that were devoted to the pursuit of theoretical knowledge in order
to form a better foundation for philosophical education. He also sought to reform faculty
compensation, arguing that the most competent teachers must be adequately
compensated. Education ought not, however, be focused solely on what is found in
books. Bacon also sought to encourage "men to sell their books and build furnaces" (PW
77). He wanted to build on the growing trend of experimental philosophy and sought
means of providing the instruments for that work. Finally, he was concerned with the
governance of educational institutions, particularly regarding curriculum and
communication between and among institutions (PW 77-79).
Having touched on the outlines of institutional reform, Bacon spends most of his
time in Book II on his recommendations for disciplinary and curricular reform, and it is
here that the complicated relationship between Bacon's thought and that of ancient
philosophies is most apparent. As his title Novum Organum indicates, Bacon saw his
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Great Instauration as a replacement for Aristotle's Organon, the set of philosophical texts
that formed the foundation for the received tradition of the Renaissance. As his
biographer Rawley indicates, Bacon very early developed a "dislike" of Aristotelian
philosophy for the "unfruitfulness" of his method, although he "ascribe[d] all high
tributes" to the author (PW 2). His comprehensive scheme for learning is imitative not
only of the wide-ranging approach of Aristotle's own school, but also of the broadly
based paideia tradition from the ancient world. 86 Rather, he proposed to classify the
disciplines according to human nature rather than tradition, but his organization was
nevertheless compatible with the humanist impulse to rely on ancient knowledge.
Bacon devised a disciplinary classification that was based on faculty
psychology, 87 the model of human psychology that was then current, and on distinctions
between the sacred and the mundane, consistent with distinctions he made between
natural and divine knowledge. Generally speaking, faculty psychology divided the human
psyche into a number of divisions, some appetitive, which applied to physical aspects of
behavior, and some intellective, which applied to mental activity. Bacon's classification
of the faculties was a relatively simple one, which made a primary distinction between
understanding and the will, which translated understanding into action. There was a
further division of the understanding into three parts: memory, imagination, and reason:
The parts of human learning have reference to the three parts of Man's
Understanding, which is the seat of learning: History to his Memory,
Poesy to his Imagination, and Philosophy to his Reason. Divine learning
receiveth the same distribution; for the spirit is the same, though the
revelation of oracle and sense be diverse[.] (Adv., PW, 79)
Bacon, of course, rejects the traditional organization into the trivium and quadrivium.
See Park and Kessler's discussion of faculty psychology in the Cambridge Companion to Renaissance
Philosophy, 455-63. For the influence of Stoicism on Renaissance views of faculty psychology, see A.H.T.
Levy 93ff.
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Bacon expands on his theories regarding the faculties and the division of the arts in

Descriptio Globi Intellectualis (A Description ofthe Intellectual Globe):
And hence it is evident that from these three fountains [memory,
imagination, and reason] flow these three emanations, History, Poesy, and
Philosophy; and that there cannot be other or more than these. For under
philosophy I include all the arts and sciences, and in a word whatever has
been from the occurrence of individual objects collected and digested by
the mind into general notions. Nor do I think that there is need of any other
division than this for Theology. For the information of revelation and of
sense differ no doubt both in matter and in the manner of entrance and
conveyance; but yet the human spirit is one and the same; and it is but as if
different liquors were poured by different funnels into one and the same
vessel. (Descriptio, P W 677)
Bacon's ideas regarding these faculties are based on his notions regarding impressions,
which are sensory images received by the mind. Impressions, which are the province of
history, are the "most ancient guests of the human mind, and are as the primary material
of knowledge" (PW 677). The mind "perpetually exercises itself, and sometimes sports"
with these impressions. He describes the process of human learning as follows:
For the images of individuals are received by the senses themselves and
fixed in the memory. They pass into the memory whole, just as they
present themselves. Then the mind recalls and reviews them, and ( which is
its proper office) compounds and divides the parts of which they consist.
For the several individuals have something in common one with another,
and again something different and manifold. Now this composition and
division is either according to the pleasure of the mind, or according to the
nature o f things as it exists in fact. (PW 677)
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When the mind's activity is "according to the pleasure of the mind" and involves the
transposition of "parts" of sensory impressions into "the likeness of some individual,"
Bacon places it within the province of poesy (PW 677). Imagination is the faculty related
to poesy and it is not "bound by any law and necessity of nature or matter," so that it may
"join things which are never found together in nature and separate things which are
primary parts of individuals" (PW 677). Nevertheless, imagination is constrained by the
primacy of impressions, for "of things that have been in no part objects of the sense, there
can be no imagination, not even a dream" (PW 677). While poesy is related to the
imagination, philosophy is the work of the faculty of reason and its material is the
"evidence of things, and as they really show themselves in nature, or at least appear to
each man's comprehension to show themselves" (PW 677).
Bacon's reorganization of learning, as it is represented in The Advancement of
Learning and its later Latin translation, De augmentis, is intended to be the means to

achieve a comprehensive and synthetic philosophy. In the ancient world, only the
Aristotelian and Stoic schools provide models for such a system, and there are clearly
problems with asserting that either is foundational for Bacon. Bacon himself declared his
general antipathy for Aristotle's method, and he was frequently critical of aspects of Stoic
philosophy. However, while it does not incorporate all aspects of Stoic philosophy,
Bacon's system is founded upon similar assumptions about the primacy of nature and
about its regularity and comprehensibility.
One remarkable aspect of Stoicism is the degree to which all parts of the
philosophy, i.e., physics or natural philosophy, logic, and ethics or moral philosophy,
were fully integrated with one another. The Stoics used a number of metaphors to
describe this interrelationship. According to Diogenes Laertius,
Philosophy, they say, is like an animal, Logic corresponding to the bones
and sinews, Ethics to the fleshy parts, Physics to the soul. Another simile
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they use is that of an egg: the shell is Logic, next comes the white, Ethics,
and the yolk in the center is Physics. Or again, they liken Philosophy to a
fertile field. Logic being the encircling fence, Ethics the crop, Physics the
soul or the trees. Or, again, a city strongly walled and governed by reason.
(vii,3 9)
In his description of his philosophical system Bacon invokes an organic metaphor that
echoes those used by the Stoics:
In philosophy, the contemplations of man do either penetrate unto God, or
are circumferred to Nature, or are reflected or reverted upon Himself. Out
of which several inquiries there do arise three knowledges, Divine
philosophy, Natural philosophy, and Human philosophy or Humanity. For
all things are marked and stamped with this triple character, of the power
of God, the difference of nature, and the use of man. But because the
distinctions and partitions of knowledge are not like several lines that meet
in one angle, and so touch but in a point; but are like branches of a tree
that meet in a stem, which hath a dimension and quantity of entireness and
contiuance, before it come to discontinue and break itself into arms and
boughs; therefore it is good, before we enter into the former distribution,
to erect and constitute one universal science, by the name of Philosophia
Prima, Primitive or Summary Philosophy, as the main and common way,

before we come where the ways part and divide themselves. (PW, Adv. of
Learning 89-90)

The educational system that Bacon proposed was predicated on the notion that nature,
which was the expression of the power and will of God, could be perceived, understood,
and, to a degree manipulated by human beings. It was, however, only by submitting
oneself to nature that it could be controlled. This submission to nature, which reflects
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both Stoic philosophy and Christian theology, is evident in Bacon's use of human nature,
or faculty psychology, as a means of organizing learning. Bacon's new philosophical
method also reflects his attempt to accommodate human nature's weaknesses as well as
its strengths.
Purging the Intellect

While there is no question that Bacon saw the goal of his project as an
improvement of the human situation, it clearly involves a transformation of more than
just the arts:
This doctrine, then, of the expurgation of the intellect to qualify it for
dealing with truth is comprised in three refutations: the refutation of the
philosophies; the refutation of the demonstrations; and the refutation of the
natural human reason. The explanation of which things, and of the true
relation between the nature of things and the nature of the mind, is as the
strewing and decoration of the bridal chamber of the mind and the
universe, the divine goodness assisting, out of which marriage let us hope
( and be this the prayer of the bridal song) there may spring helps to man,
and a line and race of inventions that may in some degree subdue and
overcome the necessities and miseries of humanity. ("Plan of the Work,"
P W 25 1)

Bacon recognizes the difficulty inherent in studying nature. Nevertheless, he believes that
penetration into nature's mysteries is possible, but only if first "a more perfect use and
application of the human mind and intellect be introduced" (246). The difficulty of the
task Bacon set for himself and his fellow human beings was worth it. The reward for
following the inductive method to observe nature was to "see things exactly as they are,"
and to gain the benefits which come from God's power.
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Although Bacon saw his project as the foundation of a new epistemological
system to replace the Aristotelian system that had so long held sway, it is not fully
system. This was the case, in part, because Bacon did not begin producing the bulk of his
philosophical works until late in his life, after his disgrace at court. More importantly,
however, Bacon saw his Great Instauration as a beginning of knowledge rather than the
end. The Plan of the lnstauratio Magno identifies six parts. The first part, the Division of
the Sciences, was published in 1 604 as The Advancement ofLearning. The second part
was the Novum Organum, or New Organon, an inductive method for making
observations of nature. The word "organon," which means instrument, referred at that
time to Aristotelian logical texts, in general, and more specifically to syllogistic
reasoning which was commonly used during the Renaissance. Bacon objected to
deductive reasoning because it was based on words, using propositions to derive other
propositions, rather than beginning with nature. Bacon considered that the state of
learning, as it then existed, was deficient because abstract principles had been hastily
derived from insufficient observation. Thus, he considered it necessary to purge the
intellect of this deficient learning before commencing the new instauration. The most
comprehensive discussion of these obstacles occurs in Novum Organum in the discussion
of the Idols of the Mind. Bacon identifies four idols that "so beset men's minds that the
truth can hardly find entrance, but even after entrance obtained, they will again in the
very instauration of the sciences meet and trouble us, unless men being forewarned of the
danger fortify themselves as far as may be against their assaults" (NO l.xxxviii). These
are the Idols of the Tribe, of the Cave, of the Marketplace, and of the Theatre.
The Idols of the Tribe are those that are inherent in human nature. Bacon says that
"perceptions as well of the senses as of the mind are according to the measure of the
individual and not according to the measure of the universe." The human understanding,
Bacon argues, is "like a false mirror, which receiving rays irregularly, distorts and
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discolours the nature of things by mingling its own nature with it" (I.xli). Bacon
summarizes the Idols of the Tribe as those which rise from "the homogeneity of the
substance of the human spirit, or from its preoccupation, or from its narrowness, or from
its restless motion, or from an infusion or the affections, or from the incompetency of the
senses, or from the mode of impression" (l.lii). In general, Bacon's idols of the tribe refer
to tendencies related to inferring general principles from particular instances (1.xlv-li).
The Idols of the Cave are those which are related to the "peculiar constitution,
mental or bodily, of each individual" and of the education and experiences which each
individual experiences (I.liii). The idols of the cave include an individual's preference for
a particular discipline, for antiquity or for novelty, for analysis or synthesizing (I.liii
lviii). These idols arise from "the predominance of a favourite subject, or out of an
excessive tendency to compare or distinguish, or out of partiality for particular ages, or
out of the largeness or minuteness of the objects contemplated" (l.lviii). Bacon suggests
that any student should be wary that "whatever his mind seizes and dwells upon" is
potentially an idol and that care should be exercised to "keep the understanding even and
clear" (l.lviii).
The Idols of the Marketplace are those related to discourse by which humans
interact with one another:
For it is by discourse that men associate; and words are imposed according
to the apprehension of the vulgar. And therefore the ill and unfit choice of
words wonderfully obstructs the understanding. Nor do definitions or
explanations wherewith in some things learned men are wont to guard and
defend themselves, by any means set the matter right. But words plainly
force and overrule the understanding, and throw all into confusion, and
lead men away into numberless empty controversies and idle fancies.
(1.xliii)
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Bacon believes that words are particularly problematic because, while "men believe that
their reason governs words . . . it is also true that words react on the understanding"
rendering intellectual enterprises "sophistical and inactive" (I.lix). Bacon identified two
specific types of linguistic idols: words that name things that do not exist and
propositions that result from faulty abstraction (I.lx).
The last of the four idols, the Idols of the Theatre, are neither innate, as are the
idols of the Tribe and the Cave, nor do they influence us without our being aware of it as
do the Idols of the Marketplace. Rather, Bacon says, the Idols of the Theatre "are plainly
impressed and received into the mind from the play-books of philosophical systems and
perceived rules of demonstrations" (I.lxi). He identifies three classes of philosophical
idols-sophistical or rational, empirical, and superstitious-all of which are "based on
too narrow a foundation of experiment and natural history, and decided on the authority
of too few cases" (I.lxii). The Sophistical schools, among which he includes the
philosophies of Aristotle, Anaxagorous, Leucipus, Democritus, Parmenides, Empedocles,
and Heraclitus, "snatch from experience a variety of common instances, neither duly
ascertained nor diligently examined and weighed, and leave all the rest to meditation and
agitation of wit" (I.lxii, lxiii). The empirical schools, which include the alchemists and,
perhaps, the philosophy of Gilbert, "having bestowed much diligent and careful labour on
a few experiments, have then made bold to educe and construct systems; wrestling all
other facts in a strange fashion to conform therewith" (I.lxii, lxiv). The superstitious
schools of philosophy, which include Plato and the Pythagoreans, "out of faith and
veneration, mix their philosophy with theology and tradition" (I.lxii, lxv). All of these
schools, argues Bacon, are concerned with what he calls the "quiescent" rather than the
"moving" or active princples of things (I.lxvi). While Bacon does not include Stoic
natural philosophy in his classification of the Idols of the Theatre, neither does he hold it
up as an example of an ideal philosophy and in fact suggests that Zeno and later heads of
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the school were among founders of "suspect schools."88 However, there are unmistakable
similarities between the Bacon's new philosophy and Stoic epistemology, which is
primarily concerned with understanding how human beings come to know the world and
to make sense of it. Given that the perfecting of an individual's rationality was the human
essential task, epistemological concerns were paramount for the Stoics. Critical to
perfecting rationality and achieving virtue was understanding how the individual gains
and evaluates knowledge. As Bacon's discussion of the Idols of the mind suggests, he
was also concerned with how knowledge is gained and secured.
The Stoics believed that the individual was born as a blank slate, a tabula rasa, or
a blank sheet on which experience is written: "When a man is born, the Stoics say, he has
the commanding-part of his soul like a sheet of paper ready for writing upon" (Aetius
4. 1 1 . 1 -4 [HP 39E]). Knowledge is gained in a number of ways. The initial apparatus by
which knowledge begins is the "impression." Stoics divided impressions into two main
categories, sensory and non-sensory. A great deal of knowledge, especially knowledge of
the material world, is gained primarily through se.nsory experience. The Stoics believed
that the individual's pneuma interacts with the pneuma of an external object, making an
"impression" on the mind. 89 Non-sensory impressions "are ones obtained through thought
such as those of the incorporeals and of the other things acquired by reason" (Diogenes
Laertius 7.49-5 1 [HP 39A]). The mind is not merely a paper upon which multiple
impressions are written. It also has associated with it and related to its rational nature,
what the Stoics called "incorporeals", which are concepts and functions the mind uses in
the process of gaining understanding. Sextus Empiricus listed four "species" of
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Bacon suggests that subsequent Roman and Arabic philosophies are tainted because they are based upon
the original Greek philosophies, and he includes Zeno, Chrysipus, and Carneades among the founders of
the suspect schools. (I.lxxi).
89
The Stoics describe sensory experience as an interaction between the immanent pneuma of the universe
and the pneuma within every human being. See Long, Hellenistic Philosophies, 1 55-58.
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incorporeals: sayables (lekta), void, time, and place (Against the Professors 10.218 [HP
27D]). The mind combines material impressions and incorporeals in the process of
gaining and evaluating information. According to Aetius, once something is perceived, a
memory remains, and a "plurality of impressions" leads to experience. He calls the
results of experience "conceptions," some of which occur through this process of
perception, while others come through "our own instruction and attention." These latter
are only called conceptions, while the original impressions are also called
"preconceptions." He says that reason develops from these preconceptions by the time an
individual is seven years old ([Aetius 4.11.1-4 [HP 39E]). Diogenes Laertius lists a
number of ways individuals come to think about sense-objects in order to create
conceptions from preconceptions, including similarity, analogy, transposition,
combination, opposition, transition and privation (Diogenese Laertius 7.53). The Stoics
also recognized several different species of impressions, including those which are
convincing, unconvincing, true, and false. 90 Thus, the result of a single sensory
experience could rarely be considered as genuine knowledge. The Stoics saw the process
of gaining authoritative knowledge as a three-stage process: the individual first sees a
thing in the world, after which an impression of the thing is made on the mind, and,
finally, the mind understands or grasps the thing. These phases of the process of gaining
knowledge were called "impression," "assent," and "cognition." Human beings, as
rational creatures, are able to differentiate between true and false impressions and only
those impressions that are true may be fully grasped, or known. An impression is not
sufficient, however, to count for knowledge. Once the impression is made, the individual
may begin to believe it is true, but until it is grasped and understood, that knowledge is
incomplete.
90

The Stoics recognized a number of combinations of categories of impressions. For a more complete
discussion, see Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors 7.242-6 .
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Knowledge is always subject to some criterion of truth. The Stoics made a
distinction between belief or opinion, which they called assent, and knowledge of
understanding. According to Sextus Empiricus, there are three states of knowledge which
are linked together:
scientific knowledge [episteme ], opinion [doxa], and cognition [katalepsis]
stationed between them. Scientific knowledge is cognition which is secure
and firm and unchangeable by reason. Opinion is weak and false assent.
Cognition in between these is assent belonging to a cognitive impression;
and a cognitive impression, so they claim, is one which is true and of such
a kind that it could not turn out false. Of these they say that scientific
knowledge is found only in the wise, and opinion only in the inferior, but
cognition is common to them both, and it is the criterion of truth. (Against
the Professors 7. 1 5 1-7 [HP 4 1 C])

In some instances, true impressions come from experiencing "what is" exactly as it is.
However, other impressions were shown to be true in other ways such as through logical
demonstration. 9 1
The Stoics used a variety of metaphors to describe the process by which the
rational human gains knowledge and understanding. They compare impressions to the
impression made in wax, with true impressions being made in a "craftsmanlike" way
(Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors 7.247-52 [HP 40E]); they also compare the
process to a hand that curls its fingers to hold the impression and then grasps knowledge
firmly in its fist:
Zeno used to clinch the wise man's sole possession of scientific
knowledge with a gesture. He would spread out the fingers of one handand
91

See Long and Selby's discussion of criteria of truth in Hellenistic Philosophers 249-53 .
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display its open palm, saying, "an impression is like this." next he
clenched his fingers a little and said, "Assent is like this. ' Then, pressing
his fingers quite together, he made a fist, and said that this was cognition
(and from this illustration he gave that mental state the name of katalepsis,
which it had not had before.) Then he brought his left hand against his
right fist and gripped it tightly and forcefully, and said that scientific
knowledge was like this, and was possessed by none except the wise man.
(Cicero, Academia 2. 1 45 )
Cicero neatly summarizes Stoic epistemology in this way:
The mind itself, which is the source of the senses and is even identical
with the senses, has a natural force which it applies to the things by which
it is activated. So it seizes some impressions in order to make immediate
use of them, others, which are the source of memory, it stores away so to
speak, while all the rest it arranges by their likenesses, and thereby
conceptions of things are produced, which the Greeks call sometimes
ennoiai and at other times prolepsis. With the addition of reason, logical
proof and a multitude of innumerable facts, cognition of all those things
manifests itself and reason, having been perfected by these stages, arrives
at wisdom. (Cicero, Academica 2.30- 1)
While Bacon does not fully delineate the process by which cognition occurs, it is
clear from his description of the various Idols of the Mind that cognition is a process
which requires significant attention. And while Bacon does not refer to Stoic cognitive
theory in Novum Organum, he does use Stoic terminology. For example, he calls inferior
forms of knowledge, such as that gained from the deficient philosophical schools, or that
which is imagined, or that which comes from the weakness of human understanding,
impressions. He also uses the term "assent" to describe a firm understanding, and the
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ultimate term for "understanding truly" is eucatalepsia (I.cxxv). Bacon believed that it
was possible to obtain a true and faithful knowledge of the world, and that such
knowledge could lead to the betterment of the human condition:
Again, it will be thought, no doubt, that the goal and mark of knowledge
which I myself set up . . . is not the true or best; for that the contemplation
of truth is a thing worthier and loftier than all utility and magnitude of
works; and that this long and anxious dwelling with experience and matter
and the fluctuations of individual things drags down the mind to earth or
rather sinks it to a very Tartarus of turmoil and confusion; removing and
withdrawing it from the serene tranquility of abstract wisdom a condition
far more heavenly. Now to this I readily assent; . . . For I am building in
the human understanding a true model of the world, such as it is in fact,
not such as man's own reason would have it to be; a thing which cannot be
done without a very diligent dissection of the world. But I say that those
foolish and apish images of worlds which the fancies of man have created
in philosophical systems, must be scattered to the winds. Be it known how
vast a difference there is between the Idols of the human mind and the
Ideas of the divine. The former are nothing more than arbitrary
abstractions; the latter are the creator's own stamp upon
creation,impressed and defined in matter by true and exquisite lines.
(I.cxxiv)
The "true model of the world" that Bacon hoped to build in human understanding was
predicated upon a new inductive method, which is the subject of Book II of the Novum

Organum.
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The New Organon
If Bacon's argument for the practice of natural philosophy cogently addresses the
epistemological anxieties of the period, his new method has little to offer as a remedy. The
"kind of logic," which he describes at length in the second book of the Novum Organum,
was meant to replace the stultifying Aristotelian logic that was then in wide use and that
had been developed to an extreme degree by the Scholastics. Organon, which means
"instrument," referred to a series of Aristotle's texts (Categories, On Interpretation, Prior
and Posterior Analytics, Topics, and Sophistical Refutations) that are related to logic and
method. Perhaps the most significant difference between Aristotle's organon and Bacon's
new philosophical method, was that Aristotle inluded a variety of logical strategies while
Bacon advocated a single logical method (induction) for all types of inquiry. He argues
that the method he proposes is new, based as it is upon inductive logic. While it is true that
inductive logic is not the primary logic of ancient philosophies in general, nor of Stoic
logic in particular, it certainly was not unknown. However, Bacon argues that his
inductive logic is different from that of the ancients: "While it might be assumed that the
ancients provided at the outset of their speculations a great store and abundance of
examples and particulars, digested the same into notebooks under heads and titles, from
them completed their systems and arts, and afterward, when they understood the matter,
published them to the world" (1.cxxv), that is not the case, as is evident from their own
descriptions of their work. Rather, they "flew at once to the most general conclusions, or
first principles of science" having examined only "a few examples and particulars (with
the addition of common notions perhaps of some of the received opinions which have
been most popular)" {l.cxxv). Unlike the unfinished induction of his predecessors,
Bacon's system advocated the gathering of instances and particulars as a foundation from
which to infer general laws.
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The exhaustiveness of assembling particulars was not the only difference between
Bacon's inductive method and that of his predecessors. He was also concerned with
examining active principles rather than "quiescent" elements of things, i.e., the elements
of which they are composed. At the beginning of Book II, Bacon makes a distinction
between the aims of human power and knowledge. The aim of human power is "to
generate and superinduce a new nature or new natures" on a given body, while the aim of
human knowledge is to "discover the form, or true specific difference, or nature
engendering nature, or source of emanation (for these are terms which come nearest a
description of a thing)" (I.i). The secondary goal of human power is the transformation of
concrete bodies and of knowledge, "the discovery in every case of generation and motion,
of the latent process, carried on from the manifest efficient and the manifest material to
the form which is engendered and in like manner the discovery of the latent configuration
of bodies at rest and not in motion" (Li). He privileges knowledge over power, and
suggests that without knowledge, power is limited. Bacon's inductive method is the means
by which knowledge is accumulated and secured.
Bacon's ideas regarding the composition of matter bear little resemblance to those
of other philosophical schools. Although he grants the appropriateness of Aristotle's four
causes, for example, he dismisses the system as ineffective in improving the
understanding of the nature of things or leading to an active science (I.ii). He is concerned
with discovering "Forms," but insists these do not correspond to the Platonic theory of
forms as abstract Ideas, for "in nature nothing really exists besides individual bodies,
performing pure individual acts according to a fixed law" (I.ii). Thus, he adopts terms
from other philosophies without sufficiently redefining them. The method of tables he
derives from these is equally confusing. It consists of a series of tabulations of what he
calls "simple natures," qualities such as hard, soft, dense, light, porous, nonporous. The
first table consists of instances in which the given nature is present, while the second table
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consists of instances which resemble those of the first table, but from which the given
nature is absent. The third table consists of instances in which the given nature increases
or diminishes in response to alterations of physical conditions. The instances are combined
with what Bacon calls "simple motions" and with a set of terms-such as "like," "unlike,"
"possible," "impossible"-which he calls "transcendentals." 92 In Bacon's system, the
transcendentals are used for forming predicates and establishing the essential definitions
that he seeks.
The success of Bacon's endeavor was mixed. The natural history, i.e., the
gathering of instances, he proposed was admired and adopted by many of the natural
philosophers of his day, particularly in England. If any significant tabulations of instances
ever occurred, it failed to produce the philosophia primum Bacon hoped for. Lisa Jardine
argues that Bacon's new logic received two quite different receptions in the early modem
period. On the one hand, Bacon was seen by members of the British Royal Society,
including Hooke, Herschel, Mill, and Wilkins, as the founder of the empirical school,
particularly because of "the centrality to scientific endeavor of carefully tabulated and
collated descriptions of external qualities of natural phenomena" ("Experientia literata or
Novum Organum?" 47). Others, such as Gassendi and Mersenne, saw Bacon as a "system
builder, intent on finding the indemonstrable first principles of things-the hidden
essential natures of things-by means of a new logic" (48). However, they doubted the
possibility "of getting from our particular experience of natural phenomena to the most
profound generalities underlying these-the essential natures of which our senses detect
only the external symptoms" (49) and suggest that there is no way to achieve anything
more than a high degree of confidence, and not the "certainty of scientia" (60). The
difficulty with the method, from either point of view, is that it begins with a "sceptical
92

Lisa Jardine notes that Bacon's "transcendentals" are associated with Aristotle's "transcendentals." See
"Experientia literata or Novum organum?" (4 7).
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suspension of belief in 'doxa' or received opinion" ( 60) and defers the realization of
general principles. Jardine argues that there are two ways of proceeding from this starting
point. First is to "pare away all the superstructure of inference based on faulty sense
perception, received conventions of reasoning, and received beliefs and theories, inference
that impedes the operation of an otherwise adequate intellectual faculty-and build
scientia afresh a priori from there" (60). Certainly, this is what Bacon claims he is doing
in the first book of the Novum Organum. The other alternative, according to Jardine, "is
the radical sceptical one of giving up the quest for certainty in natural philosophy
altogether, and being content instead with systematic attempts at providing limited
possibilities for some kind of action in the form of tentative generalizations about the most
readily accessible regularities in nature" (60). Jardine argues that Bacon attempts to have
it both ways, "man of experimental science on the one hand; Aristotelian essentialist on
the other" (60).
The discrepancy that Jardine identifies is mitigated by the belief, which Bacon
shares with the Stoics, that it is possible to penetrate the mysteries of the physical world
using the rational faculty. In the Preface to the /nstauratio Magno, Bacon claims that
through his method he has "established forever a true and lawful marriage between the
empirical and rational faculty, the unkind and ill-starred divorce and separation of which
has thrown into confusion all the affairs of the human family" (PW 246). Bacon echoes
the claims of Seneca regarding the penetrability of nature's secrets:
The very one who handles this universe, who established it, who laid the
foundations of all that is and placed it around himself, and who is the
greater and better part of his work, has escaped our sight; he has to be
perceived in thought. Moreover many things related to the highest divinity
or allotted a neighboring power are obscure. Or perhaps-which may
surprise you more-they both fill and elude our vision. Either their
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subtlety is greater than the human eye-sight is able to follow or such a
great majesty conceals itself in too holy a conclusion. It rules its kingdom
- that is itself- and grants no admission to any except the mind.
(Natura/es Quaestiones VII, 30. 3-4)

Like Seneca, Bacon believed that achieving this knowledge was a slow and methodical
process. Unlike the Stoics, however, who believed knowledge of nature would lead to
individual virtue, Bacon followed his humanist values and saw nature's lessons as a
means for improving the status of humankind.
The Essays as Method

For Bacon, who sought to establish a synthetic and comprehensive philosophical
system, nothing would have been more desireable than to develop a universal logic that
was transferrable across disciplines. As the passage from the Novum Organum at the
beginning of this chapter indicates, Bacon believed that his method was such a universal
logic. The Essays, for which he is perhaps best known in this century, represent just such
an experiment. Although the style of the Essays seems contrived and awkward to today's
audiences, they continue to be studied as a forerunner of a form which is now fully
developed and widely used. Montaigne was the first to use the term essay, which is
derived from the Latin exagium, the act of weighing, to describe a rather loose discursive
form, generally personal in nature, in which the author speculated on subjects of interest
both to individuals and society at large. Montaigne's essays, first published in 1 580, are
clearly personal and exploratory in nature and were intended to take the place of
conversations with his closest friend, Etienne de La Boetie (Frame v). The Essays in
Bacon's first edition, published in 1 597, lack the personal voice that characterizes
Montaigne's works, and seem clearly intended for a public audience. They are not meant
to share his uncertainties, but to offer to his audience the benefit of his meditations on
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commonly held views on various subjects. This first edition, published in 1597, was
entitled Essays. Religious Meditations. Places ofperswasion and disswasion, and
included ten essays, Meditationes Sacrae, and Ofthe Colours of Good and Evil, a
Fragment. Mediationes Sacrae are typical of Renaissance religious meditations, and The
Colours of Good and Evil, is Bacon's "improvement" on a set of similar arguments in

Aristotle's Rhetoric. Bacon continued to work on The Essays throughout his life and
published two additional editions, one in 1612 and the third in 1625, a year before his
death. The third and final edition contained a total of fifty-eight essays, including thirty
eight from previous editions which had been revised and expanded. 93 Although Bacon
considered The Essays to be a tangential and relatively unimportant part of his total body
of work, they are not unrelated to the rest of his philosophy. 94 Perhaps, most importantly,
they demonstrate the degree to which Bacon's project is related to the Stoic form of
Renaissance humanism.
In a letter dedicating the 1597 edition to his brother Anthony, Bacon explains that
he is motivated to publish the essays because they were about to be published by others.
He expresses uncertainty about the propriety of doing so, acknowledging that there
"mought be as great a vanitie in retiring and withdrawing mens conceites . . . from the
world as in obtruding them." Nevertheless, Bacon says that he has "played my selfe the
Inquisitor, and find nothing to my understanding in them contrarie or infectious to the
state of Religion, or manners, but rather (as I suppose) medicinable." The form of the
Essays seems peculiar to modem readers. They do not consist of an argument with

evidence. Rather, they consist of a series of statements, or sententiae, about a subject.
93

For a brief but thorough discussion of the publication history, see "A Note on the Text and Annotation"
in the Penguin edition of The Essays by John Pilcher. For a more comprehensive discussion, see R. W.
Gibson's Francis Bacon: A Bibliography of his works and Baconiana to the Year 1 750.
94
See RS. Crane, "The Relation of Bacon' s Essays to His Program for the Advancement of Learning" for
a discussion of how the Essays are related to the rest of Bacon's philosophical project.
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Sometimes, Bacon juxtaposes contradictory aphorisms. Other times, he lists a number of
commonplace assumptions about a subject, and then offers information which challenges
them all. The experience of reading the Essays is confusing, perplexing. According to
Stanley Fish, "the demands of the prose have left the reader in a state of ' healthy
perplexity,' neither content with the notion he had been inclined to accept at the
beginning of the experience, nor quite ready to put forward a more accurate notion of his
own" ("Georgics of the Mind" 262). Fish likens the state of mind induced in the reader of
Bacon's Essays to that of the scientists, "observant, methodical, cautious, skeptical, and
yet in long range terms, optimistic" (262). The relationship of the aphoristic style of the
essays to the inductive logic of Bacon's new philosophy, has been demonstrated amply
by a number of scholars including Crane, Wallace, and Vickers. What has been explored
less fully, however, is the relationship of the style of the essays to the inductive method.
The Essays operate in the realm of the contingent; they deal with subjects such as
truth, dissimulation, envy, love, marriage and the single life, studies, and even gardens,
about which there is much disagreement and for which there is little solid theoretical
knowledge available to help us negotiate our differences. This is precisely the realm
which Renaissance humanists saw as their arena. Moreover, Bacon uses many of the
same tools that the humanists employed. Certainly, his Essays are not the polished and
copious rhetoric of the humanists, but they deploy the same types of evidence:
commonplaces, opinion, and, very frequently, appeals to the authority of the ancients and
to Biblical authority .95 What is perhaps most convincing in regards to the humanistic bent
of the Essays is the way Bacon describes the action of various rhetorical strategies in The
Advancement of Learning:
95

Fish argues that that Bacon does not, in fact, value sententiae from the ancients or the Bible any more
highly than any other evidence and that his use of such sententiae in the Essays serves to teach new readers
to value all sources of evidence equally (269-27 1 ). Certainly, it is the case that Bacon sought to develop
additional sources of authority, but he continued to value the wisdom of the ancients very highly.
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And surely if the purpose be in good earnest not to write at leisure what
men may read at leisure, but really to instruct and suborn action and the
active life, these Georgics of the mind, concerning the husbandry and
tillage thereof, are no less worthy than the heroical descriptions of Virtue,
Duty, and Felicity. (PW 134)
It is clearly to the active life that Bacon addresses these ruminations.
In his summary of previous analyses of Bacon's essays, Fish notes that
commentators have had difficulty reconciling the moralistic goal of the Essays with the
analytical method. Fish suggests that the difficulty these commentators have is in the
"assumed equation of ' scientific' and 'objective"' (253). Rather, he says, the "experience,
rather than the materials of which it is composed, is what is scientific about the Essays"
(253). Two things are problematic about this assertion. First, from the perspective of
modern science, "experience" is not "scientific." The whole point of modem science is
that the personal is discounted, that the subjectivity of the researcher is, to the greatest
degree possible, removed from the experiment. Second, Fish' s insistence upon dealing
with the "experience" of the Essays suggests that their goal is not to establish some kind
of objective truth, however that might be construed, but to produce a certain kind of
person. That sort of development of moral character has largely been the province of
humanists, not scientists. Thus, while Bacon's Essays may, indeed, be related to his new
philosophy, they are not really "scientific."
The perplexing nature of Bacon's Essays is not a function of their being
"scientific," but of their reflecting the Stoic strain of humanism rather than the more
familiar Augustine/Ciceronian strain. A clue to interpreting the function, purpose, and
tradition of the Essays lies in the subtitle Religious Meditations. Places ofperswasion
and disswasion. Meditation was a common activity during the Renaissance, and was
generally not merely a mental discipline, but was practiced in writing. Generally,
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meditation was a personal and spiritual practice, a means of examining and improving an
individual's own soul. For Bacon, however, it seems clear that the practice of meditation
could be applied much more broadly.
Bacon' s Essays seem clearly related to the Stoic practice of meditatio, especially
to that of Marcus Aurelius, whom Bacon greatly admired. However, to the degree that
they are highly prescriptive acts related to judgment and persuasion and active rather than
passive in nature, Bacon' s essays are also humanistic and dialogic in nature. In his
examination of meditatio, Robert Newman suggests that the process of meditation is not
merely a logical exercise, particularly as it was practiced by Seneca. The meditatio
cannot appeal only to the intellect; the whole person must change, and, therefore, the
emotions, which are more difficult to overcome since they are not dependent on reason,
must be the primary target of meditation. The constant and rigorous application of
particular phrases and images helps to work on these emotions; they interiorize the
meditatio by driving its considerations deep into the soul. As Seneca illustrated, simple
syllogisms do not have the same force as repeated, hard-hitting phrases, since syllogisms
entertain the mind, but do not effect one's emotional reaction. ( 1 47 5).
Newman also argues that the use of rhetorical devices is a necessary component of
meditatio, since its purpose is to persuade. "The powerful images and paradoxes which
make up the meditatio are necessary to strip away the surface covering of opinion and to
reveal a thing as it really is" (1 478).

Bacon's New Philosophy as Humanistic Science
In describing Bacon' s proj ect, Gaukroger argues that his goal was
to harness firmly to the yoke of the state a new attitude to knowledge, and
in the course of attempting to do this, he was led to think through and
transform this new attitude to knowledge . . . . The obj ect of this reform
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was both the practice and the practitioners of natural philosophy. He was
concerned to reform a tradition of natural philosophy in which the central
ingredients were areas such as natural history and alchemy: empirical,
labour-intensive disciplines. (6)
Such a project is, of course, completely in keeping with the humanistic commitment to
the vita activa, and Bacon's texts that deal with natural philosophy are all active in their
focus. Both the Advancement ofLearning and its expanded edition De augmentis
describe contemporary objections to learning, enumerate the obstacles standing in the
way of its advancement, and propose a reform of education, founded on the study of
nature, including both theoretical and productive branches. The same can be said for the
Novum Organum, a description and demonstration of his inductive method, which Bacon
saw as a the means to laying the groundwork for an "active" science; and even those
texts in which he deals directly with natural philosophy are primarily examples of his
inductive method at work. But given Bacon's beliefs about the state of learning in his
own time, how could it be otherwise? Theoretical knowledge was one goal of the new
philosopher's activities in the caves and mines of nature.
Gaukroger describes Bacon's project as a "transformation of philosophy," a
description with which Bacon would, no doubt, concur. However, Bacon's investigations
of natural phenomena do not approach the quality of those of his contemporaries such as
Galileo and Boyle, and quite often he had little respect for their ideas. It is, perhaps, not
surprising that this is the case since Bacon's education was that of a humanist and his
professional life was carried out in the law courts, the parliament, and the courts of
Elizabeth I and James I. Moreover, as has previously been noted, philosophy was not
generally part of the humanist project, which was more concerned with rhetoric and other
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linguistic studies. 96 Thus, while Bacon describes a significant and comprehensive reform
of learning, his writings resemble humanist practical wisdom more than philosophical
texts. His recommendations for educational reform and his new method provided a new
focus for study, a structure within which that study could take place, a heuristic for
carrying it out, and a rationale for doing so. Rather than a transformation of philosophy,
Bacon's contribution might more accurately be characterized as a rhetorical effort, a
justification of natural philosophy and a plan for its nourishment and growth. Although
Bacon ultimately contributed little to the practice of natural philosophy, he did provide a
view of nature that accommodated both traditional theology and new claims based on the
work of natural philosophers. Bacon drew on a variety of cultural commonplaces in
making a case for orderly and rational nature. Bacon's inductive logic owes two principal
debts to Stoicism. First, the Stoic view of nature as an orderly and creative process,
helped Bacon make a case for nature as rule-ordered and comprehensible in an age when
nature was largely regarded as mysterious and susceptible to the will of the Creator. The
Stoic conflation of god with reason was useful for Bacon in this regard. Second, elements
of Stoic epistemology served as a rationale for doing away with contemporary
philosophy and as a foundation for Bacon's new inductive method. His borrowings from
the Stoics provided Bacon with a means of expanding the humanist project and
stabilizing the epistemological uncertainty of the Renaissance.
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See Kristeller's discussion of humanism's limited emphasis on moral philosophy in Renaissance
Thought and Its Sources.
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CHAPTER THREE

"TO SECOND REASON AND NOT TO OPPRESS IT":
STOIC INFLUENCE ON BACON'S THEORIES OF RHETORIC AND DISCOURSE
Yet there hapn'd in my time one noble Speaker who was full of gravity in
his speaking. His language, where hee could spare or passe by a jest, was
nobly censorious. No man ever spake more neatly, more presly, more
weightily, or suffer'd lesse emptinesse, less idleness, in what hee uttered.
No member of his speech but consisted of the owne graces. His hearers
could not cough or looke aside from him without losse. Hee commanded
where hee spoke, and had his Judges angry and pleased at his devotion.
No man had their affections more in his power. The feare of every man
that heard him was lest hee should make an end.
-Ben Jonson 97

Rhetoric is subservient to the imagination, as Logic is to the
understanding,; and the duty and office of Rhetoric, if it be deeply looked
into, is no other than to apply and recommend the dictates of reason to
imagination, in order to excite the appetite and will.
-Francis Bacon98

93
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Timber 26.
De aug., PW 535.
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Twentieth-century narratives of the scientific revolution have failed to
acknowledged the importance of Bacon' s role as an apologist for the new philosophy. In
fact, Koyre's derisive sneer at Bacon' s characterisation of himself as a "buccinator" of
science suggests that Koyre believed the role of one who announced the arrival of the
new philosophy was a largely insignificant one. But for those who understand the
generative power of language, to announce something is, in a sense, to make it so. In fact,
it is Bacon' s recognition of the power of language to obscure humankind's perception of
"the true nature of things" that impels much of his new philosophy. Not only have
historians of science such as Koyre failed to recognize the significance of this role, so
have many scholars of rhetoric and discourse, who have considered Bacon to have been
the progenitor of an anti-rhetorical approach to discourse. Bacon's reputation as one who
sought to put an end to humanism is based largely on his expressed aversion to
Aristotelianism as a stultifying veneration of the past at the expense of the future, his
claims for the novelty of his new system, and his concern that the humanist emphasis on
rhetoric came at the expense of better knowledge of things. This understanding of
Bacon's philosophy is entirely compatible with the common narrative of the scientific
revolution as the triumph of abstract Platonism over stultified, medieval Aristotelianism
and with assertions that the move toward modernity encompassed an attempt to find a
plainer, more transparent discursive style. However, the notion that Bacon' s ideas were
completely novel and that he owed nothing to the ancients is not justified by a reading of
his works, which mined the full gamut of ancient texts-mythologies, philosophies,
histories and sacred texts-for commonplaces to support his arguments.99 Moreover,
while Bacon may have criticized the copious style of his contemporaries, he was well
trained by humanist tutors in the art of rhetoric and reputed to be one of its finest
99

See Brian Vickers, "The Myth of Francis Bacon's 'Anti-humanism '," for a deconstruction of the various
arguments that Bacon was anti-humanist.
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practitioners in seventeenth-century England. As a humanist trained in rhetoric and as the
self-proclaimed "buccinator" of the new philosophy, Bacon would certainly have
recognized that producing and deploying arguments to advance the new philosophy was
�t least as important as developing a sty le of discourse particularly suited to the new
epistemological endeavors.
Bacon's anxiety about language has often been misrepresented as more radical
than it actually was. While it is true that Bacon was deeply concerned about some of the
discursive practices of his contemporaries, he was educated in a system that emphasized
rhetoric and, if we are to believe the accounts of his contemporaries such as Ben Jonson,
was one of its most adept practitioners. There is no question that among Bacon's most
significant contributions to modernity was the development of a "plain" style, but the
antecedents of that style and its relationship to contemporary rhetoric, its relation to his
epistemology, and its later influence continue to be subject to considerable debate.
According to many modem histories of discourse, Bacon's plain style de-emphasizes
aesthetic considerations and attempts to achieve a kind of transparency in representing its
subject clearly and accurately. While it is certainly the case that much of Bacon's prose,
when compared to the Ciceronian and Euphuistic styles of his contemporaries, is
somewhat less ornate, it is a serious misstatement to suggest that he believed in the
possibility of a "transparent" language in which there was no gap between signifier and
signified. In fact, Bacon expressed serious doubts regarding the possibility of clear and
accurate communication. Rather, his style is based on a belief that the gap between words
(verba) and the things (res) they represent, when combined with certain limitations of

human nature, society, and intellectual practices, make such communication difficult, if
not impossible. More to the point, however, the suggestion that Bacon's sole contribution
to the development of science is the plain style, misrepresents his ideas about language
and the degree to which discursive practices are imbedded in all human endeavor.
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Furthermore, such a simplistic view of Bacon's work fails to examine the ways in which
his theories about and use of language serve as a bridge between humanism and the new
philosophy that is the forerunner to modem science. Bacon's ideas regarding language
were formed within the humanist rhetorical tradition and are based upon a rhetorical
sensitivity to language as human interaction, just as his reorganization of learning was
founded on ideas from ancient humanist texts and the belief that learning should be
organized according to human nature. An extensive and elaborate reform of both rhetoric
and logic was central to Bacon's new instauration of learning, and while he claims that
his reorganization of learning and his method are "new," it is clear that he follows the
humanist tradition in that he incorporates aspects of a variety of schools of thought from
previous centuries. His views on language are related to his division of the sciences and
are similarly eclectic in their origins.
Bacon faced, as does anyone who thinks seriously about human language and the
way it is used, a variety of contradictions that are rooted in the relationship between
ephemeral words and the things they represent. For Bacon, these inherent inconsistencies
were exacerbated by the linguistic complexity of his age, which included, on the one
hand, reverence for recovered ancient Greek and Latin texts and, on the other hand, the
abandonment of Latin as a common lingua franca, for vernacular languages. The resultant
hermeneutical uncertainty was complicated by changes occurring on all levels of society,
and by the wide variety of ideas and practices present in the intellectual milieu. In an age
so filled with contradictions, it is difficult to situate Bacon within any particular linguistic
or rhetorical faction. For example, while he objected to what he saw as too great an
emphasis on rhetoric, he did not object to rhetoric per se. While he objected to
Aristotelian logic, he called his own method a "kind of logic," ("The Plan of the Work,
PW 249). There was an anti-Ciceronian element to his rhetoric, but he was capable of
producing prose as balanced and figured as anything Cicero could have imagined. And
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his essays employ an innovative structure that is unlike any other existing prose form.
However, many of these contradictions may be somewhat diminished if Bacon is
understood within the context of Stoic humanism, which emphasized, as Bouwsma says,
the "divine, harmonious, and intelligible order of nature" (17). Bacon's aim was not to
destroy rhetoric, but to situate it within a more comprehensive intellectual edifice that
was founded upon a clearer understanding between the nature of the mind and the nature
of things. Stoicism, which was a comprehensive and synthetic philosophy, provides a
model for just such a plan. Bacon adopts a number of elements of Stoic linguistic
philosophy, some related to style, but others related to the relationship between words
and things and between words and the mind. Finally, Stoic skepticism allowed Bacon to
occupy a middle position between early Renaissance rhetoric, which accepted the
possibility that language could be a force for positive change and the more radical
skepticism of those who came after him.

Bacon's Rhetorical Theories and Practice

· Bacon's theories about rhetoric100 and its relationship to other arts and sciences
continue to evoke much debate, 10 1 as do questions about the antecedents for his linguistic
100

See R. F. Jones, Ancients and Modems: A Study of the Rise of the Scientific Movement in Seventeenth
Century England, for an extended discussion of Bacon's "plain style." See also Brian Vickers, Francis
Bacon and Renaissance Prose 232-261 , for a review of Bacon's influence on Renaissance rhetoric. See
James Zappen, "Francis Bacon and the Historiography of Scientific Rhetoric" for a thorough but concise
review of literature on Bacon and scientific discourse. See also Robert Adolph, The Rise of Modem Prose
Style 26-77, for a discussion of Bacon's contribution to modem scientific prose. See the first chapter of
Robert Stillman's The New Philosophy and Universal Languages in Seventeenth-Century England: Bacon,
Hobbes, and Wilkins for a discussion of Bacon's views on the gap between res and verba. For a contrasting
view, see Timothy Reiss The Discourse of Modernism.
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In Francis Bacon and the Art of Discourse, Lisa Jardine argues that Bacon "subordinates rhetoric to
dialectic and characterizes rhetoric as something overlaid upon discourse composed according to dialectical
rules" ( 1 4). By contrast, Brian Vickers argues in "Bacon and Rhetoric," that "logic and rhetoric constituted
a joint training in thinking, arguing, and expressing arguments in persuasive form" (209). The notion that
Bacon's influence was largely on the development of science is also questioned. In Francis Bacon and
Renaissance Prose, Vickers argues that Bacon's "dominance on seventeenth century thought" is not a result
of his scientific program, but of "the terms in which it was formulated and the imaginative eloquence with
which these were transmitted (232). The most comprehensive study of Bacon's linguistic philosophy is
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philosophy . 1 02 Assessments of the influence of Bacon's rhetoric on subsequent discursive
practices are almost as varied and discordant as those of his antecedents. Richard Foster
Jones has described Bacon's contribution to the intellectual life of the seventeenth
century as a rejection of ancient learning and the ornate language of the humanists, and a
turn to nature as a source of truth. He characterizes Bacon's views on language as an
attempt to develop a "clear, accurate, plain style" that resisted "interposing . . . any
possible obstruction between observation and description" ("Science and English Prose
Style" 77). Jones argues that Bacon's ideas influenced seventeenth century "scientists" to
claim that ancient philosophy "was merely verbal, with no counterpart in reality," and "to
consider a reformation in language and style as essential as one in science, to formulate
their linguistic and stylistic ideals, and to try to make them operative" (Ancients and
Moderns 49). Jones also argues that Bacon proposed a utilitarian science, perhaps
because he had been "deeply impressed with the wretched condition of the human race,
and cherished the hope that out of the marriage of mind and things there might spring ' a
line and race of inventions that may in some degree subdue and overcome the necessities
and miseries of humanity"' (60). While Jones's reductionist view of Bacon's rhetoric is
consistent with the modernist �arrative of the scientific revolution, his perception
regarding Bacon's utilitarianism contradicts the notion that it amounted to a rejection of
humanism, which valued highly the individual's contribution to society. More recent
scholars have come to question the reductionist nature of this view of the origins of
found in Karl Wallace's Francis Bacon on Communication and Rhetoric.
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In Francis Bacon and Renaissance Prose, Vickers suggests that Bacon is influenced by Plato .. John
Briggs, in Francis Bacon and the Rhetoric of Nature, has also suggested that Bacon's view of rhetoric was
in the Platonic tradition, which subjected rhetoric not to dialectic but to ethics. A rather different view
suggests that Bacon follows, more or less, in the Aristotelian tradition, viewing rhetoric as equal to
dialectic, as a much fuller art which includes all the canons from invention to delivery. In "Attic Prose:
Lipsius, Montaigne, Bacon," Morris Croll suggests that Bacon relied heavily upon Aristotle ("Attic
Prose"). James Stephens, in "Bacon's New English Rhetoric and the Debt to Aristotle" argues that Bacon
returns to Aristotle's view of rhetoric in order to "take a step forward by going back to the source," and
suggests that Bacon attacks the Ciceronians and Senecans in much the same way that Aristotle faults the
Sophists for "fostering a 'delicate and polished' kind of learning" (248).
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modem science and have called into question such representations of the discursive
practices of natural philosophers which do not consider the complexity of the cultural
context within which the scientific revolution took place.
In The Material Word, Morris Kroll challenges the notion that seventeenth
century natural philosophers were able to achieve a degree of transparency in language.
He disagrees with Jones's notion
that the scientific world view produced an ideology that treated language
as transparent or referential-as an instrument, that is, to an unmediated
cognitive and experimental grasp of objects in the world. When
neoclassical authors talk about the 'plain style,' they do not advertise what
Jones and later scholars in his tradition associate with 'scientific'
neutrality or self-evidence. (4)
Kroll argues that Jones's thesis is a product of a modernist "narrative of progress" and
that it provides him with "scientific" ground from which to survey the "marshy territory
of rhetoric" (5). Ultimately, Kroll contends that, while such descriptions of the
relationship between science and language have some merit, Jones's insistence on the
transparency of scientific language "fails to recognize that the rhetoric of the materials
that supplies its evidence constitutes a substantive claim in itself' (2). He argues that
early modem philosophers, rather than rejecting the rhetorical practices of the humanists,
advocated an "ideology of contingency" that constituted "a defense of the rhetorical or
symbolic nature of human culture" ( 1 86). In other words, despite the professions of their
authors to the contrary, the texts of the scientific revolution are themselves rhetorical in
nature and are part of the rhetorical context of the Renaissance and early modem periods.
K.roll's argument and others like it risk being as reductionist as Jones's theory.
Robert Stillman has argued that both these readings of early modem natural philosophy,
which he calls the "anti-rhetorical" stance of Jones and the "ideological" stance of Kroll,
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fail to address the issue of textual contradictions. These contradictions must be accounted
for because they are symptomatic of an age "in which the opposition between the literal
and figural underlies so many polarities of discourse (the divide between truth and
falsehood, reason and imagination, philosophical discourse and rhetoric)" ("Assessing the
Revolution" 1 05). It is necessary to take seriously early-modem concerns regarding
language. There is no question that Bacon, like many of his peers, was greatly concerned
about the degree to which human language could be trusted as a reliable means of
representing truth and an acceptable means of communication. 103 But, as Stillman points
out, even the most radical new philosophers of the early modem period continued to
produce texts, and many of those texts deployed the rhetorical strategies that were taught
in the humanist educational system in which they studied. The notion that Bacon was
anti-rhetorical and anti-humanistic is an extreme representation of his views and one that
does not take into consideration either his humanist values or the rhetorical strategies by
which he justifies his turn to natural philosophy.

This debate is not the kind of

disputatiousness for its own sake that Bacon deplored among the scholastic philosophers
of his day; uncertainty about his view of rhetoric and philosophy is justifiable. Bacon
produced no handbooks, either of rhetoric or dialectic, though he discusses both logic and
and rhetoric in The Advancement ofLearning and De augmentis scientiarum, and he calls
the art of the "interpretation of Nature," which he introduced in Novum organum, a "kind
of logic" (P W 275). For Bacon, both logic and rhetoric, as practiced during the Middle
Ages and Renaissance, were significant obstacles to learning. According to Bacon's
narrative regarding the emphasis on rhetoric during the Renaissance, the humanist
fascination with ancient texts and rhetoric was a result of the Protestant reformation when
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Debates about the reliability of language continued for some time. During the early modern period the
anti-language attitudes of natural philosophers became so extreme that Jonathan Swift satirized them in
Gulliver's Travels . He described a group of roving philosophers who so mistrusted language that they
traveled from place to p lace leading heavily-burdened asses and "conversed" solely by displaying the
"things" that they carried.
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Martin Luther, "being no ways aided by the opinions of his own time was forced to
awake all antiquity, and to call former times to his succors to make a party against the
present time, so that the ancient authors, both in divinity and in humanity, which had long
time slept in libraries, began generally to be read and revolved" ( Adv. , PW 54). 104 From
this grew "a delight in their manner of style and phrase, and an admiration of that kind of
writing" which by Bacon's time had led men to "study words and not matter" ( Adv. , PW
54). Even more serious, in Bacon's view, was the contentious learning of Scholastic
deductive logic in which genuine inquiry had degenerated into unproductive
disputatiousness, "like so many substances in nature which are solid do putrefy and
corrupt into worms, so it is the property of good and sound knowledge to putrefy and
dissolve into a number of subtile, idle, unwholesome, and (as I may term them)
vermiculate questions" (Adv. , PW 55). Bacon's complaint regarding dialectic is
essentially the same as for rhetoric-that it does not focus on things but takes itself as its
subject matter. The result of this inappropriate focus is that dialectic "brings forth indeed
cobwebs of learning, admirable for the fineness of thread and work, but of no substance
or profit" (Adv. , PW 55).
Stillman has described how the many uncertainties of the period-religious and
political, as well as linguistic-opened up a gap between res and verba (between words
and things) that traditional humanists, who had too much invested in "the persuasive
power of the word," were unable to address (New Philosophy 30). He argues that Bacon
was uniquely effective in exploiting that breach in order to advance the claims of a new,
culturally superior form of knowledge:
Into the breach between words and things opened by repeated challenges
to the humanist rhetorical tradition, Bacon inserted the new logic of
This narrative does not, of course, correspond with the nineteenth- and twentieth-century narrative of
humanism in which Italian humanists, beginning with Petrarch, were responsible for reviving the interest in
ancient texts.
104
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. natural philosophy-a logic aimed an illuminating things not words . . . .
Armed with a new organon, Bacon sought to transfer the status of cultural
preeminence from oratory, poetry, and disputatious philosophy to natural
philosophy. (3 0).
This "transfer of cultural preeminence," more accurately describes Bacon's contribution
than Jones's suggestion that he sought to destroy rhetoric and humanism or Kroll's
argument that the rejection of rhetoric was merely a pose. William Bouwsma's notion of
Stoic humanism as one of two foci of Renassaince humanism provides a framework
within which to understand Bacon's justification for this transfer of cultural preeminence.
Because it offered a model for a synthetic intellectual framework, Stoicism provides the
means by which Bacon was able, not to do away with rhetoric and logic, but to resituate
them within a larger, integrated structure. Stoicism, as the hellenistic synthesis of hellenic
philosophies is a more likely antecedent for Bacon's reformulation of these arts,
reflecting the eclectic character that has been previously noted. While both his rhetorical
and linguistic theories also reflect elements of Stoic linguistic philosophy, it is his style
that most clearly demonstrates the unmistakable influence of the Stoics.

Renaissance Rhetoric and Style

Modernist histories of rhetoric have suggested that by the end of the Renaissance,
the art of rhetoric - which in Aristotle's day comprised the five canons of invention,
arrangement, memory, style, and delivery - had declined to the point that it comprised
merely the canon of style. Peter Ramus, who authored widely used textbooks on both
dialectic and rhetoric and who was among the most influential opponents of rhetoric, was
largely responsible for removing from the art of rhetoric any significant epistemological
function, essentially reducing it to an art of style. 105 Ramus was primarily concerned with
ios The definitive work on Ramus is Walter Ong's Ramus: Method and the Decay of Dialogue. Ong' s work
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sorting out the intellectual tradition he had inherited, and his most significant contribution
is his Dialectic or system of logic that is, in Ong' s estimation, "of little interest to a
serious logician" (7). It had the advantage, however, of reducing dialectic to a simple
schematic device that could be used by virtually anyone, even the thousands of
schoolboys to whom it was taught. It is clear that Ramus saw himself as a great
educational reformer whose goal was to root out errors that he believed had persisted
virtually since the time of Aristotle. 1 06 Despite these lofty claims, Ramus's contribution
was more pedagogical than philosophical, and consisted in reducing and standardizing
the various arts that were part of the curriculum so that there was little or no redundancy
among them (Conley 1 28). In parceling out the intellectual functions of rhetoric and
dialectic, Ramus, who believed that invention and arrangement were part ofjudgment,
assigned those rhetorical canons to dialectic, leaving to rhetoric the ornamental aspects of
style and delivery. He defined dialectic as "the art of speaking decisively on matters in
doubt" (Conley 129) and felt it should apply only strict syllogistic reasoning. Dialectic
yields, not probable, but certain conclusions:
For Ramus, the aim of dialectic is the truth, ratio . . . . Ramus'
commitment is to certain truth arrived at (as in Plato and Boethius) by
dialectical invention and set out according to the "natural method,"
arranging ideas in descending order of generality. Rhetoric is simply the
vehicle for the transmission of this truth to an audience unprepared to
acceptit. (Conley 1 30)

on Ramus may have exerted more influence on the history of Renaissance rhetoric than the works of
Ramus exerted on the practice of Renaissance rhetoric. I have relied also on Conley's succinct analysis of
Ramus's·work and influence (Rhetoric in the European Tradition 127- 133). The claims regarding Ramus's
influence are based largely upon the great number of editions of his textbooks on rhetoric and dialectic.
106
One of his earliest works was Aristotelica animadversiones (Remarks on Aristotle), often translated
Against Aristotle), which was essentially a diatribe against Aristotle's philosophy and its influence in the
Renaissance.
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For Ramus, rhetoric was merely a necessary evil, designed to "serve no other purpose but
to lead the vexatious and mulish auditor" (qtd. in Conley 130). Nevertheless, Ramus's
Rhetorica was very popular, most likely because of its schematic nature, which made it
easy to understand and relatively simple to use. What is perhaps most important about
Ramus' realignment of rhetoric and dialectic was that it promised a kind of
epistemological certainty that traditional rhetoric could not. At the same time, it
diminished the possibility of negotiating differences in contingent situations since,
according to Ramus' schema, such situations did not exist. While Ramus, who seems to
have been genuinely anti-humanistic, may have dismissed rhetoric as "mere" style, many
of his contemporaries viewed it quite differently.
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of rhetoric in the public life of the
Renaissance. 1 07 Not only was rhetorical training necessary for personal advancement at
court, it was a critical component in the emerging forms of government as well. The
successful courtier was expected to have a ready wit, to demonstrate sprezzeratura, a
mixture of cleverness and grace, in both written and oral discourse; 1 08 the successful
public servant required a degree of oratorical competence to engage in public debates
about civic matters. However, centuries-old arguments about the province and ethics of
rhetoric continued much the same as they had in the past and were intensified by the
replacement of the lingua franca Latin with vernacular languages and the emergence of
new forms of government. For example, on the continent, outside of the new nation states
1 07

There is a significant body of literature on Renaissance rhetoric. For an overview, see Thomas Conley,
Rhetoric in the European Tradition. For an anthology of pertinent issues, see James Murphy, Renaissance
Eloquence. Wayne Rebhorn has examined contrasting views of rhetoric during the Renaissance in
Renaissance Debates on Rhetoric. For rhetorical practice in England, see W. S. Howell, Logic and Rhetoric
in England: 1 500 to 1 700. See also, Peter Mack, Elizabethan Rhetoric. For the relationship between
rhetoric and dialectic, see Peter Mack, Renaissance Argument: Valla and Agricola in the Traditions of
Rhetoric and Dialectic.
1 08
For a discussion of the role of rhetoric in the creation of the Renaissance courtier, see Stephen
Greenblatt' s Renaissance Self-Fashioning. See also George Kennedy 's discussion of sprezzeratura in
Classical Rhetoric and its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times.
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of Italy, absolute monarchies continued to rule, while in England, the Parliament
persisted in its efforts to wrest power incrementally from the crown. Thus, while rhetoric
was a primary focus of Renaissance humanism, there is no question that as the cultural
anxieties of the period multiplied, it came under the same kinds of scrutiny as did most
other aspects of the culture.
One way of viewing Renaissance rhetoric is as the evolution of style, particularly
to the degree that it was associated with the humanist shift in emphasis from logic to
textual analysis. The earliest focus for Renaissance rhetoric, a response to the recovery of
ancient texts, was on an imitation of ancient eloquence in Latin, which remained the
lingua franca throughout Europe well after the fall of the Roman empire. 109 The
protohumanist Petrarch, who was perhaps better known in his own time for his
annotations of classical authors than for the sonnets which form the basis of his modem
reputation, lamented the deterioration of Latin style that had occurred during the Middle
Ages and consciously imitated both Augustine and Seneca in both his prose and poetry.
As the age progressed and more of Cicero's works were recovered and disseminated, his
balanced periodic style, which was rich in tropes and figures, became the standard for
eloquence. By the second half of the fifteenth century, some writers imitated Ciceronian
style so slavishly that they refused to use any word form that could not be found in the
works of Cicero. 1 1 0 The resulting backlash against Ciceronian eloquence has
subsequently been named the anti-Ciceronian movement, and Bacon has often been
considered a part of that movement. The emphasis on eloquence was not, however,
For a brief discussion of the eloquence in the Renaissance, see Elaine Fantharn' s entry on "Eloquence"
and Jean D ietz Moss's entry on "Rhetoric in Renaissance Language and Literature" in The Encyclopedia of
Rhetoric. See also the chapters on Renaissance rhetoric in Thomas Conley's Rhetoric in the European
Tradition.
1 10
Erasmus, the great Dutch preacher, rhetorician, and author of handbooks on the arts of letter writing and
preaching, composed a dialogue, Ciceronianus, critical of such slavish devotion to stylistic imitation. For a
comprehensive discussion of the debates between the Ciceronians and anti-Ciceronians, see "Part I: History
of the Controversies" in Izora Scott's English language edition of Ciceronianus.
1 09
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confined to the use of Latin, but was extended to the vulgar languages as they began to be
used for more sophisticated intellectual activities. In England, this concern with style in
vernacular rhetoric is evident in the works of Henry Peacham (The Garden ofEloquence,
1577) and George Puttenham (The Arte ofEnglish Poesie, 1589). The ornamental English
style reached its zenith in the works of John Lyly (Euphues, Anatomy of a Wit, 1578, and
Euphues and his England, 1580). For many, the euphuistic style came to represent the

worst stylistic excesses. The plain style of the early modem period has largely been seen
as a rejection of euphuistic excess. 1 1 1 The perception that Renaissance rhetoric is
primarily concerned with "mere" style, however, belies the complexity of the rhetorical
landscape of the Renaissance in general, and, in particular, the breadth of meaning
associated with the concept of style.

Eloquence, Prudence, and Practical Knowledge

Histories of rhetoric that have portrayed Renaissance style as mere ornamentation
have helped to obscure the nature of the early humanists' beliefs about the possibility of
language to represent reality and to effect change in human affairs. For the humanists,
style was not mere decoration, but was related to the belief in the possibility of language
to represent shades of meaning, as well as to be a subtle marker of character. The
textbook De copia, by Erasmus, the widely known Dutch preacher and rhetorical theory,
demonstrates the ways in which a single phrase may be transmuted to convey more or
less subtle shades of meaning. Eloquence, i.e., facility with style, was seen as a marker of
character. In her discussion of Renaissance humanism, Hanna Gray explores the
centrality of eloquence in both educational practice and in civic humanism. Gray seeks to
account for the shift from the scholastics' concern with logic and metaphysics to an
Bouwsma would likely argue that the history o f Renaissance rhetoric is not a move from Ciceronian
rhetoric to plain style since the Senecan or Stoic influence existed throughout the Renaissance. See The
Two Faces of Renaissance Humanism.
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emphasis on the methods of rhetoric in terms of a shift in values and changing notions
about the ends of knowledge and debate. For the Renaissance humanist, the goal of
education was to equip the individual to lead a good life, and "the function of knowledge
was not merely to demonstrate the truth of given precepts, but also to impel people
toward their acceptance and application" (500). The common bond among humanists,
according to Gray, is their interest in eloquence, which "endowed the precept with life,
immediacy and persuasive effect, and which stimulated a man's will as well as informing
his reason" ( 500- 1 ). Their understanding of eloquence was grounded in the traditions of
classical rhetoric which provided "a body of precepts for the effective communication of
ideas and, equally important, with a set of principles which asserted the central role of
rhetorical skill and achievement in human affairs" (498). For the Renaissance humanists,
true eloquence, as opposed to sophistry, arose from "a harmonious union between
wisdom and style; its aim was to guide men toward virtue and worthwhile goals, not to
mislead them for vicious or trivial purposes" (498). In contrasting rhetoric to logic, ethics
to metaphysics, literature to natural philosophy, and education to epistemology, the
humanists were "contrasting a general and practical culture to the professional and
academic activities and attitudes" of scholasticism (50 1 ). These humanist activities were
grounded in assumptions about the relative importance of the vita activa as opposed to
the vita contempliva, "the conviction that knowledge should serve practical ends, that
human learning ought to have utility for human life, that education should instruct both
the will and the intellect, and that in persuasion and eloquent discussion lie the effective
means of conveying truth" (505). In an age as fraught with uncertainty as the
Renaissance, the art of rhetoric was perhaps more essential than that of logic and
metaphysics since, from ancient times, the function of rhetoric was "to argue over matters
which presented alternative possibilities, problems about which different points of view
could be maintained, questions open to debate because they could be judged only in
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terms of probable truth and were not susceptible to scientific demonstrations of
irrefutable validity" (505).
Within the liberal arts tradition, eloquence was not merely facility with language,
but an indicator of character as well. Janet Atwill summarizes the relationship between a
liberal arts education and humanism in terms of the inculcation of values:
Historically, the aim of a liberal arts education, in the most general terms,
has been to inculcate a set of cultural values through texts and traditions
believed to exemplify those values. In other words, the purpose of such an
education has been to pass on "culture" - to transmit the values,
practices, and institutions a culture believes to be its fabric and
framework. The product of such an education would be the individual, a
kind of normative subject, whose values and expectations conformed to
those of the exemplars and traditions protected by the liberal arts. (1)
Central to humanism is the study of rhetoric, particularly rhetoric in the Roman tradition
of Cicero and Quintilian, in which the ideal practice is the 'good man speaking well' (vir
bonus dicendi peritus). 1 12 This belief in eloquence as a marker of character was a crucial

element of Renaissance humanism, as the centrality of rhetoric in the curriculum
suggests.
Bacon and Stoic Style

Bacon was considered an extraordinary orator in an age in which virtually all
members of the upper and middle classes had some rhetorical training. 1 1 3 However, his
1 12

The critical intersection between virtue and eloquence had been a commonplace since Cicero. See
Atwill's discussion in Rhetoric Reclaimed, 29-46. Recently, scholars have suggested that the "vir bonus,"
which comes from Quintilian, is based on the Stoic concept of the wise man or sage. See Arthur Walzer,
"Quintilian's 'Vir Bonus' and the Stoic Wise Man."
1 13
In his essay "Grammatica Movet'', Lawrence Green argues that even those who did not receive
university training in rhetoric and its history were introduced to the elements of rhetorical style through
their training in grammar. The Latin grammar books that were prominent throughout the era included
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rhetorical practice was not of a piece with the ornate, euphuistic rhetoric of some of his
contemporaries. As the excerpt from Ben Jonson's Timber at the beginning of this
chapter suggests, Bacon's rhetoric was not valued merely for its aesthetic aspects, but for
its "gravity," its neatness, and its lack of idleness and emptiness. Jonson, who himself
greatly admired the style of the Stoics, 1 1 4 emphasized, too, the conciseness of his speech,
which apparently was so tightly argued that his auditors could not "cough or looke aside
from him without loss" (26). It is clear that Bacon's concern with language and discourse
was not limited to his public oratorical performances, but is central to his philosophical
project as well. He recognized that internal communication of the new philosophy among
its practitioners was as critical to its advancement as was the external communication of
these findings to a larger audience. He also believed that communication among the
initiates was qualitatively different from communication with external audiences. While
it was not uncommon for rhetorical theorists to make distinctions among various
audiences and purposes, Bacon broadened his discursive theory to include uses of
language that were not, in his view, primarily persuasive.
There is no question that Bacon's most direct indebtedness to the Stoics is
stylistic. 1 1 5 During the early part of this century, Morris Croll produced several studies
arguing that several seventeenth-century writers-particularly Montaigne, Lipsius, and
extensive examples of the rhetorical tropes and figures. See also Peter Mack's chapter on "Rhetoric in the
Grammar School" in Elizabethan Rhetoric.
1 14
See Robert C. Evans, Jonson, Lipsius and the Politics of Renaissance Stoicism, for an analysis of
Jonson's appreciation of Stoic style and philosophy; see also Robert Adolph, The Rise of Modem Prose
Style, who notes that "Jonson's famous praise of Bacon was adapted from a passage in Seneca the Elder
{1 65)."
1 15
The secondary literature on Baconian style is extensive and the debate is not without heat. See Croll,
'" Attic Prose' in the Seventeenth Century," "Attic Prose: Lipsius, Montaigne, Bacon," and "The Baroque
Style in Prose", as well as the anthology Style, Rhythm, and Essays. George Williamson seconded Croll's
argumenet in The Senecan Amble and "Senecan Style in the Seventeenth Century." Brian Vickers rejects
the argument in Francis Bacon and Renaissance Prose; as does Robert Adolf in The Rise of Modem Prose
Style. The heat of the argument is not related to the question of Stoic influence on the style of Bacon and
the others, but to the characterization of them as anti-Ciceronian. See also Stanley Fish, "Georgics of the
Mind: The Experience of Bacon's Essays"; and A. C. Howell, "Res et Verba: Words and Things."
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Bacon-imitate the style of the Stoics Tacitus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius. Croll places
these writers within the anti-Ciceronian movement, and delineates the distinctions
between the "oratorical" style, "invented" by the Sophist Gorgias and elaborated by
Isocrates, and the plainer "essay" style of the Stoic writers. The oratorical style was
"distinguished by the use of schemata verborum, or 'schemes,' as we might call them,
which are chiefly similarities or repetitions of sound used as purely sensuous devices to
give pleasure or aid the attention" ('" Attic Prose' in the Seventeenth Century" 54). The
essay style lacks these figures, relying instead uponfigurae sententiae, "the figures of wit
or thought" ( 54 ). The Stoics, in particular, valued. the figure antithesis. During the
Renaissance and early modem periods, the Ciceronian movement reached its zenith in the
euphuistic style of John Lyly. Ciceronian style was further characterized by long,
balanced sentences, the phrases and sentences of which were fully connected to one
another, in contrast to the shorter, disconnected sentences of the essay style.
The Stoics followed Aristotle in being concerned with the rhetorical qualities of
clarity, brevity, and appropriateness. Croll argues that the Stoics devalued clarity, i.e.,
"the exposition of objective reality, as in the statement of the facts and laws of natural
science" (85) because the kind of "truth" they wanted to expose was
moral and inward . . . a reality not visible to the eye, but veiled from
common observation; hidden in a shrine toward which one might win his
way, through a jostling, noisy mob of illusory appearances, by a series of
partial initiations. This kind of reality can never be quite portrayed, of
course, because ultimate knowledge of the mystery of truth is never
attained. But it is at least possible to depict the effort of the athletic and
disciplined mind in its progress toward the unattainable goal. And this
effort of the mind was the characteristic theme of the Stoics, and the object
of their rhetorical art. Though by the rigor of their theory they were bound
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to a cold passionless objectivity, they really aimed at a highly imaginative
portrayal of their relations with truth; and even those who professed to
strive for clearness, and in fact did so, could not resist the temptation to
convey the ardor of their souls in brevities, suppression, and contortions of
style which are in fact inconsistent with a primary devotion to the virtue of
perspicuity. (85-86)
Bacon expressed similar concerns about the virtue of clarity, or seeming clarity. The truth
that Bacon wished to expose was not moral and inward, but the truth of ''things" or
nature, which he felt was obscured by language. When knowledge was delivered in the
form of continuous discourse (what he called Methods) i.e., in the way "best to be
believed," he claimed that there resulted "a kind of contract of error between the deliverer
and the receiver" because the deliverer does not reveal the way in which the knowledge
was acquired, nor does the receiver find it necessary to inquire (De aug., PW 530). He
preferred the cryptic, aphoristic style of the Stoics because it forced the auditor to try to
assemble or add to the "broken" or incomplete knowledge that existed in his time.
Brevity, according to Croll, is the virtue the Stoics most admired as a quality
"almost necessarily involved in the attempt to portray exactly the immediate motions of
the mind" (87). He suggests that throughout history,
those which have aimed at the expression of individual experience have
tended to break up the long musical periods of public discourse into short,
incisive members, connected with each other by only the slightest of
ligatures, each one carrying a stronger emphasis, conveying a sharper
meaning than it would have if it were more strictly subordinated to the
general effect of the whole period. Such a style is a protest against easy
knowledge and the complacent acceptance of appearances. ("Attic Prose"
87)
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This affection for brevity is evidenced in the Stoic affection for sententiae, an affection
which Bacon shared. He found a number of virtues associated with sententiae, or
aphorisms:
[B]ut that other delivery by aphorisms has many excellent virtues whereto
the methodical delivery does not attain. First it tries the writer, whether he
be light and superficial in his knowledge, or solid. For aphorisms, not to be
ridiculous, must be made out of the pith and heart of sciences. For
illustrations and excursion are cut off; variety of examples is cut off;
deduction and connexion are cut off; descriptions of practice are cut off; so
there is nothing left to make the aphorisms of but some good quantity of
observation. And therefore a man will not be equal to the writing in
aphorisms, nor indeed will he think of doing so, unless he feel that he is
amply and solidly furnished for the work. (De aug., PW 53 1)
The virtue of appropriateness is, according to Croll, the most puzzling of the Stoic
virtues of style. Appropriateness, for the Stoics, had two aspects, appropriateness as to
thing and person. Appropriateness to thing was simply defined, although that definition
perhaps opens up whole avenues of disagreement. Lipsius, writing about Stoic style in
the late sixteenth century, suggests that appropriateness to thing meant that "everything is
said for the sake of the argument" and that "the vesture of sentence and phrase exactly
fits the body of the thing described" (qtd. in Croll, "Attic Prose" 88). Appropriateness to
person was related to appropriateness to audience as well as to the speaker. Here Croll
contrasts Stoic rhetoric to Aristotelian rhetoric that places primary emphasis upon the
appropriateness of discourse to the audience. For the Stoics, however, primary
importance was placed on the "exact interpretation in one's expression of the mode of
one's thought" (89). This, again, is related to the goal of style as the presentation of the
action of the mind of the speaker.
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The secrets of nature are made known only to attentive and collected
minds, prepared by a long preliminary training in habits of exclusion and
rejection; and even to them but partially, and in moments of rare
illumination. A style appropriate to the mind of the speaker, therefore, is
one that portrays the process of acquiring the truth rather than the secure
possession of it, and expresses ideas not only with clearness and brevity,
but also with the ardor in which they were first conceived. (89)
Thus, Croll argues, Stoic rhetoric must be characterized not by the sensuous schemes of
oratory, but the "figures of wit," chief of which were antithesis, "as a means of
expressing striking and unforeseen relations between the objects of thought" (90) and
points (argutiae). These two figures are the primary means employed in condensation of
argumentation in sententiae and aphorism (89-90).
Colish notes that Stoic literary style is based on the notion that language is a
natural sign. For the Stoics, a work must be mimetic and must conform to nature and to
truth, lest it "distort the natural function of language" (1:58). The same holds true for
rhetoric, according to Colish:
In the realm of rhetoric the Stoics elaborate five basic canons of style:
purity of language; clarity and distinctness; conciseness, even tending
toward paratactic constructions; the avoidance of inaccuracy,
colloquialism, barbarism, and solecism; and appropriateness of style.
Appropriateness of style means its appropriateness to the subject matter, in
the light of which the speaker should select his figures and should decide
whether to employ high, middle, or low style. (1:59)
Colish argues that in Stoic literary theory, there is no need to consider the ethos of the
audience in selecting style because the speaker addresses the audience's logos which is
the same for all. She recognizes the irony that the Roman Stoics, who were not
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particularly interested in speculating about physical correlatives to logic and ethics
created "the most eloquent literary expression to a theory of style in which the logos of
physics and the logos of ethics are so integrally related with the logos of language" (I:60).
Certainly, it seems to be the case that Bacon's concept of language attempted a similarly
comprehensive, integrated system, although the impetus for Bacon was to create a
wholistic system that could complement the deficiencies of language itself.
Bacon's preference for sententiae and aphorisms is related to the Stoic preference
for brevity. Perhaps the greatest correspondence between Stoic linguistic philosophy and
Bacon's is the sense of the important connection between the cognitive process and its
expression:
But knowledge that is to be delivered to others as a thread to be spun on
ought to be insinuated (if it were possible) in the same method wherein it
was originally invented. And this indeed is possible in knowledge gained
by induction; but in this same anticipated and premature knowledge (which
is in use) a man cannot easily say how he came to knowledge which he has
obtained. Yet certainly it is possible for a man in a greater or less degree to
revisit his own knowledge and trace over again both the footsteps of his
cognition and consent; and by that means to transplant it into another mind
just as it grew in his own. (De aug. PW 530).
Bacon's description of language which reflects the process through which knowledge
was obtained is remarkably similar to Seneca' s advice in response to Lucullus' s criticism
of a philosopher' s style:
Suppose, now, that your statement is true-that he pours forth rather than
places his words; let me however, tell you at the start that this trait of
which you speak has a peculiar charm, and that it is a grace appropriate to
a smoothly-gliding style. For I maintain, it matters a great deal whether it
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tumbles forth or flows along . . . . Fabianus seems to me to have not so
much an "efflux" as a "flow" of words; so copious is it, without confusion,
and yet not without speed. This is indeed what his style declares and
announces-that he has not spent a long time in working the matter over
and twisting it into shape . . . . the man was building up character rather
than words, and was writing those words for the mind rather than for the
ear. . . . But certainly whenever I heard him lecture such did his work seem
to me-not solid but full, the kind which would inspire young men of
promise and rouse their ambition to become like him, without making
them hopeless of surpassing him . . . . (Epistles III, C. 8, 1 2)
For Seneca, the artfully crafted language of the Ciceronians diminished the direct impact
of the speaker upon the audience. In this passage, Seneca is concerned that the speaker's
character is able to be imitated his auditors, whereas Bacon is concerned that the
speaker's knowledge-making process be what is imitated.
The Stoic emphasis on language as process is based, to a degree on their own
perceived understanding of the gap between verba and res and the belief that things
matter more than words, particularly in philosophical matters:
One should not, however, bestow very much attention upon mere words.
Let this be the kernel of my idea; let us say what we feel, and feel what we
say; let speech harmonize with life . . . . . Are you concerned about words?
Rejoice this instant if you can cope with things. (Seneca Epistles II,
LXXV.4,8)
Style as Method in Bacon 's Works
Despite the apparently great differences between Bacon's plain style and the
copious rhetoric of the Renaissance humanists, they share certain fundamental
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assumptions about the importance of style. Both believed that style was more than mere
ornamentation. The fact that Bacon advocates a plain style for natural philosophy does
not mean that style is unimportant. As Jeanne Fahnestock points out in her examination
of Rhetorical Figures in Science, a plain style is a style nonetheless. Bacon's taxonomy
of styles suggests, in fact, that Bacon related style to different kinds of mental effort just
as he based his division of the sciences upon the faculties. In addition to a belief in the
importance of style, Bacon also seems to share with the Renaissance humanists the
assumption that reading is a prudent or deliberative act.
Bacon's new method, which purports to be a kind of inductive logic, is itself
based on the rhetorical trope antithesis. Fahnestock argues that the rhetorical tropes act as
organizing principles for ways of thinking. She calls them "epitomes of durable lines of
argument" (40). Antithesis is one of the most fruitful of these tropes because setting one
thing against the other in effect forces the auditor to make choices between them.
Bacon's method, which he describes as "a process of exclusion and rejection" relies
heavily on antithesis. He applies his method by compiling tables in which a given
characteristic, such as heat or cold, is either present or absent. Fahnestock argues that
Bacon's method is derived from rhetorical practice:
[F] or all his gesturing about departing from the methods of the ancients,
[it] is still topical and, given the relation between the figures and the
topics, it is essentially figural as well. In particular, Bacon demonstrates
how existing or acceptable pairs of contraries, fitted into a syntactic frame,
can invite the invention of new arguments and direct the search for new
sources of evidence. Thus, it is possible to say that Bacon's empirical
method of inquiry is in a sense figure-driven, and that given his
epistemological commitment to the aphorism, he was predisposed to
package both his arguments and his observations in epitomes such as the
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antithesis. Far from turning his back on the rhetorical tradition, he in fact
tapped its conceptual resources epitomized in the figures. (65)
Bacon would perhaps argue that the fact that his empirical method is figure-driven
merely demonstrates the universality of his method. It is more likely, that it demonstrates
the degree to which he was immersed in the rhetorical and textual practices of the
humanists. However, there is no question that Bacon did resituate rhetoric within a larger
and more complex framework, and one that draws heavily on Stoic linguistic philosophy.
Linguistic Theory
Bacon addresses matters of language in Book VI of De augmentis, in which he
discusses the "Art of Transmission . . . or of producing and expressing to others those
things which have been invented, judged, and laid up in the memory" (PW 52 1 ). The
general Art of Transmission includes "all the arts which relate to words or discourse," but
he argues that "reason [is] the soul of discourse, yet in the handling of them reason and
discourse should be kept separate" (52 1). He includes three divisions of the Art of
Transmission: first, the Organ of Discourse, or Grammar, which he subdivides according
to speech and writing and which is of two sorts, literary and philosophical; second, the
Method of Discourse, or the Wisdom of Transmission, is divided into the "different kinds
of methods [with] their advantages and disadvantages"; and third, "the Illustration of
Discourse, which is the Art of Rhetoric" (52 1). This division differs from the traditional
humanist curriculum in a number of ways. First, the humanist liberal arts tradition
included grammar, rhetoric, and poetics, the last of which Bacon elevates to a much
higher level according to his distribution of learning according to the faculties. Second,
Bacon allots judgment to logic, or to his philosophical method, rather than to rhetoric.
Finally, Bacon resituates rhetoric as a subordinate part of philosophy rather than valuing
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it as an art equivalent to and sometimes more useful than philosophy as did the
humanists.
Grammar, or the Organ ofDiscourse
Bacon begins his discussion of the Arts of Transmission with grammar, which he
divides into two parts relating to speech and writing following Aristotle's dictum that
"words are the image of thought and letters are the image of words" (521). However, he
digresses with a discussion of what he calls the "Organ of Transmission" that, he says,
"has other children besides Words and Letters" (521). These other children are
hieroglyphics and pictographs, as well as human sign language. Bacon calls these "real
characters, not nominal; characters, I mean, which represent neither letters nor words,
but things and notions" (521-22). He calls these characters "Notes of Things" and says
they are of two types: "ex congrua where the note has some congruity with the notion,
the other adplacitum, where it is adopted and agreed upon at pleasure" (522). Bacon's
recognition of a difference between characters that are "real, not nominal" and letters, as
well as his differentiation of characters as congruent and conventional seems to be related
to the distinction he makes between literary and philosophical grammar. Literary
grammar is for the purpose of learning everyday languages more quickly and speaking
them more purely and correctly (523). Philosophical grammar, however, ought to inquire
regarding "the analogy between words and things, or reason" (523).
This notion that some aspects or types of language are more congruent with things
than others is also reflected in Bacon's notion of an uncontaminated, prelapsarian
language in which words and things were perfectly congruent. This prelapsarian language
was made possible by "knowledge of nature, by the light whereof man discerned of every
living creature, and imposed names according to their propriety" (Filum labyrinthi, PW
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209). 1 16 Bacon's view of a pure prelapsarian language is, of course, consistent with
Christian theology, but it also conforms with Stoic view that language is a natural sign:
"Language is sound; it is material and corporeal; and it has a direct and natural
correlation with the physical realities which it signifies" (Colish 1:56). Consequently, the
Stoics spurned neologisms as linguistically less authentic than older words.
Bacon also follows the Stoics in several technical aspects of linguistic philosophy,
which made distinctions among words, speech, and internal language. Although the
Stoics are said to have made significant contributions to the traditional grammar that was
transmitted from the Hellenistic period to the Middle Ages and Renaissance, there are no
extant grammatical texts from the period. Blank and Atherton argue that Stoic
grammatical theory must be derived from the various parts of dialectic. Grammatical
theory regarding parts of speech, for example, are related to the subsection of dialectic
concerned with "voice" while syntax was concerned with a different part of dialectic
(314). Diogenes Laertius says that the Stoics distinguish between utterance and speech
and between ·saying and voicing:
Utterance and speech are different, because vocal sound is also an
utterance but only articulated sound is speech. And speech is different
from language, because language is always significant, but speech can
lack significance, e.g. blituri, whereas language is not so at all.
Furthermore, saying is different from voicing. For utterances are voiced
but it is states of affairs which are said-they, after all, are actually
sayables. (Diogenes Laertius 7.57)
According to Diogenes Laertius, "Impression leads the way; then thought, which is able
to speak, expresses in discourse what it experiences as a result of the impression" (Long
116

See Stillman's discussion of Bacon's views of an Adamic language in New Philosophy and Universal
Language 98ff.
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HP Vol. 1 33D). Discourse is made possible by that class of incorporeals, the sayables
(lekta). Stoic linguistic philosophy is the first to recognize and elaborate upon the
difference between linguistic and grammatical meaning, a difference which is based in
the Stoic dichotomy between form and force. The Stoics made a distinction between the
material aspects of language-which included both the thing to which a word referred
and the word itself, or utterance-and its meaning, i.e., the idea the word denoted. A
word must be associated with what the Stoics called a "movement of thought," which
they called a lekta, or sayable. Seneca describes the difference between words and lekta
in this way:
There are [the Stoic says] bodily substances: for instance, this is a man,
and this is a horse. These are accompanied by movements of thought
which can make enunciations about bodies. These movements have a
property peculiar to themselves, which is separate from bodies. For
example, I see Cato walking: sense-perception has revealed this, and my
mind has believed it. What I see is a body, and it is to a body that I have
directed my eyes and mind. Then I say, "Cato is walking." What I now
utter (he says) is not a body, but a certain enunciation about a body, which
some call a proposition, others a thing enunciated, and others a thing said.
(Letters 1 1 7. 1 3)
According to Sextus Empiricus, Stoics place the issue of truth within the sphere of what
he calls "the signification."
The Stoics defended the . . . opinion . . . that three things are linked
together, "the signification", "the signifier", and "the name-bearer". The
signifier is an utterance, for instance "Dion"; the signification is the actual
state of affairs revealed by an utterance, and which we apprehend as it
subsists in accordance with our thoughts . . . ; the name-bearer is the
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external object, for instance Dion himself. Of these, two are bodies-the
utterance and the name-bearer; but one is incorporeal-the state of affairs
signified and sayable, which is true or false. (Against the Professors 8 . 1 1 1 2)
It is on this theory that Stoic linguistic philosophy, which can be subdivided into
grammar, dialectic (logic), and rhetoric, is based. Bacon's description of grammar and his
anxiety about the gap between word and thing suggest that he shared a similar
understanding of language.
Methods ofDiscourse
Though the early Stoics were concerned with speaking well, their rhetorical
theory, at least until the late imperial period, seems relat_ively undeveloped. Diogenes
Laertius says that for the Stoics, rhetoric is "the science of speaking well in regard to
continuous discourses" (7.41 [HP 3 1 A]). Plutarch also suggests that Stoic rhetoric, at
least according to Chrysippus, was concerned with "continuous discourse and its
arrangement," and says that the speaker should be concerned not with appropriate speech
but with delivery as well. However, he points out that Chrysippus later eschewed the use
of many rhetorical figures and tropes. (HP 3 1 H [On Stoic self-contradictions 1 047 A-B]).
The second part of Bacon's Art of Transmission, which he calls "Methods of
Discourse," offers a unique typology of genres. Aristotle, for example, sorted rhetoric
according to its purpose--epideictic, forensic, or deliberative-and also according to
levels of style-high, midlde, and low-which should be fitted to the occasion. Bacon
classifies his types of discourse according to their auditors. The first pair, "Magistral" and
"Initiative" discourse, are both related to learning: magistral aims to teach crowds of
learners; Initiative attempts to spur the adept to seek deeper knowledge.
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The magistral method teaches; the initiative intimates. The magistral
requires that which is told should be believed; the initiative that it should
be examined. The one transmits knowledge to the crowd of learners; the
other to sons, as it were, of science. The end of the one is the use of
knowledges, as they now are; of the other the continuation and further
progression of them. (De aug., PW 530).
A second pair, which Bacon says are related to Magistral and Initiative but "in reality
almost contrary" are exoteric and acroamatic. These are intended to "separate the vulgar
among the auditors from the select" (531). While he does not describe exoteric discourse
except to say that it is the more open of the two, the intention of acroamatic discourse is
"by obscurity of delivery to exclude the vulgar . . . from the secrets of knowledge, and to
admit those only who have received the interpretation of the enigmas through the hands
of teachers, or have wits of such sharpness and discernment as can pierce the veil" (531).
It is likely that Bacon is referring here to hermetical texts, as well as some ancient texts.
A third pair is "methods" and "aphorisms". Aphorisms are the short, pithy
constructions that are often associated with Bacon's writing. Ideally, they are the
distillation of intense and prolonged observation (induction). The value of aphorisms is
that they "represent only portions and, as it were fragment of knowledge, [and] invite
others to contribute and add something in their turn" (531 ). In contrast, methods are
continuous discourse, that is, compositions that include assertions with proof to back
them up. Methods "many times carry a shot of I know not what excellent art, which if
they were taken to pieces, separated, and stripped, would shrink to little or nothing . . .
they [are] fit to win consent or belief, but of little use to give directions for practice"
(531 ). Bacon suggests that these discursive methods ought only be used to "remove
strong preoccupation's and prejudgments" (531-2). To summarize, then, magistral
discourse and methods are used to obtain adherence or belief; initiative discourse and
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aphorisms are used among "experts" to provide a structure for continuing investigation of
natural history. Bacon uses both these discursive modes in his Great Instauration as a
means of realizing his goals of commencing "a total reconstruction of sciences, arts, and
all human knowledge" (PW24 1). It is primarily because of these latter forms of
discourse, which contrast so sharply with the copious rhetoric of his age, that Bacon is
considered to be the father of modem discursive practices.
Bacon's distinction between aphorisms and continuous discourse is one he shares
with Stoic rhetorical theory. According to Plutarch, Chrysippus was opposed to the
elaborate style that was focused on figures of speech:
He defines rhetoric as an expertise concerned with the order of continuous
speech and its arrangement. Furthermore, in book I he has even written the
following: "I think one should cultivate not just a frank and unaffected
order but also, apart from the speech, the appropriate kinds of delivery in
relation to the fitting tones of voice, facial expressions and gestures." Yet
after being so ambitious about speech here, he says again in the same
book, when discussing hiatus, that we should not only ignore hiatus and
stick to what is better, but we should also ignore various kinds of unclarity,
ellipses and - in heaven's name - solecisms, of which numerous others
would be ashamed. (On Stoic self-contradictions 1 047A-B)
The Stoic who is, perhaps, best known for his use of the aphorisms, or sententiae, is
Tacitus, the Roman historian whom Bacon greatly admired. 1 1 7 Patrick Sinclair, in his
examination of the use of sententiae in the works of Tacitus and other Roman Stoics,
examines how Seneca demonstrates the value of aphorisms (or precepts or sententiae) in
an educational project. Seneca sets up a relationship between a philosopher/praeceptor
who "attempts to elucidate the the occurrences of daily life and history in conformity
1 17 In "Attic Prose: Lipsius, Montaigne, Bacon," Croll identifies Bacon's style as Tacitean.
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with general Stoic doctrine" (9 1 ), and a philosophical novice who needs instruction in the
obligations of Stoic sapientia:
Seneca' s preceptor-student relationship in fact sets up a model that can
illluminate important aspects of [the preceptor's] use of sententiae to
communicate his policies on particular issues and events, to instruct
Roman citizens about the broader vision behind those policies, and to
define the relation of the individual and the social orders to his
government and to political life in general. For [the] sententiae do in fact
comprise a political 'De rerum natura' in [the] narrative. (91 )
This relationship between preceptor and student precisely mirrors Bacon's use of
aphorisms as the ideal form for philosophical communication, since they are the distilled
essence of wisdom.

Rhetoric
Although Bacon found the humanist emphasis on texts and rhetoric to be one of
the most serious deficiencies of learning, he did not dismiss rhetoric out of hand as
Ramus did. While he recognized the propensity for speech to mislead, he also saw the
need for an art of persuasion. Bacon ranked eloquence inferior to wisdom, but called it a
"science both excellent in itself, and excellently laboured" ( Adv., PW 534-35). Following
his division of learning according to the "faculties of the rational soul," he allied rhetoric
with the imagination: "Rhetoric is subservient to the imagination, as Logic is to the
understanding,; and the duty and office of Rhetoric, if it be deeply looked into, is no other
than to apply and recommend the dictates of reason to imagination, in order to excite the
appetite and will" (535). Rhetoric acts with logic and moral philosophy to strengthen
reason: "For the end of logic is to teach a form of argument to secure reason, and not to
entrap it; the end likewise of moral philosophy is to procure the affections to fight on the
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side of reason, not to invade it; the end of rhetoric is to till the imagination with
observations and images, to second reason and not to oppress it" (535). Bacon's division
of the faculties is like that of other Renaissance Stoics. According to A. H. T. Levi, the
scholastic model of faculty psychology was based on Augustine's introduction of the
concept of voluntas or will. "The _scholastics made the voluntas, together with the
intellectus and the memoria, into 'faculties' of the soul, really distinct from the soul and
from one another. Acts were specified by their objects, and faculties were specified by
their acts. The acts of the intellectus were specified by the true, and those of the voluntas
by the good" (93). The problem for the scholastics was how to account for acts that were
both cognitive and volitive, e.g., an act of faith, or rational choice. Cognitive acts,
because they refer to a standard of truth, could not be free; acts of the will, however, may
be made without reference to the "truth." According to Levi, Lipsius's generation
imported into the scholastic model of faculty psychology the Stoic doctrine that "the
passions were based on or constituted false judgements [sic], and that the 'ratio' of the
Stoics, necessarily right, because divine, had become in the scholastics subject to error"
(94). This version of faculty psychology is compatible with Bacon's description of the
way rhetoric works· as an assistant to reason to strengthen the will:
Rhetoric is subservient to the imagination, as Logic is to the
understanding; and the duty and office of Rhetoric, if it be deeply looked
into, is no other than to apply and recommend the dictates of reason to the
imagination, in order to excite the appetite and will. For we see that the
government of reason is assailed and disordered in three ways; either by
the illaqueation of sophisms, which pertains to Logic; or by juggleries of
words, which pertain to Rhetoric; or by the violence of the Passions, which
pertains to Ethics. For as in negotiations with others men are usually
wrought either by cunning or by importunity, or by vehemency; so
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likewise in this negotiation within ourselves, we are either undermined by
fallacies of arguments, or solicited and importuned by assiduity of
impressions and observations, or agitated and transported by violence of
passions. And yet the nature of men is not so unfortunately built, as that
those arts and faculties should have power to disturb reason, and now
power to strengthen or establish it; on the contrary they are of much more
use that way. For the end of logic is to secure a form of reason, and not to
entrap it; the end likewise of moral philosophy is to procure the affections
to fight on the side of reason, and not to invade it; the end of rhetoric is to
fill the imagination with observations and images, to second reason and
not to oppress it. (De aug., PW 535)
There are no Stoic rhetorical treatises extant, but Diogenes Laertius describes the
differences between rhetoric and dialectic:
[T]he logical part is divided into two sciences, rhetoric and dialectic. . . .
rhetoric since it deals with the art of speaking well in regard to continuous
discourses; and dialectic, since it is the science of correct discussion in
regard to discourses conducted by question and answer, so they also define
it as the art of what is true and false and neither. (7.41-4)
According to Sextus Empiricus, Zeno of Citium described the difference between rhetoric
and dialectic in terms of brevity and copiousness:
When Zeno of Citium was asked how dialectic differs from rhetoric, he
clenched his fist and spread it out again, and said, "like this" characterizing compactness and brevity as the hallmark of dialectic by the
clenching, and hinting at the breadth of rhetorical ability through the
outspread and extension of his fingers. (HP 3 1 F)
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There are echos of both these notions of rhetoric in Bacon's Arts of Transmission,
particularly in the notion that brevity is related to epistemology, while continuous
discourse is related to persuasion.
James Stephens argues that Bacon follows Aristotle in describing rhetoric as a
moral art and classifying it according to audience. However, Bacon corrects Aristotle in
several significant areas, including the role of imagination and the inconsistency of
Aristotelian logic. Perhaps most significantly, Stephens argues, Bacon "seeks to correct
Aristotle's error in reducing style, the only function which rhetoric serves exclusively, to
a 'minor' and ' vulgar' accessory. The only way to reform rhetoric is to grant the
importance _of style and then re-work it as a philosophical ornament which transcends
mere ornament" (Francis Bacon and the Style ofScience 249). Stephens identifies three
doctrines that distinguish Bacon's approach to rhetoric from that of Aristotle: the
psychology of discovery, which considers the relationship between audience and the
content of scientific communication; his theory regarding the relationship between style
and scientific method, which examines how human emotions are exploited "in the
interest of reason;" and the doctrine of "literate experience," which explores the special
relationship between rhetoric and philosophy (Francis Bacon and the Style ofScience
56). Stephens has not, however, examined the importance of Stoicism as an influence on
Bacon's "corrections" of Aristotle, a topic which remains relatively unexplored.
Williamson and Croll, who have certainly catalogued the stylistic similarities between
Bacon's prose and that of Stoic authors Seneca and Tacitus, have not gone much farther
to demonstrate a connection between philosophy and rhetoric, either in Stoic or Baconian
thought. Vickers and Robert Adolph have, in fact, rejected Croll's and Williamson's
thesis regarding Bacon's imitation of Senecan or Tacitean prose style. In Francis Bacon
and Renaissance Prose, Vickers argues essentially that Bacon borrows from many
different styles and deploys his borrowings according to his own purposes. Thus, it is
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inappropriate to limit him merely to Stoic style. Adolph argues that what appears to be
Stoic in Bacon's style is a rather a reflection of Bacon's own utilitarian philosophy (4748).
There are valid reasons to reject arguments that Bacon was a neo-Stoic. Not the
least of these is Bacon's overt criticism of certain elements of Stoic philosophy, criticism
that may be related to his perpetual efforts to curry favor with James 1. 1 1 8 Moreover,
although Bacon seems always willing to mine the works of classical authors for wise
sayings and pithy aphorisms, he is seldom so eager to give them credit as his intellectual
antecedents, preferring instead to cast his project as a wholly new creation. Nevertheless,
Stoicism is arguably the source of several important aspects of Bacon's linguistic
philosophy and rhetorical practice. And, while it would be inaccurate to suggest that
Bacon's philosophy precisely mirrors Stoicism, it is clear that this ancient philosophy
provides a model for the sort of synthetic, comprehensive philosophical system that he
hoped to create. Rather than rejecting rhetoric as the Jonesian thesis suggests, Bacon's
reform of education preserves both rhetoric and "a kind of logic" within an expanded
educational scheme. That reorganization is based on values that are compatible with the
Stoic strain of humanism, which attempted to negotiate a path between the creation story
and the Hellenistic principle of the immanent rationality of the university. Ideas from
Stoic philosophy regarding the relationship between nature and the human mind are
certainly a basis for Bacon's theories regarding education, rhetoric, and philosophy and
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See J. H. M. Salmon, "Stoicism and Roman Example: Seneca and Tacitus in Jacobean England."
Salmon examines the ways in which a group of rebellious Elizabethan and early Stuart courtiers, including
Sidney and Essex, attempted to use Stoic philosophy to justify shifting authority from the monarch to the
aristocracy. It is possible that Bacon's objections to certain aspects of Stoicism reflect his desire to avoid
any hint of anti-monarchialism. His complaints about the Stoics focused primarily on their moral
philosophy, particularly on their preoccupation with death. However, Bacon continued to admire much
about the Stoics, especially Tacitus. See Edwin Benjamin's discussion of this admiration in "Bacon and
Tacitus."
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provide a means for uniting these arts within a comprehensive epistemological
framework.
Style as Process in the lnstauratio Magno
Although Bacon ostensibly intended his Jnstauratio magno as a philosophical
text, it is clearly a rhetorical text. He addresses multiple audiences and his goals are
complex. Among the ends Bacon articulated for the Jnstauratio magno, three are of
primary importance: first, to acquaint humankind with the obstacles that stand in the way
of true knowledge of the world; second, to lay out a plan for achieving a more perfect
understanding; and third, to develop an "active science" in which human power is
supported upon human knowledge of nature. Thus, Bacon's project was to move from an
active life in which subjective concerns obscured true vision and understanding, through
a contemplative phase in which better understanding is gained, to a new and more
powerful active life supported upon true and objective knowledge of the world. As his
introduction to that great work, the Novum organum purports to be anything but a piece
of mere rhetoric, but not even the most well-disposed auditor would make such an
intellectual leap except under the influence of powerful persuasion. However, Bacon is
true to his representation of rhetoric as the "appl[ication] of reason to the imagination for
a better moving of the will." Bacon's persuasive action in the Jnstauratio magno and
Novum organum is a stylistic representation of the intellectual journey he hopes that his
auditors will take. It moves from a more copious style resembling humanist rhetoric to
his own plain sty le, from methods, or continuous discourse to aphorisms, and from
magistral to initiative discourse, from action and subjectivity to contemplation and
objectivity.
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Bacon opens the Preface to the lnsauratio magno in a rhetorical style similar to
that of his humanist counterparts. He not only uses copious language, such as doubling,
and figures of sound that are more often seen in the oratorical style, he also uses extended
metaphors, similes, and analogy. He compares his work to the establishment of a new
edifice for learning. This new edifice will replace the crumbling, decaying temple of
learning whose foundation rests not on the natural world but on the flawed wisdom of the
ancients. Charles Whitney has explored at length how this metaphor "suggest[ s] the
restoratio nor re-edification of King Solomon's Temple of Jerusalem [to invoke] the
Christian process of spiritual edification toward salvation" (23). But the word
"instauration" has a double meaning, and signifies also a new beginning. Bacon never
clearly articulates which meaning he intends and, according to Whitney, he does so
advisedly:
As a lover of allegory and secret codes, Bacon never explained what he
meant by instauration, or why he continued to use this word so
exclusively . . . . the word's doubleness of meaning (restoration/new
beginning) embraces many of the paradoxes of change with which Bacon
is deeply concerned. (23)
And surely this is the case. But it is also typical of Bacon's rhetoric to leave issues of this
sort unresolved so that the audience is forced to continue to ponder the paradox and, if
Bacon is successful, to seek a resolution for the mystery. Even as Bacon sets forth this
paradox, he offers a means of pursuing its resolution. If the reader adopts his method, i.e.,
if the reader moves from the copious rhetoric of the humanists to a simple inductive
practice as it is demonstrated in this text, the answer may ultimately become cleat. The
Preface of the Jnstauratio magno begins with as copious a metaphor as any humanist
rhetorician ever articulated, an emblem of learning as "Scylla, who had the head and face
of a virgin, but her womb was hung round with barking mnosters, from which she could
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not be delivered" (PW 243). This use of simile is in striking contrast to Bacon's
discursive style at the end of the Preface when he insists that "all this depends on keeping
the eye steadily fixed on the facts of nature and so receiving her images simply as they
are" (253).
The movement from familiar literary style to Baconian plain style is echoed in the
movement from familiar methods of continuous discourse to cryptic aphoristic discourse
that characterizes the publication as a whole. The Preface takes the form of an argument
with assertions, and while Bacon may give this style of argumentation his own flavor, it
certainly is one that would have been familiar to his audience. As he progresses to the
body of the Novum Organum, he abandons this discursive form and begins to set forth
his argument in ahporisms. In doing so, he hopes to move his audience from their old
rhetorical habits to his new method. A similar rhetorical movement is discernible
between the two books of the Novum organum. There is a clear difference between the
language and arguments of these two books. They are both presented in aphorisms, but
the first book is clearly directed at those who have yet to be persuaded to embrace the
inductive study of nature. In fact, Bacon is quite clear that his purpose in this first book is
to prepare the minds of his audience for his new method. Book One is arguably what
Bacon called magistral discourse, i.e., discourse that "transmits knowledge to the crowd
of learners," that teaches," and that "requires that which is told should be believed."
Book Two is initiative discourse that "intimates the new work that the convicted hearer
should now begin. 1 1 9
In attempting to establish his new philsophy, Bacon is struggling against both
scholastic dialectic and humanist rhetoric. It is the hide-bound forms of the scholastics
that, in his view, constrict the current state of human knowledge, that keep it, like Scylla,
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In fact, even Book Two retains some elements of continuous discourse. Only some of the more obscure
texts are genuinely aphoristic.
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from bearing fruit. But he is equally contemptuous of the subjectivity of the humanists
whose rhetoric, he believes, obscure humanity's vision of nature, the deserving object of
its attention. He subverts both these discourses to his own ends. Eloquence is consumed
by plain style, syllogistic reasoning by aphoristic induction, and the gaze is turned from
the subject of the self and language, to the object of nature.
Bacon's Rhetoric as a Balance Between Prudence and Skepticism

Ramus's realignment of rhetoric and dialectic was probably less influential than
many twentieth-century histories of rhetoric have suggested, but there is little doubt that
the art of rhetoric became increasingly less influential during the period. In Rhetoric,
Prudence, and Skepticism in the Renaissance, Victoria Kahn traces a trajectory of
decline, from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century, in the confidence regarding
rhetoric's potential to move others to right action. Key to understanding the trajectory of
Renaissance rhetoric, Kahn argues, is the contradiction inherent in the humanist attempt
to reconcile the ideological and epistemological inconsistencies among Christianity,
Ciceronian prudential rhetoric, and the practice of arguing both sides of a question (in
untramque partem) that was a legacy of medieval Academic skepticism. 1 20 Quattrocento
humanists
are united by their faith in the compatibility of Christianity, prudential
rhetoric and Academic skepticism and they believe that the Academic
skeptic's way of arguing in utramque partem can be used to support their
ethic of decorum. Contradiction for these authors is not a logical scandal,
but a sign of rhetorical possibility. Skepticism is conceived of not as a
threatening relativism, but as an occasion for action. (27)
120

Aguing in utramque partem was not limited to the skeptics, but is as old as the art of rhetoric itself and
was the principal instructional strategy of the Sophists of ancient Greece.
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These humanists saw the capability of arguing on either side of a question as liberating, .
as evidence for the possibility of change. The impossibility of theoretical knowledge of
God provides for the possibility of free will and also determines that practical certainty
was the only degree of certainty available to human beings. Practical certainty resulted
from social and linguistic custom and convention, consensus omnium, so that the arts of
politics, philology, and rhetoric were seen to be "analogous and inseparable" (27).
As the Renaissance progressed, humanists such as Erasmus, Montaigne, and
Hobbes, became increasingly less certain about the efficacy of rhetoric. Kahn argues that
"at the same time that their texts reveal an awareness of the ideal alliance of rhetoric and
prudence, their rhetorical strategies prove to be symptomatic of an increasing anxiety of
skepticism about the power of rhetoric to persuade to right action" (27). These later
humanists become more concerned with examining the possibility of persuasion itself,
than with attempting to persuade their readers to right action:
By emphasizing the problematic nature of interpretation, they force us to
reflect on the relationship between interpretive and ethical practice, the
practice of reading and practical reason. Thus, while they instruct us in the
complexities of the humanist rhetorical and pragmatic conception of
literature, they also allow us to perceive the shifting status of prudential
rhetoric in the Renaissance and its eventual decline. (28)
According to Kahn' s narrative of the trajectory of rhetoric, by the middle of the
seventeenth century when Hobbes was writing, rhetoric was a virtual "outcast from the
commonwealth" (28). Unlike the Quattrocento humanists, whose religious beliefs and
stable society allowed them to reconcile the inconsistencies between prudence and
skepticism, Hobbes lived in an age in which epistemological certainty had been
undermined on all fronts: religious, political, and social. Thus he attempted "to invent a
new language of certainty, a sovereign logic that will effectively exclude all further
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rhetoric in utramque partem" ( 1 54). He sought to distinguish between "a rhetoric of
probability, opinion, and experience on the one hand, and a logic of universal truths on
the other; between a prudential and a scientific method; or between a rhetoric in

utramque partem and a logic of non contradiction" (1 55). For Hobbes, the end of rhetoric
was victory, the end of logic, truth ( 1 55). Ultimately, he sought to substitute for the
practical wisdom of his humanist predecessors "scientific" fact as a basis for certain
truths upon which human beings may determine their actions.
The Academic skepticism that Kahn attributes to the earlier humanists is a
function of Stoic humanism. According to A.H.T. Levi, in order to reconcile the conflict
between will and desire in scholasticism, Renaissance Stoics adopted this rather mild
form of skepticism that gradually evolved into the more extreme form that Kahn
identifies. While skepticism and Stoicism were quite separate philosophies in the ancient
world, Renaissance Stoicism and skepticism were not incompatible. Levi argues that both
doctrines were transmitted within defective traditions and that the terms had been altered
by scholasticism. According to Levi, "Freedom from passion, the Stoic ethical ideal of
'apatheia' meant either making the sage exempt from false judgment of passion, making
the wise man omniscient, which was absurd, or positing in the sage recourse to the
suspension of judgment . . . which was skeptical" (94). Bacon employs this milder form
of skepticism as a middle ground between humanism and natural philosophy. Bacon has
often been criticized because his new philosophy is, in a sense, a method without content.
The same kind of skepticism by which Renaissance Stoics were able to account for the
sage' s incomplete knowledge allowed Bacon to defer the realization of his intellectual
project. At the same time, because the promise of his proj ect had not yet yielded the kind
of certain knowledge that the study of nature would eventually provide, rhetoric remained
an essential

art for the

philosopher who continued, at times, to operate within the realm of
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contingent knowledge. Bacon's less radical skepticism allowed him to create a middle
path between his new philosophy and the rhetorical orientation of his fellow humanists.

16 5

CHAPTER FOUR
The Sage In the House of Solomon

The Stoics said that wisdom is scientific knowledge of the divine and the
hwnan, and that philosophy is the practice of expertise in utility. Virtue
singly and at its highest is utility, and virtues, at their most generic, are
triple - the physical one, the ethical one, and the logical one.
-Aetius 1 2 1

Frances of Verulam reasoned thus with himself, and judged it to be for the
interest of the present and future generations that they should be made
-Francis Bacon 1 22

aquainted with his thoughts.

[A ]mongst the excellent acts of that king, one above all hath the
preeminence. It was the erection and institution of an Order or Society
which we call "Salomon's House"; the noblest foundation (as we think)
that ever was upon the earth; and the lanthorn of this kingdom. It is
dedicated to the study of the Works and Creatures of God. . . . [T]his
Order or Society is sometimes called Salomon's House and sometimes the
College of the Six Days Works; whereby I am satisfied that our excellent
king had learned from the Hebrews that God created the world and all that
therein is within six days; and therefor he instituted that House for the
finding out of the true nature of all things (whereby God might have the

121
1 22

Preface 2 (HP A26)
The Great Jnstauration, Proemium (PW 241)
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more glory in the workmanship of them, and men the more fruit in the use
of them) did give it that second name.
-Francis Bacon 1 23

Critical to both the practical wisdom of Renaissance humanism and the materialist
philosophy of Stoicism is the concept of the sage, or wise individual. For the humanists,
the sage was the vir bonus dicendi peritus, the good man speaking well, whose eloquence
is a reflection of his virtue. The Stoic sage, on the other hand, is the individual who is
completely dedicated to the study of nature and who has submitted completely to the
rational will of the universe. For the humanist, the vir bonus is an essential concept
because, after all, the entire impulse of the humanist project is the inculcation of values,
and the vir bonus constitutes an exemplar to be imitated. For the Stoics, the concept of
the sage is even more important because, unlike philosophies and religions that posit an
ideal to which one must aspire, the individual exists in a universe that is the working out
of reason. Virtue consists, not in realizing some abstract ideal, but in perceiving and
conforming to the logos of Nature. Thus, much of the extant literature of Stoicism, such
as Seneca's epistles, or meditations like those of Marcus Aurelius, comprises lessons on
proper behavior examples of strategies by which the sage gains wisdom. When these two
systems, humanism and Stoicism, are combined, there are subtle changes in both the
character and goal of the sage, who is now required to gain both practical and theoretical
knowledge and to put that knowledge to work for the benefit of society. Francis Bacon's
New Atlantis demonstrates the role of the sage in a humanistic society. Bacon's sage is
both wise and productive, learning from nature and distributing her bounty to his fellow
citizens. He unites the contemplative life of the Stoic sage with the active life of the

1 23

The New Atlantis (PW 72 1 )
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humanist vir bonus engaged in service to the commonwealth. In Bacon's society, art
performs a normative function to perfect reason within the individual. I argue that this is
related to the conflation of techne and logos in the Stoic concept of nature.
The New Atlantis
Bacon's fragmentary text, The New 1-tlantis, 124 clearly offers an alternative to
Thomas More's humanist vision of Utopia. Though composed about one hundred years
apart, the similarities between the two texts are striking. Both narratives take place on
remote islands previously unknown to European explorers, and the stories are related by
sailors who, having become lost at sea, discover the islands when blown off course by
life-threatening storms. Both societies, though unknown to Christian Europe, have
through some miraculous event become aware of and been converted to Christianity, and
both have benefitted from social reforms made by a wise and enlightened king. However,
the differences are equally striking. In More's Utopia, the problems that plague European
society are ameliorated by a closely ordered communal society in which power and
wealth are strictly controlled and evenly distributed. In Bacon's Bensalem, however, the
well-ordered society is a result of prosperity that is itself the result of natural philosophy
and technology; it is a society ruled by wise men whose study of natural philosophers
124

As with most of Bacon' s texts, the New Atlantis has been extensively examined and written about over
the years. See Judah Bierman, "The New Atlantis Bacon's Utopia of Science" and "Science and Society in
the New Atlantis and other Renaissance Utopias"; Jerry Weinberger, "Science and Rule in Bacon's Utopia:
An Introduction to the Reading of the New Atlantis. " "On the Miracles in Bacon's New Atlantis " "Francis
Bacon and the Unity of Knowledge: Reason and Revelation";See Elizabeth McCutcheon, "Bacon and the
Cherubim: An Iconographic Reading of the New Atlantis, " for a close reading of the imagery of the
cherubim in the New Atlantis and of several of the emblems in the original texts. See the extended
discussion of the New Atlantis in Timothy Reiss's Discourse ofModernism. See also Denise Albanese,
"The New Atlantis and the Uses of Utopia," and New Science, New World for a discussion of the New
Atlantis as colonialist literature. In this same vein, see also Claire Jowett, "'Books Will Speak Plain':
Colonialism, Jewishness, and Politics in Bacon's New Atlantis. " See also Kate Aughterson, "The 'Waking
Vision' Reference in The New Atlantis" and "' Strange Things So Probably Told' : Colonialism, Jewishness,
and Politics in Bacon's New Atlantis." For a critique of such readings, see Catherine Gimelli Martin, "The
Ahistoricism of the New Historicism: Knowledge as Power versus Power as Knowledge." Also see
Bronwen Price's recent anthology, Francis Bacon 's New Atlantis: New Interdisciplinary Essays.
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allows them to reap the benefits of God's creation for themselves and their fellow
citizens. More's text is a somewhat pessimistic view of humankind, which suggests that
the baser elements of our nature may only be suppressed through the most vigorous
control. Bacon' s New Atlantis is a much more optimistic text that hints at the relative
perfectability of human nature through art and science.
The New Atlantis was most likely written sometime in 1 624 and was published
posthumously in 1 627 by Rawley along with the Sylva sylvarum. 125 According to
Spedding, "the story of.Solomon's house is nothing more than the vision of the practical
results which [Bacon] anticipated from the study of natural history diligently and
systematically carried on through successive generations" (Editor's Preface to The New
Atlantis, PW 7 1 0). Rawley called it a fragment, and it clearly seems to be incomplete.
However, Spedding suggests that its brevity is a reflection of the unfinished state of
Bacon's project:
Of the state of Solomon's House he has told us all that he was as yet
qualified to tell. His own attempts to "interpret nature" suggested the
apparatus which was necessary for success; he had but to furnish
Solomon's House with the instruments and preparations which he had
himself felt the want of. The difficulties which had baffled his single
efforts to provide that apparatus for himself suggested the constitution and
regulations of a society formed to overcome them; he had but to furnish
Solomon' s house with the helps in head and hand which he had himself
wished for. His own intellectual aspirations suggested the result; he had
but to set down as known all that he himself most longed to know. Buthere

125 Sylva sylvarum is one of Bacon' s fragmentary philosophical texts. It consists of a large number of
aphorisms, which Rawley called a "heap of Particulars." Rawley divided them into "centuries," but there is
no other apparent organizational scheme as in the &says. See Hutton 49-50.
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he was obliged to stop. He could not describe the process of a perfect
philosophical investigation; because it must of course have proceeded by
the method of the Novum Organum which was not yet expounded. Nor
could he give a particular example of the result of a such investigation, in
. the shape of a Form or an Axiom; for that presupposed the completion not
only of the Novum Organum but (at least in some subject) of the Natural
History also. . . . Here therefore he stopped. (PW 7 1 0)
Spedding' s confidence in Bacon's intellectual integrity is impossible to confirm. 126 Many
of Bacon's philosophical texts are unfinished, while the aphoristic style of others makes
them seem incomplete. It was, after all, a tenet of Bacon's philosophy that "scientific"
communication should be incomplete, a goad to spur the auditor to further
investigation. 127 Whether it is complete or not, however, The New Atlantis offers an
intriguing glimpse of a society led by wise men whose knowledge is secured by natural
philosophy, "not an ideal world released from the natural to which ours is subject, but of
our world as it might be made if we did our duty by it" (Spedding PW 7 1 0) .
The Wise Men o fBensalem
For the Renaissance humanist, the issue of character was of utmost importance.
The ideal humanist was the vir bonus dicendi peritus, the "good man speaking well,"
whose eloquence arose from "a harmonious union between wisdom and style" and whose
"aim was to guide men toward virtue and worthwhile goals, not to mislead them for
vicious or trivial purposes" (Gray 498). Central to the appeal of The New Atlantis is the
character of the Bensalemites. They possess, in Spedding's words, "sober piety," "serious
126

Spedding follows Rawley's explanation for the fragmentary nature of this text. For an alternative
explanation, see J. C. Davis, Utopia and the Ideal Society: A Study ofEnglish Utopian Writing, 1516-1 700,
1 05-37.
1 2 7 See Bacon's discussion of"broken knowledge" in Book VI, Ch. 2 of De augmentis.
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cheerfulness," "tender and gracious courtesy." "open-handed hospitality," "fidelity in
public and chastity in private life," "grave and graceful manners," "order, decency and
earnest industry" (7 1 1 ). In addition, the inhabitants of Bensalem were, for the most part,
Christians, having encountered a mysterious chest containing the books of the Bible.
They were equally well acquainted with the histories and mythologies of other lands,
including those of the far east and the Americas. This knowledge was gained both from
their own travels to other lands and from travelers whom they had received throughout
history.
The narrator of The New Atlantis meets a number of individuals whose actions
demonstrate the character of the larger society of Bensalem. The first meeting between
the ship's company and a citizen of Bensalem takes place after they seek refuge in their
harbor following a storm. The crew saw on the shore of the city "divers of the people,
with bastons in their hands, as it were forbidding us to land; yet without any cries or
fierceness but only as warning us by signs that they made" (456). When the Bensalemites
deliver to the ship a scroll, which offers them sanctuary for sixteen days, as well as
asking after their needs for food, water, medical treatment, or repairs to their ship, it is
evident that theirs is a hierarchically-ordered, Christian society, acquainted with the
world outside its borders, clearly cautious, but not apparently xenophobic. The ship's
company, who are put at ease by this encounter, inform the Bensalemites of the status of
their ship and health and are later invited into a place called the "Stranger's House"
where they are "accommodated of things both for our whole and for our sick" (459). The
sailors' dealings with the island's inhabitants are characterized by the utmost civility, and
when they meet the governor of the Stranger's House, they admire his "gracious and
parent-like" treatment of them (71 6). Their treatment in the Stranger's House so
impresses them that they said that "we were come into a land of angels, which did appear
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to us daily and present us with comforts, which we thought not of, much less expected "'
(7 1 6).
It is not merely the generosity of spirit that impresses the narrator; he also admires
their physical well-being and the abundance and quality of their material culture. It is
clear from the beginning that Bensalem's society is a wealthy one with material goods of
quality at least equal to that of Europe. The narrator describes the city as "well built," and
the parchment on which the greeting is written is superior to the European equivalent
"somewhat yellower than our parchment, and shining like the leaves of writing tables, but
otherwise soft and flexible" (7 13). The officer who meets them is wearing a gown of "an
excellent azure color, far more glossy than ours" and persons whom they subsequently
meet are dressed even more finely (7 13). The streets through which the ship's company
pass are all "fair" and the Stranger's House is well-constructed, commodious, and
includes an infirmary for their sick. The food is healthful and of the highest quality:
Soon after our dinner was served in, which was right good viands; both for
bread and meat; better than any collegiate diet than I have known in
Europe. We also had drink of three sorts, all wholesome and good; wine of
the grape; a drink of grain, such as is with us our ale, but more clear; and a
kind of cider made of a fruit of that country; a wonderful pleasing and
refreshing drink. Besides, there were brought into us a great store of those
scarlet oranges for our sick; which (they said) were an assured remedy for
sickness at sea. (46 1 )
The narrator is also impressed by the knowledge of the healing arts the Bensalemites
demonstrate. During their first encounter, the official who greets them explains that their
hesitancy in granting them entrance to the city is on the advice of their Conservator of
Health in case the illness of their sailors was contagious. The notary who boards the ship
carries with him a fruit "like an orange . . . which cast a most excellent odor" which he
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seemed to use "for a preservative against infection" (459). Once they arrive at the house,
their sick are supplied with a box of pills to hasten their recovery (46 1 ).
Bensalem is clearly a wealthy society. The Governor of the Stranger's House tells
them that there are sufficient funds to care for the entire ship's company for at least
sixteen days and to compensate them in silver or gold for any of their own stores that are
used. However, it soon becomes clear that the real currency of this society is knowledge.
Every twelve years a group of Bensalemites would travel to other lands, to discover
"knowledge of the affairs and state of those countries to which they were designed, and
especially of the sciences, arts, manufactures, and inventions of all patterns in every kind .
. . . But thus you see we maintain a trade, not for gold, silver, or jewels; nor for silks, nor
for spices; nor any other commodity of matter; but only for God's first creature, which
was Light; to have light (I say) of the growth of all parts of the world" (722). The
propagation of that knowledge was the task of the fellows of Salomon's House.

The House of Salomon

According to the history of Bensalem, which is related by the governor of the
House of Strangers, the wisest of the Bensalemites was a King Solamona, who had
reigned about nineteen-hundred years previously, and whom the Bensalemites considered
"a divine instrument, though a mortal man" (PW 720). Solamona "had a 'large heart',
inscrutable_ for good, and was wholly bent to make his kingdom and people happy" (72 1 ).
This king was the primary author of the laws of the land and, having realiz�d the se�f
sufficiency of his kingdom, had instituted hospitality laws to protect Bensalem against
opportunistic visitors. However, he "preserved all points of humanity" regarding the good
treatment of strangers, allowing those who desired to do so to remain and learn from
them.
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The source of Salomona' s wisdom was the lost works of King Solomon, "that
Natural History which he wrote, of all plants, from the 'cedar of Libanus' to the 'moss
that groweth out of the wall', and of all 'things that have life and motion "' (72 1 ).
Salomona, feeling an affinity with Solomon, instituted an "Order or Society," which he
called "Salomon's House" that is "dedicated to the study of the Works and Creatures of
God" (72 1 ). Salomon's House is also called The College of the Six Days Work, which
the governor intuits is because "our excellent king had learned from the Hebrews that
God had created the world and all that therein is in six days; and therefore he instituting
that House for the finding out of the true nature of all things (whereby God might have
the more glory in the workmanship of them, and men the more fruit in the use of them)
did give it that second name" (72 1). It is clear that the Fathers of the order are held in the
greatest esteem by the Bensalemites, as evidenced by the quality of his conveyance and
garments better than those even of the governor of the city, and the respect accorded him.
During his procession into the city, the narrator says that "the street was wonderfully
kept; so that there was never any army had their men stand in better battle-array, than the
people stood. The windows likewise were not crowded, but every one stood in them as if
they had been placed" (726). The fellows of the House of Salomon are the equivalent of
the Renaissance ideal of the vir bonus dicendi peritus, but it is not merely speaking well
that sets them apart.
The New Atlantis as a Synthesis of Humanism and Stoicism
In the New Atlantis, Bacon depicts a society in which many of the conflicts that
led to the anxieties of Renaissance Europe have been reconciled. In earlier works, he
made linkages among a number of concepts that are at the heart of the conflicts among
church, humanism, and natural philosophy, conflicts that seem to present no problem for
the inhabitants of Bensalem. These concepts-God, nature, reason, knowledge, and
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power-do not trouble the inhabitants of the New Atlantis as they did Renaissance
Europeans. The inhabitants of Bensalem have internalized a set of beliefs that authorize
the study of natural philosophy as the basis for a well-ordered society. However, the
fellows of the House of Salomon are inculcated with more than a set of values that enable
their study of nature and manipulation of the knowledge gained for the betterment of their
society.' they have also internalized arts and methods.
The centerpiece of Bacon's new philosophy was a methodology by which human
beings could reap the benefits of Nature. Bacon's new method functions as an art, or
techne, in the same way as rhetoric and dialectic. Technai, however, are culturally
problematic because they do not encompass particular cultural, moral, or ethical value
systems. Plato's complaints against rhetoric in the Socratic dialogues are emblematic of
the objections to a techne. In Rhetoric Reclaimed, Janet Atwill connects the conflicts in
the humanist/liberal arts epistemological tradition to the older techne tradition. Technai,
or arts, occupied the realm of productive knowledge as distinct from theoretical or
practical knowledge. For example, Plato's epistemological scheme distinguished only
between true and sham arts, and classified philosophical method, or dialectic as a true art
with rhetoric as a sham art. Aristotle replaced this two-fold classification with one that
included three categories of knowledge: theoretical, practical, and productive. Theoretical
knowledge included mathematics and moral and natural philosophy; practical knowledge
included ethics and politics; productive knowledge included medicine, the art of warfare,
and rhetoric. According to Aristotle's epistemological typology, the productive arts, or
technai, were not bound by values or knowledge in the same way that the theoretical and
productive arts were.·
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Atwill identifies three characteristics of a techne: 128
( I ) A techne is never a static, normative body of knowledge. A techne is
described as a dynamis (or power) and a set of transferrable strategies. A
techne neither represents reality nor encompasses a set of deductive
postulates.
(2) A techne resists identification with a normative subject. . . . As such,
there are no well-defined boundaries between the subject and knowledge.
Consequently, it is difficult, if not impossible, to make techne conform to
either Plato's equation of knowledge and virtue or Quintilian's vir bonus
(3) Techne marks a domain of human intervention and invention. What is
at stake in a techne is neither subjectivity nor virtue. . . . [T]echne is
defined against the forces of necessity, spontaneity, experience, chance,
compulsion, and force; it is often associated with the transgression of an
existing boundary . . . . In contrast to philosophical knowledge, a techne is
defined by its relation to situation and time. A techne is knowledge as
production, not product, intervention and articulation, rather than
representation. (7)
In subsequent centuries, most productive arts came to be identified as "crafts," while
rhetoric as productive knowledge came to be identified with the handbook tradition,
(Atwill 5-6).
In the Stoic period, the concept of techne was transformed as a result of its role in
the Stoic conceptualization of nature. The Stoics defined nature as a combination of
reason and matter. Zeno called nature "a craftsmanlike fire, proceeding methodically to

1 28

Atwill's examination of the concept of techne is limited to the period between the seventh through
fourth centuries BCE. Understanding of the concept varied over this time period, but Atwill contends that
these characteristics remained relatively constant.
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the work of generation" and Diogenes Laertius said that the Stoic view of nature was as
an "artistically working fire going on its way to create." Diogenes Laertius also calls
nature "a force moving of itself, producing and preserving in being its offspring in
accordance with seminal principles. "1 29 In these definitions, the Stoics use the terms
techne and logos in referring to the active principle in the universe, a principle that is
equivalent to God. According to Gerard Watson, "The picture that emerges from this
combination of techne and logos is of a natural power working in a unified fashion
through the control of details . . . to produce in time one perfect co-ordinated structure"
(1). Because humans, as rational beings, share in the logos of the universe, the concept of
techne is key to Stoic epistemology and is the basis of their "realization of the importance
of the particular, even in the midst of a system where universal unity seems at first to be
the overriding consideration" ( 1 ). 1 3 0
Techne, for the Stoics, was no longer an inferior form of making
knowledge. According to Watson, a techne is an activity, unified by a plan
or structure, the knowledge of which is gradually acquired through
experience. In time this knowledge becomes a part of the artist himself,
and constitutes the constant norm which imposes itself on the contingent
which is its field. In imposing itself it relies on the immediate
apprehension of the individual concrete reality. The production of the
particular depends on the artist's skill and at each point he must choose
what will best suit the realization of his concept. This implies an aesthetic
1 29

The citation from Zeno comes from Cicero's De natura deorum II 57. The quotations from Diogenes
Laertius are from VII 1 56 and VII 148, respectively. All three are cited in Gerard Watson, The Stoic Theory
ofKnowledge, 1 .
1 30
Stillman has described the political implications of technai for Bacon: "Politics is a conservative
business, inherently resistant to change, Bacon understands, since ' a change even for the better is
distrusted, because it unsettles what is established' (4.89) . . . . By contrast, the arts are dynamic and
progressive; they depend upon change and the 'noise of new works and further advances' (4.89-90).
Natural philosophy is liable to be perceived as politically suspect by reason of the very dynamism intrinsic
to its operation" (New Philosophy and Universal Language 8 1 ).

1 78

judgment based on intuition, involving selection and limitation. It involves
a keen awareness of the particular and its conditions, and since it is
production, it cannot ignore details. (3)
It is easy to see how the Stoic conflation of techne and logos transforms the concept of
techne. First, while techne may not have been a static, normative body of knowledge, it
acted, to the extent that it was internalized by the sage, as a "constant norm." The second
characteristic of techne in the previous centuries no longer applies; techne is now clearly
identified with a normative subject. In the Stoic model, as in previous philosophical
systems, technai operate in the field of the contingent, but what is contingent in Stoicism
is not nature, but the individual's knowledge of nature. Thus, according to Watson, the
usefulness of techne is that it allows for assembling particulars and testing them against
one another, which allows the individual to act "artistically" and function as a rational
being (7).
Watson's description of the work of the Stoic sage might well be a description of
Bacon's project. The inductive method is founded upon an extensive and careful
assembly of as many particulars as possible. From these particulars, by means of
exclusion and inclusion, according to the "Prerogative Instances" that he delineates in the
Novum organum, the "sons of science" eventually will be able to draw general principles
in order to assemble a true picture of the world:
It must be remembered that in this Organum of mine I am handling logic,
not philosophy. But since my logic aims to teach and instruct the
understanding, not that it may with slender tendrils of the mind snatch at
and lay hold of abstract notions (as the common logic does), but that it
may in very truth dissect nature, and discover the virtues and actions of
bodies, with their laws as determined in matter, so that this sciences flows
not merely from the nature of the mind, but also from the nature of things;
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no wonder that it is everywhere sprinkled and illustrated with speculations
and experiments in nature, as examples of the art I teach. (NO I.Iii)
Bacon clearly draws a distinction here between art and philosophy, as do the Stoics.
Similarly, the virtue of the art is clearly secured by the virtue of nature, and it is the
conjunction of the nature of the mind with the nature of things that secures the legitimacy
of the art. Bacon echoes the Stoic concept of art as "knowledge [that] becomes a part of
the artist himself and constitutes the constant norm which imposes itself on the
contingent which is its field" when he argues that the purpose of arts is to achieve the
"furthest end of knowledge . . . . to give a true account of their gift of reason "
(Advancement, PW 60).
For the Stoics, whose philosophical aim was to live in accordance with nature,
techne was directed toward the perfection of the individual's rationality. However, for
Bacon the civic humanist, that the pursuit of knowledge is not merely an intellectual
pursuit, but required an active component as well:
But this is that which will indeed dignify and exalt knowledge, if
contemplation and action may be more nearly and straitly conjoined and
united together than they have been; a conjunction like unto that of the
two highest planets, Saturn the planet of rest and contemplation, and
Jupiter the planet of civil society and action. Howbeit, I do not mean when
I speak of use and action, that end before-mentioned of the applying of
knowledge to lucre and profession . . . . Neither is my meaning, as was
spoken of Socrates, to call philosophy down from heaven to converse
upon the earth; that is, to leave natural philosophy aside and to apply
knowledge only to manners and policy. But as both heaven and earth do
conspire and contribute to the use and benefit of man, so the end ought to
be, from both philosophies, to separate and reject vain speculations and
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whatsoever is empty and void, and to preserve and augment whatsoever is
solid and fruitful; that knowledge may not be as a courtesan, for pleasure
and vanity only, or as a bond-woman, to acquire and gain to her master's
use; but as a spouse for generation, fruit, and comfort. (60)
Productive knowledge was an inseparable part of Bacon's project. Following
Democritus, who said that "the truth of nature lieth hid in certain deep mines and in
caves," Bacon divides natural philosophy into "the mine and the furnace, and [makes]
some to be pioneers and some smiths; some to dig, and some to refine and hammer"
(Advancement, PW 92). He identified two branches of natural philosophy: the Inquisition
of Causes ( also called Speculative and Natural Science) and the Production of Effects
(also called Operative or Natural Philosophy) (92). These two branches were inextricably
linked via a "double scale or ladder, ascendent and descendent; ascending from
experiments to the invention of causes, and descending from causes to the invention of
new experiments" (92-93). Bacon divided the Inquisition of Causes into Physic and
Metaphysic, both of which were based upon a comprehensive natural history. Bacon
represents this theoretical branch of natural philosophy as a wholly integrated discipline:
"For knowledges are as pyramids of which history is the basis: so of Natural Philosophy
the basis is Natural History: the stage next the basis is Physics: and the stage next the
vertical point is Metaphysics" (Advancement, PW 92). As for the vertical point of the
pyramid, which he calls the Summary Law of Nature or Philosophia Prima, Bacon is
unsure whether that degree of knowledge is attainable by human beings. Physic "should
handle that which supposeth in nature only a being and a moving" while Metaphysic
"should handle that which supposeth in nature further a reason, understanding, and
platform" (94). In Aristotelian terms, Physic is concerned with material and efficient
causes, while Metaphysic is concerned with formal and final causes (94). Natural history
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was concerned with gathering particulars, Physic with comparing those instances using
inductive logic, and Metaphysic with deriving universal principles from them.
For Bacon, techne was also intimately related to technology. Bacon was
fascinated with improvements in all kinds of mechanical arts. His interest in the ideas of
the French ceramicist and potter Bernard Palissy has already been noted. In the Preface to
the Great Instauration, he contrasts the creativity and progressiveness of the mechanical
arts with the stultification of the intellectual arts:
Observe also, that if sciences of this kind had any life in them, that could
never have come to pass which has been the case now for many ages that they stand almost at a stay without receiving any augmentation worthy
of the human race . . . In the mechanical arts we do not find it so; they, on
the contrary, as having in them some breath of life, are continually
growing and becoming more perfect. As originally invented, they are
commonly rude, clumsy, and shapeless; afterwards they acquire new
powers and more commodious arrangements and constructions; in so far
that man shall sooner leave the study and pursuit of them and turn to
something else, than they arrive at the ultimate perfection of which they
are capable. (PW 244)
In Book One of Novum Organum, Bacon addresses the connection between intellectual
arts and mechanical arts and the subservience of both to Nature, saying that "Human
knowledge and human power meet in one; for where the cause is not known, the effect
cannot be produced. Nature to be commanded must be obeyed" (NO I.iii, PW 259). For
Bacon, knowledge without corresponding technological production was problematic not
only because it produced no fruit, but also because he saw technology as furthering the
advancement of knowledge itself. He compared the status of knowledge in his day to the
fable of the monstrous Scylla,
1 82

who had the head and face of a virgin, but her womb was hung round with
barking monsters, from which she could not be delivered. For in like
manner the sciences to which we are accustomed have certain propositions
which are specious and flattering; but as soon as they we come to the
particulars, which are the parts of generation, when they should produce
fruit and works, then arise contentions and barking disputations, which are
the end of the matter and all the issue they can yield. (Inst. magno,
Author's Preface, PW 243)
This stultification of the intellectual arts is contrasted with technological innovation,
which serves as the metaphor for progress. In contrast, the invention of the compass is
instrumental in furthering discovery, "but as in former ages, when men sailed only by
observation of the starts, they could indeed coast along the shores of the old continent or
cross a few small and mediterranean seas; but before the ocean could be traversed and the
new world discovered, the use of the mariner's needle, as a more faithful and certain
guide, had to be found out" (246).
The concept of art or techne was also a critical aspect of Bacon' s attempt to
resolve conflicts between natural philosophy and religion. As has been discussed earlier,
Bacon's view of nature is that it is the expression of God' s power, as compared to divine
revelation, which is the expression of God's will. He also suggests that to engage in the
work of natural philosophy is a holy act:
But these three [natural history, physic, and metaphysic] be the three
stages of knowledge; and are to them that are depraved no better than the
giants' hills [Pelion, Ossa, and Olympus piled on one another], . . . but to
those who refer all things to the glory of God, they are as the three
acclamations, Sancte, sancte, sancte; holy in the description or dilatation of
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his works, holy in the connection or concatenation of them, and holy in the
union of them in a perpetual and uniform law. (Advancement, PW 95)
For Bacon, the practice of natural philosophy and, indeed, of all the intellectual
arts, is intended to realize the individual's own potential, to derive benefits to
enhance the status of humankind, and to glorify God.

The Sage

For the Stoics, the ultimate product of techne is the Sage, or wise man, who
according to R. J. Hankinson, never errs in making choices: "Secure in their
understanding of the providential structure of the world, which is identical with fate,
which in turn is identical with the will of Zeus, Sages order their lives in accordance with
it, assimilating their will to the will of Zeus, living in accordance with nature, and so
achieving the smooth flow of life, the eurhoia bioa so devoutly to be wished" (59). The
Stoic relationship between techne and character can be summarized in this way. Techne
is the means of securing knowledge about nature to which the Sage conforms.
The Stoic Sage per se was not an ideal model for Bacon's new philosopher. Not
only was Bacon careful not to ally himself too closely with the more fractious English
neo-Stoics, but he rej ected the more fatalistic elements of Stoic philosophy. While he
approved, for example, the Stoic control of the passions, he rejected the extremes to
which they might go to achieve that control. In a letter to the Earl of Rutland, he said,
"The Stoics were of the opinion that there was no way to attain this even temper of the
mind but to be senseless, and so they sold their goods to ransom themselves from their
evils" (qtd. in Salmon 2 12). The Stoic's emphasis on preparation for death and their
pessimism directly contradict Bacon's program for advancement of the human condition.
Regardless of his objection to these aspects of Stoic ethical philosophy, the concept of the
wise individual is integral to Bacon's project.
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The concept of the good or wise man was familiar to Renaissance humanists as it
had come down through the liberal arts tradition. It is clear, too, that the notion of the
wise individual is important to Bacon. In Book One of The Advancement ofLearning, he
offers many historical examples of wise men who have contributed to the received store
of knowledge of his age. For example, Adam, before the fall, represents the perfect
knowledge of nature to which Bacon aspires. Abel, the contemplative shepherd is
superior to Cain, the tiller of the soil. Moses, the lawgiver, had all the learning of the
Egyptians. (PW 6 1 -2). All the examples of wise men that Bacon assembles have in
common a tendency toward contemplation and study. While he recognizes that God was
in the beginning obliged to "employ persons altogether unlearned otherwise than by
inspiration" in subsequent ages "he did send his divine truth into the world waited on
with other learnings as with servants or handmaids" (63). Thus, just as humanist
education was intended to create a particular kind of subject, Bacon's project for the
reform of learning relied on the intellectual arts to produce a certain kind of educated
individual. In his essay "Of Studies," he explores the ways that particular disciplines
· impart particular characteristics:
Histories make men wise; poets witty; the mathematics subtle; natural
philosophy deep; moral grave; logic and rhetoric able to contend. Abeunt
studia in mores. [The studies pass into the manners.] Nay there is no stond

or impediment in the wit but may be wrought out by fit studies; like as the
disease of the body have appropriate exercises . . . . So if a man's wit be
wandering, let him study the mathematics; for in demonstrations, if his wit
be called away never so little, he must begin again. If his wit be not apt to
distinguish or find differences, let him study the schoolmen; for they are
cymini sectores [splitters of hairs]. If he be not apt to beat over matters,
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and to call up one thing to prove another, let him study the lawyers' cases.
So every defect of the mind may have a special receipt. (PW 798).
For Bacon, however, education not only should improve the mind, but should lead to
action as well. The "true" end of knowledge is "for the benefit and use of life," and it
must be "perfected and governed in charity" to avoid the consequences experienced by
angels who "lust[ed] for power" and men who "lust[ ed] for knowledge"(Preface to the
Great Instauration, PW 24 7). Bacon saw his new instauration "not as an opinion to be
held, but as a work to be done" and as the "foundation, not of any sect of doctrine, but of
human utility and power" (247).

From Techne to Technology
The Fellows of the House of Salomon in the New Atlantis, are examples of the
kind of sage who embodies not only the appropriate values, but the necessary arts as well,
so that they are capable of producing theoretical, practical, and productive knowledge.
Their work is both philosophical and mechanical, theoretical and experimental. They
produce both knowledge and goods for their society. In a meeting with the narrator, the
Father of the House of Salomon offers to impart "the greatest jewel I have . . . the true
state of Salomon's house," including "the end of our foundation. Secondly the
preparations and instruments we have for our work. Thirdly the several employments and
functions whereto our fellows are assigned. And fourthly, the ordinances and rites which
we observe" (727). According to the Father, "The End of our Foundation is the
knowledge of Causes, and secret motions of things; and the enlarging of the bounds of
Human Empire, to the effecting of all things possible" (727). 1 3 1 The Father of the House
of Salomon describes the many and varied activities of the institution, as well as their
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various facilities, which include mines, both artificial and natural; towers; lakes, pools,
streams, and cataracts, as well as artificial wells and fountains; great and spacious houses
for the study of meteorological phenomena; Chambers of Health; orchards and gardens,
parks and enclosures; brew houses, bake-houses, and kitchens; dispensatories, or shops of
medicines; furnaces; perspective-houses, sound-houses; engine-houses; a mathematical
house; and houses of deceit of the senses. Within these various laboratories, the Fathers
and Sons of the House of Solomon are engaged in all manner of arts and sciences,
including mining, ceramics, climatology, engineering, botany and the propagation of
species of flora and fauna, medicine, the culinary arts, and optics (72 7-731 ). It is clear
that the activities of the House of Salomon represent technai or arts. For example, the
Father of the House describes the propagation of fruits:
And we make (by art) in the same orchards and gardens, trees and flower
to come earlier or later than their seasons; and to come up and bear more
speedily than by their natural course they do. We make them also by art
greater much than their nature; and their fruit greater and sweeter and of
differing taste, smell, colour and figure, from their nature. And many of
them we so order, as they become of medicinal use. (728)
And again, regarding experimentation in animal husbandry, he says, "Neither do we do
this by chance, but we know beforehand what manner and commixture what kind of
those creatures will arise" (728). The Father also demonstrates the relationship between
art and technology:
We have also divers mechanical arts, which you have not; and stuffs made
by them; as papers, linen, silks, tissues; dainty works of feathers of
wonderful lustre; excellent dyes, and many others; and shops likewise, as
well for such as are not brought into vulgar use amongst us as for those
that are. For you must know that of the things before recited, many of them
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are grown into use throughout the kingdom; but yet if they did flow from
our invention, we have them also for patterns and principals. (729)
The interrelationship between art and character in Bacon's philosophy is
emblematized in the description of the occupations of the fellows of the House of
Salomon. They have a variety of tasks, but what is important to recognize is that their
titles are related to the arts they perform and the benefits they produce. Twelve of them,
called "Merchants of Light," travel to foreign lands and bring back "books, and abstracts,
and patterns of experiments" (73 1 ). "Depradators" collect experiments from books;
"Mystery-men" collect experiments of mechanical arts and liberal sciences; "Pioners or
Miners" try new experiments of their own design; "Compilers" assemble and transmit the
data from the work of the others; "Benefactors or Dowry-men" examine the experiments
of the others to draw out "things of use and practice for man's life and knowledge as well
for works as for plain demonstrations of causes, means of natural divinations, and the
easy and clear discovery of the virtues and parts of bodies" (732); "Lamps" direct new
experiments "of a higher light, more penetrating into nature than the former" after
meetings and consultations of the whole membership; "Inoculators" execute the
experiments directed by the Lamps; and the Interpreters of Nature: "raise the former
discoveries by experiments into greater observations, axioms, and aphorisms" (73 1 -32).
The ordinances and rites include the veneration both of products of their art and of
their greatest minds. In long galleries, they display "patterns and samples of all manner of
the more rare and excellent inventions" (732). They also erect statuary to their own
greatest minds and to those from other lands, such as the inventor of ships, the inventors
of music, letters, and printing; and Christopher Columbus for discovering the West
Indies. (732). They have "certain hymns and services which we say daily, of laud and
thanks to God for his marvellous works; and forms of prayers, imploring his aid and
blessing for the illumination of our labours, and the turning of them into good and holy
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uses" (732). And finally, they travel to foreign lands to make known both the
fundamental natural philosophy and "new profitable inventions" (732).
The degree to which the values and methods of the House of Salomon are
inculcated into its Fellows is illustrated by a story regarding the Bensalemites' conversion
to Christianity. The inhabitants of Bensalem, although their civilization had no contact
with European civilization, were Christians as the result of a separate divine revelation
involving the discovery of an ark containing both canonical and non-canonical books of
the Bible. The Governor of the Stranger's House explains how, about twenty years after
the ascension of Christ, the arrival of this ark was marked by a "a great pillar of light"
rising from the sea, topped by "a large cross of light more bright and resplendent than the
body of the pillar" (464 ). Among those who went out to examine this phenomenon was
"one of the wise men of the society of Salomon's House" who "attentively and devoutly
viewed and contemplated" the pillar and cross, and then made the following prayer:
Lord God of heaven and earth, thou has vouchsafed of thy graces to those
of our order, to know the works of creation, and the secrets of them; and to
discern (as far as appertaineth to the generations of men) between divine
miracles, works of nature, works of art, and impostures and illusions of all
sorts. I do here acknowledge and testify before this people, that the thing
which we now see before our eyes is thy Finger and a true Miracle; and
forasmuch as we learn in our books that thou never workest miracles but
to a divine and excellent end (for the laws of nature are thine own laws,
and thou exceedest them not but upon great cause), we most humbly
beseech thee to prosper this great sign, and to give us the interpretation
and use of it in mercy; which thou dost in some part secretly promise by
sending it to us. (464)
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This prayer, which echoes Bacon's Confession ofFaith, asserts that nature is God's
creation and that he does not interfere with its laws. The response of this "wise man of
the House of Salomon," after "attentive" and "devout" viewing and "contemplation" of
the phenomenon, is to offer an eloquent prayer for wisdom to interpret and use this
revelation. In relating this story, the governor calls the House of Salomon the "eye" of the
society, but it is, in fact, much more. The fellows do not merely observe, although
observation is their initial response to phenomena, either natural or unnatural. Their
observation is followed by interpretation and then by use. Observation and interpretation
are governed by reason and method; use is governed by art. The Fellow of the House of
Salomon, because his character has been honed by the observation of nature and the
application of method, is able to discern the truth of the divine revelation. Techne is an
essential concept in Stoicism as it is for humanism, and it is through techne that Bacon is
able to resolve the conflict between humanism, natural philosophy, and Christian
theology.

The Rhetorical Value of the House of Salomon

Given their belief in the possibility of language to achieve practical certainty and
to move individuals to right action, the production and consumption of literary texts were
acts of great importance for early Renaissance humanists. Quattrocento humanist rhetoric
was situated within the context of civic humanism and allied to the virtue of prudence, or
practical wisdom. Because the marker of the individual's achievement of humanist values
was eloquence, the art of rhetoric was critical to the humanist project. As it was practiced
during the quattrocento, however, rhetoric was a "truncated version of classical rhetoric"
because it did not extend to legislative and legal settings (Kahn 3 8). Rather, it was
primarily epideictic rhetoric - the rhetoric of praise or blame. Unlike other scholars who
stress the limitations on rhetoric and view quattrocento rhetoric as a precursor to a purely
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aesthetic form of the art, Kahn suggests that the conflation of rhetoric and poetics
"enlarges the sphere of literature, since the written text now takes on the functions of
deliberative and judicial rhetoric" (3 8). Thus, the production of the work of literature, or
any work of art, was a deliberative or prudential act, as was consumption of that work
through the act of reading:
[P]rudence or practical reason that is deliberation about action in a social
or political context is also at work in the artist's production of a work of
art. Prudence is, in this sense, the precondition of artistic decorum, just as
it is of ethical decorum. As a result, the work of art is seen less as an
object than as reflecting a certain process or activity or judgment. (39)
Consequently, "knowledge of the literary text can only be practical, since the interpretive
practice of reading requires the same acts of discrimination, the same judgments of
decorum, as does the author's practice of writing" (39). For the humanists, then, literary
texts - and these included primarily poetry and drama, dialogues, and texts such as
Philip Sydney's "Defense of Poesy" - were considered appropriate rhetorical activities
that could lead individuals to right action in the realm of human affairs. 1 3 2 Bacon's New
Atlantis follows in this tradition and is intended to lead both the king and fellow citizens

to the right action of embracing natural philosophy.
Civic humanism during the Renaissance was nowhere more fully developed than
in England of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and texts such as Thomas Elyot' s
Boke Named the Gouvernour and Thomas More's Utopia, were critical elements in the

transmission of humanist values. Although they are generically very different-The Boke
Named the Gouvernour is an advice book to rulers while Utopia is a detailed description

of the life and habits of the citizens of a fictional island-both texts are concerned with
1 3 2 This

understanding of reading as a deliberative and/or prudential act helps to elucidate the power of the
"book of nature" metaphor that was prominent in the discourse of early modem natural philosophers.
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the proper way to organize and govern society. Such texts, as Kahn has suggested,
perform an essentially rhetorical function, in that the act of reading was seen as a
deliberative and prudential act. 1 33 More's Utopia, for example, acted as a critique of
various social ills, and offered as a solution a highly-structured communal society whose
laws and customs were founded upon Christian and humanist values. Like his fellow
humanists, Bacon was interested in improving society, and his New Atlantis, which is
clearly a response to More's Utopia, offers the very different view of how to accomplish
that goal. Both More's Utopia and Bensalem of Bacon's New Atlantis are island societies,
discovered by sailors lost at sea. More imagines a communal society in which power is
diffused because its leaders are drawn from the general population and serve for limited
terms. In Bacon's ideal society, the leaders are philosophers who are dedicated to the
"proficiency and advancement" of knowledge as a means of improving their society. 1 34
The social institutions in Utopia are based on humanist ethical principles; in The New
Atlantis, ethical principles are derived from natural philosophy, and the preeminent social
institution is a philosophical society. In Bensalem, nature is not only the source of
material benefits, but serves a normative function as the source of knowledge from which
serves as a basis for an ethical system. Bacon's blending of Stoic concepts with
humanistic values.
The century between the publication of these two texts comprised a critical time
in the declining trajectory of rhetoric as an architectonic epistemological art. As Kahn
133 While More's Utopia was not the first text to present the image of an ideal soceity, it has come to
represent all such literature. See Paul Salzman, "Narrative Contexts for New Atlantis" for a discussion of
the series of narratives touched off by Bacon's response to More. See also Elizabeth Dickinson Blodgett,
"'The New Atlantis' and Campanella's ' Civitas Solis "' and Timothy J. Reiss, "Structure and Mind in Two
Seventeenth-Century Utopias: Campanella and Bacon" for examinations of Bacon's work to another
contemporary piece of Utopian literature. See also Denise Albanese, "The New Atlantis and the Uses of
Utopia."
1 34
The leaders of Bacon's Bensalem are more reminiscent of the philosopher-kings of Plato's Republic.
An essential difference between More's Utopia and The New Atlantis is that More assumes that society's
resources are limited and guards against discord by leveling class and monetary distinctions; Bacon
suggests that the new philosophy will reduce discord because it creates and abundance of materials goods.
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and Stillman have suggested, by the early part of the seventeenth century there is
considerably less confidence in the power of language to produce the right action that is
required to make a good society than More would have felt. Because the integrity of
humanist rhetoric was secured by the concept of the vir bonus, one might assume that
with the decline of rhetoric the importance of the vir bonus within society might also
have declined. However, the part played by such individuals within these two narratives
suggests that such is not the case. If anything, the wise individual is even more important
in Bacon's New Atlantis than in More's Utopia. Moreover, Bacon's act of producing the
text of the New Atlantis suggests that he did not consider the persuasive power of texts to
have been completely lost. 1 3 5 What is clear, however, in Bacon's new society is that
eloquence persists, but rhetoric has lost its epistemological primacy to a variety of other
arts.
Solomon as Rhetorical Trope
Of all the wise men in history, Bacon most admired Solomon of whom he said:
[I]n the person of Salomon the king, we see the gift or endowment of
wisdom and learning, both in Salomon's petition and in God's assent
thereto, preferred before any other terrene or temporal felicity. By virtue
of which grant or donative of God, Salomon became enabled not only to
write those excellent parables or aphorisms concerning divine and moral
philosophy, but also to compile a natural history of all verdure, from the
cedar upon the mountain to the moss upon the wall, ( which is but a
rudiment between putrefaction and an herb), and also of all things that
1 3 5 See Sarah Hutton, "Persuasion to Science: Baconian Rhetoric and the New Atlantis." Hutton argues that
Bacon follows Sydney in believing that poetic, or imaginative texts, have greater persuasive power than
histories. She also discusses Bacon's ideas regarding the impact of figurative language and metaphor.
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breathe and move. Nay, the same Salomon the king, although he excelled
in the glory of treasure and magnificent buildings, of shipping and
navigation, of service and attendance, of fame and renown and the like,
yet he maketh no claim to any of these glories, but only to the glory of the
inquisition of truth. (Advancement, PW 246-7).
It is not difficult to identify what Bacon admired about Solomon. The use of aphoristic
reasoning, the emphasis on natural history, and the comprehensive nature of Solomon's
interests -divine, moral, and natural philosophy-are all things that Bacon himself
attempted. However, Bacon also exploited the Solomonic ideal of the wise king in his
attempt to persuade James I to help establish the kind of institution he proposed in the
various texts of the lnstauratio Magna.
In the opening pages of The Advancement ofLearning, Bacon praises James's
eloquence and wisdom. 1 3 6 He compares James to Solomon, praising him for his God
given ability "to compass and comprehend the greatest matters, and nevertheless to touch
and apprehend the least" (PW 42). Bacon's purpose for the Advancement ofLearning was
to provide for James a description of the excellency of learning and knowledge, a
description of the current status of knowledge, and his prescription for its advancement.
He hoped that his work would "excite [James's] . . . to visit the excellent treasures of
[his] mind, and thence to extract particulars for this purpose agreeable to [his]
magnanimity and wisdom" (PW 43). Bacon repeats this comparison in the Epistle
Dedicatory to the Great Instauration . "you who resemble Solomon iD: so many things in the gravity of your judgment, in the peacefulness of your reign, in the largeness of your
heart, to the noble variety of books you have composed" (PW 242).
1 36

See Sharon Achinstein, "How to Be a Progressive Without Looking Like One: History and Knowledge
in Bacon's New Atlantis." Achinstein argues that Bacon's project is, in fact, intended to enhance the power
of the monarch. See also David Colclough's "Ethics and Politics in the New Atlantis," and Simon
Wortham, "Censorship and the Institution of Knowledge in Bacon's New Atlantis."
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This flattery of James is not mere sycophancy, however, but is intended to urge
James to support Bacon's educational reforms and Great Instauration in substantial
material ways. In the Epistle Dedicatory, Bacon asks that James follow Solomon's
example in
taking order for the collecting and perfecting of a Natural and
Experimental History true and severe (unencumbered with literature and
book-learning), such as philosophy may be built upon - such, in fact, as I
shall in its proper place describe; that so at length, after the lapse of so
many ages, philosophy and the sciences may no longer float in air, but rest
on the solid foundation of experience of every kind, and the same well
examined and weighed. I have provided the machine, but the rest must be
gathered from nature. (PW 242).
Bacon was not asking merely for James's encouragement; in fact, he hoped that James
would provide resources to endow institutions in which the research for this natural and
experimental history would occur. In the Advancement ofLearning, Bacon identifies
three "objects" involved in learning: places, books, and persons (PW 75). Regarding
books, he was concerned with the institution of libraries for assembling the works of
ancient authors and with commissioning the production of new and more accurate
translations of these authors (75).
There are four items to be considered regarding the places of learning:
"foundations and buildings, endowments with revenues, endowments with franchises and
privileges, institutions and ordinances for government; all tending to quietness and
privateness of life, and discharge of cares and troubles" (P W 76). Bacon was concerned
that the colleges and universities of Europe were primarily places for professional
education and argued that institutions dedicated to the arts and sciences were needed. He
argued for institutions that were devoted to philosophical pursuits as a way of building up
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knowledge to form a better foundation for philosophical education. He also sought to
reform faculty compensation, arguing that the most competent teachers must be
adequately compensated. Bacon also sought to encourage "men to sell their books and
build furnaces" (PW 77). He wanted to build on the growing trend of experimental
philosophy and sought means of providing the instruments for that work. Finally, he was
concerned with the governance of educational institutions, particularly regarding
curriculum and communication between and among institutions (PW 77-79). Bacon
demonstrates the kind of institution he hopes James will establish in The New Atlantis.
In establishing Solomon as the model for King Salomona and Solomon's learning
as model for the intellectual activity undertaken there, Bacon manages to reconcile
Christian tradition with the new practice of natural philosophy. Moreover, although the
kind of natural philosophy he describes bears significant similarities with Stoic
philosophy, he places it neatly within a Christian context. In addition, in describing a
natural philosophy that is both theoretical and practical, he reconciles the conflict
between the vita contemplativa and vita activa. The Fathers of the House of Salomon
represent the kind of practice and institutions that will bring Bacon's Great Instauration
to fruition.
The apothegm that appears at the beginning of Bacon's Great Instauration is an
almost perfect emblem of the role the wise individual ought to play in society. The wise
individual reasons, i.e., applies method to observation in order to form generalized
judgments. However, j udgment , or making knowledge, is not sufficient in Bacon's
conceptualization. The wise individual is also required to communicate that knowledge
for the "interest of present and future generations." This combination of reason,
judgment, and utility is the essence of Bacon's attempt to reconcile the contemplative life
of medieval scholasticism with the active life of Renaissance humanism. However, the
basic conflict between the active and contemplative life was rooted in epistemological
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inconsistencies, the conflict between scholastic dialectic and humanist rhetoric, between
received theology and the contradictory discoveries of natural philosophers. Stoic
philosophy provided a means to mediate these conflict.
By the the time Francis Bacon was writing during the late Renaissance, a variety
of epistemological activities were jostling against one another. Christian theology was
secured by the revealed word of God, while scholasticism privileged the art of dialectic,
which relied on the philosophical universals of syllogistic reasoning. Humanists, on the
other hand, valued ancient texts and privileged the art of rhetoric for its utility in the
contingent realm of human government. Renaissance humanism was concerned with the
production of a normative subject, the vir bonus peritus dicendi (the good man speaking
well). However, the values to which the Renaissance humanist conformed were not
logically derived from nature, but from various texts and cultural institutions. In large
part, recovered ancient texts led to the focus natural philosophy, which in turn challenged
long-held ideas about the place of human beings in the natural world. Resulting
technological advances not only changed the physical culture, but enlarged the known
world. Stoic philosophy provided a way to reconcile many of these conflicts. Stoic
naturalism provided a way to reconcile the conflicts between traditional Christianity and
natural philosophy. The concept of the Sage, the wise individual, was also useful. While
Renaissance humanism was concerned with the production of a normative subject, the vir
bonus dicendi peritus (the good man speaking well), the values to which the Renaissance

humanist conformed were not logically derived from nature. Stoic philosophically
provided a foundation for objectively applying inductive logic to the study of God's
natural creation in order to garner benefits for humankind. However, Bacon lived in a
humanist age, in which virtue was allied with character. Thus, throughout the Great
Instauration, Bacon illustrates the humanist values with human exemplars. and situates
his new philosophy within humanist educational and religious institutions. In sum,
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Bacon's new philosophy embeds significant aspects of Stoicism - its belief in Nature as
normative and certain epistemological beliefs - within a Christian and humanist matrix.
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CONCLUSION

For man is but the servant and interpreter of nature; what he does and what
he knows is only what he has observed of nature's order in fact or in
thought; beyond this he knows nothing and can do nothing. For the chain
of causes cannot by any force be loosed or broken, nor can nature be
commanded except by being obeyed. And so these twin objects, human
Knowledge and human Power, do really meet in one.
-Francis Bacon 1 3 7

Bacon at last, a mighty Man arose,
Whom a wise King and Nature chose,
Lord Chancellor of both their Laws,
And boldly undertook the injured pupil's caus . . . .
Like some old Giants more Gigantic Ghost,
To terrify the Learned Rout,
With the plain Magique of true Reasons Light,
He chac'd out of our flight,
Nor suffer'd Living Men to be misled,
By the vain shadows of the Dead;
To graves from which it rose the conquer'd Phantome fled;
He broke that Monstrous God which stood . . . .
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The Orchard's open now, and free,
Bacon has broke that Scare-crow Dietie;
Come, enter all that will,
Behold the ripen'd fruit come gather now your Fill;
Yet still, methinks, we fain would be
Catching at the Forbidden Tree,
We would be like the Deitie
When Truth and Falshood, Good and Evil, we
Without the Sences aid within ourselves would see;
For 'tis God only who can find,
All Nature in his Mind.. . . .
From Words, which are but the Pictures of the Thought,
(Though we our Thoughts from them perversely drew)
To Things, the Minds right Object, he it brought,
Like foolish Birds, to painted Grapes we flew;
He sought and gather'd for our use the True;
And when on heaps the chosen Bunches lay,
He prest them wisely the Mechanic way,
Till all their juyce did in one Vessel joyn,
Ferment into a nourishment Divine,
The thirsty Souls refreshing Wine. . . . .
Bacon, like Moses, let us forth at last,
The barren Wilderness he past,
Did on the very Border stand,
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Of the blest promis'd Land,
And from the Mountain Top of his Exalted Wit,
Saw it himself, and shew' d us it.
-Abraham Cowley 1 3 8

The Renaissance was an age during which almost all foundations of cultural
certainty were undercut. The Protestant Reformation questioned the authority of Catholic
Church. New forms of government, new types of economic activity, and a resultant social
mobility upended the stable, hierarchical social order. Discoveries of new lands, new
technological inventions, and new ways of seeing the natural world led to new ways of
understanding the relationship between human beings and the world. The humanist' s
recovery of a variety of ancient texts injected a host of new ideas that challenged both the
stultified logic of the scholastics and the contingent art of humanist rhetoric. The
abandonment of Latin, the lingua franca, for the common vernacular languagues
constituted an almost Babel-like confounding of the epistemological status quo. It was a
time of intense cultural anxiety, but also a time of tremendous opportunity for new
intellectual projects. It is, perhaps, no surprise that modern science would have its
beginning during this period. Given the tremendous variety of ideas jostling against one
another, it is appropriate to examine the ways in which the "new" natural philosophy
achieved the kind of epistemological supremacy it now holds. Francis Bacon has long
been recognized as one of the fathers of the scientific revolution, although it is clear that
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his contribution is not consistent with that of many others such as Galileo's experiments
view of the heliocentric universe or Robert Boyle's experiments with air pressure.
Historians of science such as Alexandre Koyre have suggested that the idea that Bacon
was a scientist is a joke. Others have suggested that his contribution was merely as the
father of a plain style of discourse more suitable to scientific communication than the
ornate style of Renaissance rhetoric.
To assign Francis Bacon to the scrap heap of the scientific revolution or to limit
his contribution to the invention of the plain style is to ignore the real impact of his
philosophical works during the years subsequent to his death. While Bacon's rather
peculiar philosophical method was never successfully implemented, even, so far as we
know, by Bacon himself, his emphasis on the compilation of an exhaustive natural
history as a foundation for practical, experimental science was taken seriously by a
number of his near-contemporaries. Nevertheless, Bacon's contribution to the
development of modern science was important. His role was that of an apologist for
natural philosophy who used his considerable rhetorical skills to make a case for the
acceptance of ideas and practices that were radically at odds with those of his
contemporaries. Bacon's contributions to the changes that have been called the scientific
revolution are both epistemological and institutional. First, he made the case for a view of
nature as a rational and orderly creation the workings of which could be understood and
manipulated by human beings. Second, he argued that natural philosophy was the
appropriate foundation for all intellectual endeavors. Finally, he made the case for the
establishment of institutions to support the work of natural philosophers. As an apologist
for the new philosophy, Bacon drew from ancient philosophies, particularly Stoicism,
using both the rhetorical skills and the cultural values of his humanist context.
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The Stoic Humanism of Bacon's New Philosophy

The philosophy of the Stoics, a synthesis of a variety of ancient philosophies, was
a comprehensive system based upon the notion that the whole of the universe is the
embodiment of reason. As such, it is ultimately perceptible by human beings who share
in its rationality. For the Stoics, the ultimate good was to study nature and to conform to
its rationality. They believed that physics, the study of nature, was the most important
branch of philosophy and should form the basis for their logic and moral philosophies. It
was a philosophy that valued the inward life of contemplation and meditation.
Renaissance humanism privileged rhetoric as an architectonic art in a world of shifting
values and valued the active life of service to one's community. Bacon's new "active
science" combined both Stoicism' s emphasis on natural philosophy with the humanist
desire to better the human condition.
The passage from the Plan of the Work from Bacon's Instauratio magno is
emblematic of his blending of Stoicism and humanism. His representation of humankind
as the "servant and interpreter of nature" is derived from the Stoic notion of submission
to the rationality of nature, but is also compatible with the Christian notion of submission
to the will of God. Human knowledge is limited to what can be observed in nature using
the rational faculty that defines human nature. The "chain of causes" to which Bacon
· refers is more consonant with the Stoic notion of cause and effect than with the
Aristotelian concept of the four causes. Bacon is not willing, however, to accept the
fatalism that is part of Stoic philosphy. His humanistic sense of service to society is too
strong. He intends not merely to study nature, but to reap its benefits for his fellow
beings, recognizing, however, that nature cannot "be commanded except by being
obeyed." Thus, in Bacon's philosophy, "human Kno'wledge and human Power, do really
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meet in one." The humanistic impulse toward bettering society transforms Stoic
knowledge of nature into power over the natural world.

Natural History
The most successful element of Bacon's program for human learning is the notion
that a thorough gathering of particulars was necessary before deriving general principles.
Bacon draws from Stoic epistemology. In the division of the disciplines in Bacon's
Advancement ofLearning, Bacon organizes the "parts of human learning" according to
the psychological faculties of memory, reason, and imagination. He allots history to the
memory, philosophy to reason, and poesy to the imagination (PW 79). Each major
division of studies, i.e., natural, civil, ecclesiastical, or literary, is subdivided into
according to these parts. In all cases, history is the foundation upon which the other parts
are founded. The notion that a comprehensive natural history is a necessary beginning for
natural philosophy is Bacon's most tangible contribution to the practice of early modern
natural philosophy. Among the early examples of texts which followed Bacon's
description of a natural history was Joshua Childrey's Britannica Baconia: Or, the
Natural! Rarities ofEngland, Scotland, and Wales in 1 661 . In 1662, John Graunt and
William Petty published Natural and Political Observations . . . Made Upon the Bills of
Mortality, and in 1 665 London 's Dreadful Visitation, a collection of the Bills of Mortality
for the year 1 664. Among the most articulate and effective adherents to Bacon's belief in
the need for a comprehensive natural history were John Wilkins, founder of the Royal
Society, and Robert Hooke.
In addition to being the leading light in the founding of the Royal Society, John
Wilkins is best known for his attempts to establish a universal language, which he
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describes in his Essay towards a Real Character, and a Philosophical Language,
published in 1 668. Wilkins follows Bacon's pattern of gathering the largest possible
particular instances from which to infer generalities. Wilki11:s makes a distinction between
being and knowing as they are related to the development of a metaphysics: "The
particulars are .first in the order of Being, yet Generals are first in the order of Knowing.
Now the proper end and design of Metaphysic should be to enumerate and explain those
more general terms, which by reason of their Universality and Comprehensiveness, are
above all those heads of things styled Predicaments, or else common to several of them . .
.. " (24). Wilkins' attempt to develop a universal language are not merely an attempt to
develop a simplified language, but are part of the kind of a comprehensive program that
had implications not merely for institutionalized science, but for society as a whole.
Robert Hooke was first employed by the fellows of the Royal Society in 1 662 as
Curator of Experiments, but was not elected a fellow until 1 665. In 1 677, he became one
of the Secretaries of the Society. He was a professor of Geometry at Gresham College,
Oxford, and is perhaps best known as author of Micrographia, in which he documented
the results of his examination of bodies, great and small, terrestrial and astronomical,
using a magnifying lens. He was also author of a text on natural philosophy : A General
Scheme, or Idea ofthe Present State o/Natural Philosophy. The extended subtitle of this
text indicates that the remediation of its defects should include experimentation as well as
"collecting observations" in order to compile "a natural history as the solid basis for the
superstructure of true philosophy" (Posthumous Works). Hooke's Natural Philosophy
closely follows Bacon's plan in its early stages. While Bacon calls his method as the
Novum Organum, Hooke sets out to develop a "True Method of Building a Solid
Philosophy or of a Philosophical Algebra" (7). He divides the project into three parts:
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1 st, An Examination of the Constitution and Powers of the Soul, or an
Attempt of Disclosing the Soul to it self, being an Endeavour of
Discovering the Perfections and Imperfections of Humane Nature, and
finding out ways and means for the attaining of the one, and the helping of
the other;
2ndly, A Method of making use of, or employing these Means and
Assistances of Humane Nature for collecting the Phenomena of Nature,
and for compiling of a Philosophical History, consisting of an exact
description of all forms of Natural and Artificial Operations, or a Method
of making Experiments and Observations for the Prosecution and
Examination of any Philosophical Inquiry.
3rdly, A Method of describing, registering, and ranging these
Particulars so collected, as that they may become the most adapted
Materials for the raising of Axioms and the Perfecting of Natural
Philosophy. (7-8)
Hooke's natural philosophy both adheres to and extends Bacon's work in significant
ways. His defects of the soul are effectively a recounting of Bacon's Idols of the M ind,
but he is much more specific regarding the "perfections." His experimental methods go
far beyond Bacon's tables for induction. Clearly, however, he is a true _disciple of Francis
Bacon and adopts his belief in a normative natural philosophy.

The Father of the Royal Society

What is perhaps Bacon's most important contribution to the development of
modern science is the notion that the state should establish and support an institution to
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support the advancement of natural philosophy. The House of Salomon in the New
Atlantis is an example of a collegial philosophical institution that he describes in the
Advancement ofLearning, which served as a model for the institution of the British
Royal Society. Bacon died in 1 626 and the Royal Society was not established until 1 662,
so that he was not directly involved in the establishment the institution. However, the
notion that an experimental society ought to be an officially recognized and supported
part of national culture is clearly consistent with Bacon's plan. The establishment of the
Royal Society and its early history led to a number of conflicts, but the question of
whether a society to explore natural philosophy ought even to exist was no longer an
issue. 1 3 9
At the beginning of the second book of The Advancement ofLearning, Bacon
suggests that James I should be concerned, not only with leaving behind heirs to the
throne, but to "be conversant not only in the transitory parts of good government, but in
those acts which also are in their nature permanent and perpetual" (PW 15). The most
appropriate of these acts, in Bacon's view, is to "[endow] the world with sound and
fruitful knowledge" (76). The works related to learning had three foci: "the places of
learning, the books of learning, and the persons of the learned" (75). Like water, which is
wasted unless it is "collected into some receptacle where it may by union and comfort
and sustain itself' (75) the
excellent liquor of knowledge, whether it descend from divine inspiration
or spring from human sense, would soon perish and vanish to oblivion if it
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were not preserved in books, traditions, conferences, and places appointed,
as universities, colleges, and schools, for the receipt and comforting of the
same. (75-76).
The House of Salomon in the New Atlantis represents the kind of intellectual institution
Bacon describes in Advancement ofLearning. Its fellows, who are among the society's
most revered and wealthy members, engaged in both theoretical and applied studies, and
gathered knowledge, theories, and inventions from all parts of the intellectual globe. It is
also, according to Joseph Glanvill, the model for the British Royal Society: "Salomon' s
House in the NEW ATLANTIS was a Prophetick Scheam of the ROYAL SOCIETY"
(65).
The notion of an intellectual fraternity engaged in the study of natural philosophy
was, like many of his ideas, not original to Bacon. 140 The earliest of these societies was
the Italian Academie Lincei (the Academy of the Lynx), founded in 1 603 by the
nobleman Francesco Cesi, whose most famous member was Galileo Galilei. The
Accademie Fran�ais, founded by Cardinal Richelieu, also predated the Royal Society, but
pursued a theoretical rather than experimental approach. According to its first historian
Thomas Sprat, the small group of individuals who formed the core of the Royal Society
first began meeting "some space after the end of the Civil Wars" (53) in John Wilkins
lodgings at Wadham College, Oxford, where they continued intermittently until about
1 658. The group reconstituted itself in 1 660 and was incorporated by Charles II as the
Royal Society in 1 662.
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The significance of Francis Bacon to the Royal Society is apparent in the
frontispiece of Thomas Sprat's History ofthe Royal Society, in which Bacon is pictured
along with Charles II and Lord Brouncker, who was president of the Royal Society.
Bacon's influence is also celebrated in Abraham's Cowley's ode "To the Royal Society,"
which is reproduced at the beginning of Thomas Sprat's history. Cowley not only adopts
Bacon's metaphor of knowledge as a sweet liquid which must be gathered and preserved,
but also argues that previous generations had limited philosophy to the study of discourse
when its true province should be the study of nature. Bacon, "like Moses" had led
humankind from the captivity of ancient philosophy, but never entered the promised land.
Exploration of that land was left to the Fellows of the Royal Society. Bacon's influence is
also apparent in Sprat's history of philosophy in the goals of the Royal Society as they
are articulated by Sprat in his history.
Their purpose is, in short, to make faithful Records of all the Works of
Nature, or Art, which can come within their reach; that so the present Age,
and posterity, may be able to put a mark on the Errors which have been
strengthened by long prescriptions, to restore the Truths, that have lain
neglected; to push on those, which are already known, to more various
uses: and to make the way more passable, to what remains unreveal'd.
This is the compass of their Design. And to accomplish this, they have
indeavor'd, to separate the knowledge of Nature, from the colours of
Rhetorick, the devices of Fancy, or the delightful deceit of Fables. (6 1-63)
They recommended similar reforms to the curriculum and advocated the remedy the error
that "Seats of Knowledge have been for the most part heretofore, not Laboratories as they
ought to be, but onely Scholes, where some have taught, and all the rest subscrib'd" (68).
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They also invited scholars from various professions and from different parts of Europe.
Finally, what distinguished the Royal Society most particularly was its emphasis on
experimental philosophy and the method by which they carried it out. According to Sprat,
two things governed their experiments. First, they prescribed no particular "art of
Experimenting" but kept themselves free to adapt their methods to "different
circumstances, that occur to them in their operations; and the several alterations of the
Bodies on which they work" (89). Further, they determined to "regard the least, and the
plainest of things, and those that may appear at first the most inconsiderable" (90),
reasoning that their predecessors had erred in collecting only extraordinary examples of
the qualities of matter. Like Bacon, they believed a true and accurate natural history was
an essential foundation upon which to build further knowledge.

***
In Leviathan and the Air Pump, Shaffer and Shapin examine a controversy
between the political philosopher Thomas Hobbes and Robert Boyle, one of the early
members of the Royal Society and author of a series of experiments utilizing his
invention, the air pump, to investigate a variety of questions about that most ubiquitous
material, the answers to which ·we now take for granted. A consequence of the
controversy that that is of greatest interest to Shaffer and Shapin is that Hobbes, who was
a member of the Royal Society and was known in his day as an accomplished natural
philosopher, is now remembered almost exclusively for his political writings. Hobbes had
been, in fact, "virtually written out of the history of science" by the end of the eighteenth
century (8). Shaffer and Shapin conclude that Hobbes' s disappearance from the history of
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science is not necessarily a result of his ideas being inherently wrong, but reflects a
fundamental difference in what counts as scientific knowledge: "which propositions were
to be counted as meaningful and which absurd, which problems were soluble and which
not, how various grades of certainty were to be distributed among intellectual items,
where the boundaries of authentic knowledge were to be drawn" (332). They argue that
the Hobbes-Boyle controversy represents a conflict; it is not merely a scientific debate,
but a serious disagreement about how and where science ought to be performed. It
illustrates their contention that "there is a conditional relationship between between the
nature of the polity occupied by scientific intellectuals and the nature of the wider polity"
(3 32). The disappearance of Hobbes from the history of science suggests that the
experimental form of philosophy championed by Bacon had clearly triumphed.
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, there is no question that the polity
occupied by scientific intellectuals was a precarious space, indeed. Early modem natural
philosophers, in many cases, practiced at their own risk within a larger polity which was,
itself, plagued by uncertainties. The so-called scientific revolution was only possible
because a place was opened within that wider polity for it to occur. By skillfully blending
the Stoic attitude of normative nature with the Christian concept of nature as a second
divine text within the context of civic humanism, Francis Bacon helped to authorize the
pursuit of experimental natural philosophy. Though his scientific method per se

was

never practiced, his contributions as an apologist for the development of early modem
science are beyond question. "
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